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Abstract 
Sign and Zeit: Deconstruction and the Medieval Text creates a dialogue between 
deconstruction and medieval literature, which have traditionally been polarised 
as opposite modes of thought. In this thesis, I deconstruct the conservative 
viewpoint which regards medieval thought as a prime representative of 
logocentrism, and which conceives of medieval thought and deconstruction as 
binary opposites existing in a relation which is similar to other oppositions: 
old /new, outdated /fashionable, reactionary /radical, theocentric /objective, etc. 
This thesis challenges the fundamental opposition between deconstruction and 
medieval thought, which is constructed on oppositions which are themselves 
grounded in logocentrism. It begins with the assumption that the sphere of 
Western culture demarcated by Derrida may possess temporal as well as 
geographical boundaries. 
Chapter One lays the foundation for later discussions of the ontological theory of 
signs, while introducing the question whch is central to this thesis, the 
opposition of speech and writing. Through a reading of Aristotle's De Anima, I 
argue that the opposition of speech and writing in Of Grammatology actually 
masks a more fundamental opposition between Being and Becoming. Chapter 
Two returns again to the question of speech and writing, using Augustine's 
Confessions as the central text. Chapter Three contains a discussion of a radically 
different expression of medieval Christian thought, the negative theology of 
Pseudo -Dionysius. This chapter focuses on the act of speaking, on the effort to 
speak what is fundamentally inexpressible, and on Derrida's question of how to 
avoid speaking in order to say nothing, or in the case of negative theologians, 
how not to speak so that everything can be expressed. Chapter Four moves to a 
later theory of representation developed by Bonaventure. In this chapter, I 
interrogate the images of the book, the mirror, and the trace. Chapter Five 
explores the concepts of allegorical representation and the death of he author in 
Dante's works. Chapter Six investigates the relation between time and space, 
using Dante's Paradiso as the focal point in this discussion of the circularity of 
time. Chapter Seven attempts to bring together the fundamental concepts 
addressed throughout this thesis and to interpret them, based not on a work 
from the Middle Ages, but on Derrida's autobiography. In this chapter, my 
process of deconstruction and my reduction of the opposition between speech 
and writing becomes complete, ending in a circular model of time in which 
reading the past allows us to more wisely write the future. 
Vl 
Introduction 
". . ." -- Cratylus 
The very question which is central for this introduction and for this thesis 
can only be asked ironically: Is there a Derridean deconstruction, a 
deconstruction which belongs to Derrida, which is untouched and 
untouchable by the literary critics and numerous scholars from other fields 
who create permutations of deconstruction. When we discuss 
deconstruction, where can we begin? Where can we comfortably place our 
point of origin, in a place where it will not be immediately displaced? In one 
work of Derrida, in all the works on which Derrida has placed or added his 
own signature? On one work or all the works in which others have signed or 
assigned the name of Derrida across countless pages? 
This thesis will aim to explore the relationship between deconstruction 
and medieval literature, which have traditionally been polarised as opposite 
modes of thought. A conservative viewpoint would regard medieval 
thought as a prime representation of logocentrism, the ideology which 
Derrida deconstructs. It would conceive of medieval thought and 
deconstruction as binary opposites existing in a relation which is similar to 
other oppositions: old/ new, outdated/ fashionable, reactionary/ radical, 
theocentric/ objective, etc. I propose to challenge the fundamental opposition 
between deconstruction and medieval thought, which is constructed on 
oppositions which are themselves grounded in logocentrism. 
This thesis must begin by announcing its own limitation. My aim is to 
discuss deconstruction and not to summarise it. Therefore, I must limit my 
discussion to specific topics involving deconstruction, and to certain works 
which are representative of only a part and not the totality of Derrida's work. 
Any attempt to give a brief summary of Derrida's work must begin with the 
knowledge that such an attempt is impossible due to the size of his corpus 
and the number of topics he has covered. Therefore, I will try to limit my 
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discussion to those works and issues which have heavily influenced literary 
criticism, concentrating on his early work in Of Grammatology. What 
follows is not a summary of deconstruction nor of Of Grammatology but an 
identification of the key issues within deconstruction which will be 
addressed by this thesis. 
Of Grammatology has been cited as the work which revolutionised 
literary criticism. In the plethora of texts which Derrida has produced, Of 
Grammatology stands out among critics as a kind of centre around which 
deconstructive criticism has evolved. Even though it is representative of 
early Derridean thought, I have chosen to centralise it as the key Derridean 
text precisely because of its influence on literary criticism. In O f 
Grammatology, Derrida renames Western metaphysics as logocentrism and 
proceeds to demonstrate how this logocentrism contradicts and overturns 
itself. In the Exergue, Derrida defines logocentrism as "métaphysique de 
l'écriture phonétique" 1 [ "the metaphysics of phonetic writing. "]2 H e 
associates logocentrism not merely with Western metaphysics, but with the 
ethnocentrism of Western metaphysics and Western culture in general. 
Logocentrism is essentially ethnocentrism, and the phoneticisation of writing 
represents the essence of this ethnocentrism. Derrida locates examples of the 
logocentrism of phonetic writing in Rousseau and Hegel. In Essai sur 
l'origine des langues, Rousseau places the modes of writing on an 
evolutionary scale in which Western phonetic writing sits at the highest 
point of development. The other modes of writing, such as ideogrammatic 
writing, are attributed to savages and barbarians. Hegel, similarly, declares in 
the Enzyklopädie that alphabetic script is the most intelligent. It is this 
'De la grammatologie, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit), 1967, p 11. 
20f Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Spivak, (Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press), 1976, p. 3. 
2 
imperialistic vein in the history of Western phonetic writing which leads 
Derrida to associate it with what he terms "l'ethnocentrisme le plus original 
et le plus puissant "3 [ "nothing but the most original and powerful 
ethnocentrism. u']4 
However, the ethnocentric character of the Western concept of writing 
is not, according to Derrida, the only problem with phonetic writing. Derrida 
associates phonetic writing with metaphor, metaphysics, and theology. He 
argues that this connection between phonetic writing and metaphysics/ 
theology leads to a system of thinking which is necessarily limiting and 
entrapping. Within a phonetic writing system lurks a false belief which 
determines the origin of truth to be the logos. He writes, "le langage lui - 
même s'en trouve menacé dans sa vie désemparé, désamarré de n'avoir plus 
de limites, renvoyé à sa propre finitude au moment même où ses limites 
sembler s'effacer, au moment même où il cesse d'être rassuré sur soi, contenu 
et bordé par le signifié infinit qui semblait l'exceder. "5 [ "language itself is 
menaced by its very life, helpless, adrift in the threat of limitlessness, brought 
back to its own finitude at the very moment when its limits seem to 
disappear, when it ceases to be self- assured, contained, and guaranteed by the 
infinite signified which seemed to exceed it. "]6 
The paradox which Derrida associates with phonetic writing involves 
the contradiction between the power of language to set limits and the limits 
already imposed on language through its existence in space -time. Derrida 
sees this temporal limitation as the limiter of Western imperialism: 
3 De la grammatologie, p. 11. 
40f Grammatology, p. 3. 
5De la grammatologie, p.15. 
60f Grammatology, p. 6. 
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Ce développement, joint à celui de l'ethnologie et de l'histoire de 
l'écriture, nous enseigne que l'écriture phonétique, milieu de la 
grande aventure métaphysique, scientifique, technique, 
economique de l'Occident, et limitée dans le temps et l'espace, se 
limite elle -même au moment précis où elle est en train d'imposer 
sa loi aux seules aires culturelles qui lui échappaient encore.? 
This development, coupled with that of anthropology and of the 
history of writing, teaches us that phonetic writing, the medium 
of the great metaphysical, scientific, technical, and economic 
adventure of the West, is limited in space and time and limits 
itself even as it is in the process of imposing its laws upon the 
cultural areas that had escaped it.8 
Recognising the danger of extending his critique to non -Western systems of 
thought, Derrida wisely draws a boundary between Western and non - 
Western thought, limiting himself as an expert in these areas and also 
limiting these systems of thought by designating them as separate, isolated, 
and unmixable. The limiter is phonetic writing, which serves as a boundary 
between what is familiar and decipherable and what is mysterious and 
unknowable. The project which Derrida undertakes in Of Grammatology is 
to overturn or deconstruct this theological -metaphysical writing system by 
demonstrating how it deconstructs itself. 
Derrida makes the issue of speech and writing the central one in Of 
Grammatology . He argues that in phonetic writing, in which writing aims to 
imitate speech through a representation of phonetic sounds, writing is 
regarded as secondary to speech. Speech is privileged as the medium through 
which true representation can be achieved via the physical presence of the 
speaker to the hearer. Writing is only valued insofar as it mimics speech 
through an accurate representation of phonetic sounds. The logocentric 
7De la grammatologie, p.21. 
80f Grammatology, p.10. 
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tradition depends on the exteriority of writing, writing as distant and 
displaced. Writing is associated with artifice, with the tool rather than the art 
itself. Derrida finds the roots of this degradation or repression of writing in 
Plato's Phaedrus: 
Cet accent commençait à se laisser entendre lorsque, au moment 
de nouer dejà dans la même possibilité l'epistème et le 
logos, le Phèdre dénonçait l'écriture comme intrusion de la 
technique artificieuse, effraction d'une espèce tout à fait originale, 
violence archétypique: irruption du dehors dans le dedans, 
entamant l'intériorité de l'âme, la présence vivante de l'âme à soi 
dans le logos vrai, l'assistance que se porte à elle -même la parole.9 
This tone began to make itself heard when, at the moment of 
already tying the episteme and the logos within the same 
possibility, the Phaedrus denounced writing as the intrusion of an 
artful technique, a forced entry of a totally original sort, an arche- 
typal violence: eruption of the outside within the inside, 
breaching into the interiority of the soul, the living self -- presence 
of the soul within the true logos, the help that speech lends to 
itself.lo 
The Platonic division between the sensible and the intelligible seeps into the 
difference between speaking and writing. The latter element is then reflected 
downwards. Derrida accuses the Western tradition of a degradation of 
writing through its association with the sensible: the body, matter, the 
physical world. 
Derrida makes us realise that writing is connected with life and death, 
relegated either to one or the other, but never empty. Writing is always filled 
with images of the absolute. As Derrida remarks on Rousseau's Origin of 
Languages, "L'écriture au sens courant est lettre morte, elle est porteuse de 
9De la grammatologie, p. 52. 
100f Grammatology, p.34. 
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mort. Elle éssoufle la vie." 11 [ "Writing in the common sense is the dead 
letter, it is the carrier of death. It exhausts life. "] 12 Logocentric writing cannot 
be empty. There is always meaning attached to the signifier -- images of life 
and death and the soul. We cannot conceive of a completely empty text. 
However, in filling the text we have imagined a writing in which life and 
death co -exist in a binary opposition which makes writing itself logocentric: 
Il y a donc une bonne et une mauvaise écriture: la bonne et 
naturelle, l'inscription divine dans le coeur et l'âme; la perverse 
et l'artificieuse, la technique, exilée dans l'exteriorité du corps. 
Modification tout intérieure du schéma platonicien; écriture de 
l'âme et écriture du corps, écriture de la conscience et écriture des 
passions, comme il y a une voix de l'âme, les passions et une voix 
du corps ... 13 
There is therefore a good and a bad writing: the good and natural 
is the divine inscription in the heart and the soul; the perverse 
and artful is technique, exiled in the exteriority of the body. A 
modification well within the Platonic diagram: writing of the soul 
and of the body, writing of conscience and of the passions, as there 
is a voice of the soul and a voice of the body.14 
By creating a binary opposition within writing itself, Derrida is able to counter 
the argument that many logocentric authors privilege writing as the divine 
medium. Such authors are therefore not, according to his argument, 
privileging writing itself, but a logocentric conception of it. When Derrida 
refers to writing, he means a writing which Western culture regards as 
exterior, human, and artifical, as opposed to a logocentric divine writing. In 
Chapter Four, I will examine Derrida's argument in further detail. 
11De la grammatologie, p. 29. 
12of Grammatology, p. 17. 
13De la grammatologie, p. 30. 
140f Grammatology, p. 18. 
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Derrida argues that the privileging of speech and the debasement of 
writing results from a desire for presence, which manifests itself in the 
following forms: 
1) presence of the thing to the sight (eidos); 
2) presence as substance/ essence/ existence (ousia); 
3) temporal presence as point (stigme) of the now of the moment (nun); 
4) the self -presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity. 
In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida describes this longing for presence: 
Pour que la possibilité de cette répétition puisse s'ouvrir idéaliter à 
l'infini, il faut qu'une forme idéale assure cette unité de 
l'indéfiniment et de l'idéaliter: c'est le présent ou plutôt la 
présence du présent vivant. La forme ultime de l'idéalite, celle 
dans laquelle en dernière instance on peut anticiper ou rappeler 
toute répétition, l'idéalite de l'idéalite est le présent vivant, la 
présence à soi de la vie transcendentale. La présence a toujours été 
et sera toujours, à l'infini, la forme dans laquelle, on peut le dire 
apodictiquement, se produira la diversité infinie des contenues. 
L'opposition -- inaugurale de la métaphysique -- entre forme et 
matière, trouve dans l'idéalite concrète du présent vivant son 
ultime et radicale justification.15 
In order that the possibility of this repetition may be open, ideally 
to infinity, one ideal form must assure this unity of the indefinite 
and the ideal: this is the present, or rather the presence of the 
living present. The ultimate form of ideality, the ideality of 
ideality, that in which the last instance one may anticipate or 
recall all repetition, is the living present, the self -presence of 
transcendental life. Presence has always been and will always, 
forever, be the form in which, we can say apodictically, the infinite 
diversity of contents is produced. The opposition between form 
and matter -- which inaugurates metaphysics -- finds in the 
15La viix et le phénomène: introduction au problème du signe dans la 
phenomenologoe de Husserl. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), 
pp 4 -5. 
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concrete reality of the living present its ultimate and radical 
justification.16 
Derrida locates the longing for presence at the very heart of logocentrism, at 
the debasement of writing, at the separation between form and matter. This 
very theological, very logocentric desire can only be exorcised by a constant 
referral to absence. When considered in the context of literary criticism, 
however, the desire for presence has come to mean not the desire for God or 
for the thing or for the now, but a desire for the presence of the author to her 
text or for an identifiable authorial voice within the text. 
Derrida argues that the time of the logos is a distinct, categorised period 
of time. He contains logocentrism within this period, which can be 
characterised by a debasement of writing. In defining the logocentric era, 
Derrida places temporal and spatial (geographical) limits around an ideology 
which may indeed be limitless. In the following passage from De la 
grammatologie, he characterises the era of logocentrism: 
L'époque du logos abaisse donc l'écriture pensée comme 
médiation de médiation et chute dans l'exteriorité du sens. A 
cette époque appartiendrait la différence entre signifié et 
signifiant, ou au moins l'étrange écart de leur "parallélisme ", et 
l'exteriorité, si extenuée soit -elle, de l'un à l'autre. . . La 
différence entre signifié et signifiant appartient de manière 
profonde et implicite à la totalité de la grande époque couverte 
par l'histoire de la métaphysique, de manière plus explicite et 
plus systematiquement articulée à l'époque plus étroite du 
créationnisme et de l'infinitisme chrétiens lorsqu'ils 
s'approprient les ressources de la conceptualité grecque.17 
The epoch of the logos thus debases writing considered as 
mediation of mediation and as a fall into the exteriority of 
meaning. To this epoch belongs the difference between signified 
16Speech and Phenomena: And other essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, 
trans. David B. Allison. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1973), p. 6. 
17De la grammatologie, p. 24. 
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and signifier, or at least the strange separation of their 
"parallelism, "and the exteriority, however extenuated, of the one 
to the other . . . The difference between signified and signifier 
belongs in a profound and implicit way to the totality of the great 
epoch covered by the history of metaphysics, and in a more 
explicit and more systematically articulated way to the narrower 
epoch of Christian creationism and infinitism when these 
appropriate the resources of Greek conceptuality.18 
The idea of the "fall" is contained in the definition of the sign as a 
composite of signifier and signified -- the signifier (the temporal component) 
belonging to the realm of exclusion and expulsion. The signified, "absolute 
intelligibility," on the other hand, is joined to the logos in a simulation of 
presence which joins the temporal to the divine. The idea of the sign as a 
composite of the signifier and the signified is, according to Derrida, the logical 
conclusion of a larger worldview originating with the Greeks which 
postulated a fundamental distinction between a real temporal realm and an 
ideal, perfect, and untouchable realm of sensibles. In Christian thought, the 
"real" world became associated with the Fall, the descent into hell in which 
the temporal world was designated as mankind's punishment for sin. Thus 
the intellectual history of the West is plagued by an image of itself as debased 
and fallen and by an unrealisable longing for its absent self. It is the hierarchy 
beneath this entrapping mode of thought which Derrida hopes to dismantle 
through deconstruction. 
Yet in describing the process of deconstruction, Derrida too finds 
himself entrapped by the notion of the Fall. He is aware of a certain danger 
inherent in deconstruction, the danger of returning to the point of origin -- 
that is, the falling back into old patterns of thought. He writes: 
A l'intérieure de la clôture, par un mouvement oblique et 
toujours périlleux, risquant sans cesse de retomber en -deçà de ce 
180f Grammatology, p. 13. 
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qu'il déconstruit, il faut entourer les concepts critiques d'un 
discours prudent et minutieux, marquer les conditions, le milieu 
et les limites de leur efficacité, designer rigouresement leur 
appartenance à la machine qu'ils permettent de déconstituer; et du 
même coup la faille par laquelle se laisse entrevoir, encore 
innommable, la lueur de l'outre- clôture.19 
Within the closure, by an oblique and always perilous movement, 
constantly risking falling back within what is being deconstructed, 
it is necessary to surround the critical concepts with a careful and 
thorough discourse -- to mark the conditions, the medium, and 
the limits of their effectiveness and to designate rigorously their 
intimate relationship to the machine whose deconstruction they 
permit; and, in the same process, designate the crevice through 
which the yet unnameable glimmer beyond the closure can be 
glimpsed.20 
In this description, Derrida relies on the images of inside and outside, the 
entrapping circle of logocentrism and the "yet unnameable glimmer" beyond. 
He draws an imaginary limit between the present what -is (logocentrism) and 
the ineffable "beyond the closure." Yet he is prevented from commenting 
any further on this yet unnameable. He also refers to the danger of "falling 
back within what is being deconstructed," suggesting that the illusiveness of 
what is being searched for opens up the danger of falling into what we know 
to be erroneous. We may almost call this passage prophetic, for Derrida has 
foreseen a future in which deconstruction will fall back into what it is trying 
to deconstruct. Derrida calls attention to the possibility that there is no 
possibility other than logocentrism, whether expressed in Platonic thought, in 
Judeo- Christian theology, or in a postmodern revolution which is 
continuously overturning itself. We should also be aware of another 
possibility: that deconstruction may assume a logocentric role in dominating 
Western thought, becoming not the neutral critical force, but the foundation 
19De la grammatologie, p. 25. 
200f Grammatology, p. 14. 
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which in turn must be deconstructed. One objective of this thesis will be to 




In an interview with Imre Saluzinsky, Derrida described what he 
achieved in Of Grammatology as "to some extent, a coherent vision of 
Western culture and its relation to speaking and writing. "21 However, any 
attempt to realise a great vision, such as gathering all of Western culture into 
one comprehensive category, creates the possibility that exceptions will arise 
which resist this categorisation. The question which inevitably appears in 
this discussion is, "What does one mean by Western culture ?" What are the 
geographical and temporal boundaries with which we define ourselves? Do 
we include in our geographical territory, for instance, Eastern Europe or the 
former or present colonial acquisitions of Western imperial powers? The 
question which will be central in this thesis is whether there should be 
temporal as well as geographical limits placed around what we designate as 
"Western." At what point does a self -critical examination of Western 
metaphysics assume the role of cultural imperialism? In this thesis, I will 
demonstrate how medieval philosophical texts may provide the exceptions to 
Derrida's model of Western culture, how they resist the structures which 
deconstruction has assigned them. My argument will involve a critique of 
logocentrism, the term which Derrida has used to describe Western 
metaphysics from Plato to the present. I will question the idea that the 
philosophical tradition is a history of logocentric wrong turns. 
Deconstruction maintains that so insidious is the influence of 
logocentrism that it has become, perhaps always was, language itself. And 
21Imre Saluzinsky, Criticism in Society, (NY and London: Methuen, 1987) 
pp.22 -3 
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any language that deconstruction uses only reaffirms logocentrism even as it 
exposes it. Geoffrey Hartman, commenting on the logocentric element 
present in the French philosophical tradition, writes: 
That wrong turn -- at once rhetorical and conceptual, which can be 
felt in Claudel's Augustinian style, so vocative in the void -- that 
wrong turn, Derrida claims, has been taken so often that it has left 
its mark, frayed its path, in language, and perhaps has become 
language itself. We cannot but follow it even when we realize its 
deception. It is indeed a lure; but unlike the lure, say, of fleshly 
love, its disabusement cannot lead to the idea of a more glorious 
body or a more perfect language. It leads to the method called by 
Derrida "deconstruction," which reveals that turn being taken, not 
only against the will of the author, since it is preinscribed in 
language, but also because any author who stands in that turn 
cannot express that experience, that impersonification, except by 
words that sound, willy -nilly, mystical, like a displaced or negative 
theology.22 
Although Derrida tends to focus his critique on post -medieval 
philosophy, medieval thinkers are assimilated into the category of 
logocentrism because Augustinian theory is regarded as one of the earliest 
and most crucial of the wrong turns, burying a path of wrong turns that came 
before, and paving the way for future wrong turns that they might add their 
signatures to the error. My intention is to disrupt the generalisations made by 
deconstructionists by focusing on texts which Derrida and the American 
deconstructionists have neglected to discuss, but which nevertheless make up 
part of the logocentric canon. 
Derrida and deconstructive critics have been accused of a deliberate 
ambiguity in their expositions of deconstruction. This claim certainly applies 
to logocentrism, which, while playing a key role in the enterprise of 
22Geoffrey Hartman, Saving the Text: Literature/ Derrida/ Philosophy, 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1981), pp 6 -7. 
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deconstructive criticism, is difficult to define. In this section, I will attempt to 
arrive at a definition of logocentrism and to explore some of the problems 
inherent in the term which might prevent us from reaching a clear 
understanding of its implications. John Ellis, in Against Deconstruction, 
demonstrates how ambiguous and shifty is the critic's idea of what 
"logocentrism" means by compiling a number of definitions written by 
leading deconstructive critics, which he describes as vague and inconsistent.23 
Among these are two from Jonathan Culler, which are quoted below. Culler 
writes, "[L]ogocentrism involves the belief that sounds are simply a 
representation of meanings which are present in the consciousness of the 
speaker. "24 The second quotation is more comprehensive and attempts to 
relate the above definition to the broader spectrum of metaphysics and 
ontotheology: "[The] 'phonocentrism' that treats writing as a representation 
of speech and puts speech in a direct and natural relationship with meaning 
is inextricably associated with the "logocentrism" of metaphysics, the 
orientation of philosophy toward an order of meaning - thought, truth, 
reason, logic, the Word - conceived as existing in itself, as foundation. "25 
This second statement associates the belief that speech is prior to writing with 
a belief in the divine Logos, although the associations are not explained, 
merely assumed. Ellis argues that the ambiguity with which defenders of 
deconstruction define the term serves as a defense against those who would 
argue against its validity: "At this juncture, there is a strong tendency for 
Derrida's advocates to object that a demand for clarity begs the question at 
23John Ellis, Against Deconstruction, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989) 
24Jonathan Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure, (Harmondsworth: Harvester, 1977), 
p. 119, quoted in Ellis, p. 31. 
25Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism, (Ithaca: 
Cornell, 1982), p. 92, quoted in Ellis, p. 31. 
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issue and violates the spirit of the deconstructive enterprise. "26 Ellis would 
attribute the ambiguity inherent in attempts to define logocentrism to weak 
scholarship, but there may be other possibilities, for instance the difficulty in 
accurately describing and categorising ideas when speaking about issues 
which concern reality and truth. 
I will begin with a working definition of logocentrism, which includes 
the following beliefs: 
1) There is a fixed relation between the signifier and the signified. 
2) Speech is prior to writing. Derrida argues that speech gives the 
speaker the illusion of presence, while writing, the mere token of speech, is 
secondary and repressed. 
3) There is a division and hierarchisation of the intelligible over the 
sensible. This primary binary opposition is linked to a host of false binary 
oppositions which have dominated our world view, including nature/ 
culture, mind/ body, etc. 
4) Words are mystified through their association with the Word of 
God, truth, reason, or idea, and through that most mysterious of words, logos. 
More specifically to the Middle Ages, logocentrism involves the formulation 
of an ontotheological theory of signs centred on the Logos, the Incarnation, or 
the Word of God. 
Derrida's philosophical vision is of a universe of discourse which is 
not organised, structured, or harnessed in any way except in the minds of 
human beings. He deals specifically with the way structure has been imposed 
by and on Western culture. The imposition of structure on the infinite play 
of discourse by metaphysicians involves the idea of a centre, an originary 
point of reference or the point of Creation, to use mythological terms: 
26Ellis, p. 33. 
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Neanmoins, jusqu'à l'événement que je voudrais répérer, la 
structure, ou plutôt la structuralité de la structure, bien qu'elle ait 
toujours été a l'oeuvre, s'est toujours trouvée neutralisée, reduite: 
par un geste qui consistait à lui donner un centre, à la rapporter à 
un point de présence, à une origine fixe. Ce centre avait pour 
fonction non seulement d'orienter et d'équilibrer, d'organiser la 
structure -- on ne peut en effet penser une structure inorganisée -- 
mais de faire surtout que le principe d'organisation de la 
structure limite ce que nous pourrions appeler le jeu de la 
structure. Sans doute le centre d'une structure, en orientant et en 
organisant la coherence du système, permet -il le jeu des éléments 
à l'interieur de la forme totale. Et aujourd'hui encore une 
structure privée de tout centre représente l'impensable lui - 
même.27 
Nevertheless, up to the event which I wish to mark out and 
define, structure -- or rather the structurality of structure -- 
although it has always been at work, has always been neutralized 
or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center of referring it 
to a point of presence, a fixed origin. The function of this center 
was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure -- one 
cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure -- but above 
all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure 
would limit what we might call the play of the structure. By 
orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the center 
of a structure permits the play of its elements inside the total 
form. And even today the notion of a structure lacking any center 
represents the unthinkable itself.28 
Deconstruction has shown us that not to question the origin is to perpetuate 
an illusion which will lead us nowhere except into Derrida's metaphorical 
abyss -- that is to say, to a continuing logocentrism which cannot be 
overturned. In the deconstructive universe, logocentrism hides a secret guilt 
-- it is the guilt that it has repressed (excluded) something. Laden with guilt, 
repressing everything, the discourse which it has invaded carries that same 
27 "La structure, le signe et le jeu dans la discourse des sciences humaines," in 
L'Ecriture et la différence, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1967), p. 409. 
28Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," 
in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, (London and Henley: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 278. 
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guilt and reaches throughout the course of Western metaphysics. Our vision 
cannot extend past the logocentric illusion: for what we see is a Glas only, 
and not face to face. 
Tournée vers la présence, perdue ou impossible, de l'origine 
absente, cette thématique structuraliste de l'immédiaté rompue 
est donc la face triste, négative, nostalgique, coupable, 
rousseauiste, de la pensée du jeu dont l'affirmation 
nietzschéenne, l'affirmation joyeuse du jeu du monde et de 
l'innocence du devenir, l'affirmation d'un monde de signes sans 
faute, sans verité, sans origine, offert à une interprétation active, 
serait l'autre face.29 
Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent 
origin, this structuralist thematic of broken immediacy is 
therefore the saddened, negative, nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic 
side of the thinking of play whose other side would be the 
Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play 
of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of 
a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin 
which is offered to an active interpretation.30 
Logocentrism mysticises language, and even as we speak we participate and 
prolong the dream. 
Where does this leave the text? And how do we read the text, 
especially the medieval text, already believing that it is corrupt? According to 
Derrida, we must read recognising "la procès de la signification ordonnant 
ses déplacements et ses substitutions a cette loi de la présence centrale; mais 
d'une présence centrale qui n'a jamais été elle -même, qui a toujours dejà été 
deportée hors de soi dans son substitut. "31 [ "the process of signification which 
orders the displacements and substitutions for this law of central presence -- 
29 "La structure, le signe et 
30Derrida, "Structure, Sign 
31 "La structure, le signe et 
le jeu," p. 427. 
and Play," p. 292. 
le jeu," p. 411. 
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but a central presence which has never been itself, has always already been 
exiled from itself into its own substitute.132 
Deconstructive criticism is dependent upon an initial characterisation 
of the text as resting on a logocentric foundation. The term "logocentrism" 
has become a generic label placed on Western metaphysics and on literary and 
philosophical texts. The aim of deconstructive criticism is to show how 
logocentric texts undermine themselves, without first investigating how or 
why a text is logocentric. In most cases, it is merely assumed to be so. This is 
particularly true in texts with a theological basis, as in the case of medieval 
literature. It is necessary, however, to understand why a text is logocentric 
before proceeding to deconstruct that logocentrism. This thesis will begin 
with the absence of a basic assumption, the assumption that medieval texts 
are necessarily logocentric. In light of this absence, we will encounter an 
absence in the "foundation" of deconstruction itself. This absence can serve 
as a makeshift origin for a critique which will bring together medieval 
literature and deconstruction. 
32Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play," p. 280. 
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Deconstruction as critical theory 
Departments of English literature have turned deconstruction into a 
method of textual reading which has become so widespread that it is now part 
of the standard undergraduate curriculum. The interest which English 
departments have shown in postmodern philosophical theory is an 
indication that the field of literary criticism is willing to engage itself in issues 
of truth -- not to search for truth but to speak about truth, to speak about the 
process of searching for truth. As a result, deconstruction in a literary context 
has mutated away from its original base in order to suit the issues involved 
in literary theory. Deconstructive criticism is the intrusion from which the 
philosophy of deconstruction cannot isolate itself. Perhaps criticism has 
become deconstruction itself. Before commencing on the main body of this 
work, I would like to comment on the present state of deconstruction in 
literary criticism. 
Deconstruction as a literary theory in America has centred around 
several notable critics. They have worked to make deconstruction 
comprehensible to literary critics whose philosophical background may be 
insufficient. This transition may have resulted in a somewhat un- 
philosophical mode of deconstruction quite distanced from the original, but it 
is the deconstruction which, in the minds of most critics and students of 
literature, is deconstruction itself. The challenge for postmodernist critics is 
to explicate deconstruction in a clear and concise manner to a non - 
philosophically trained audience wishing to apply philosophy to literature. 
This challenge is made more difficult by Derrida's often poetic and abstruse 
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style, which should not serve as a model for literary critics attempting to 
explicate deconstruction with clarity to others in their field. 
In this section I will comment not on deconstruction as a philosophy 
but as a method of reading texts. My purpose in calling attention to this 
distinction is not to privilege one over the other but to acknowledge the dual 
processes of selection and translation which take place whenever 
deconstruction is used as a method of reading texts. I have chosen to focus on 
Jonathan Culler's On Deconstruction because it aims to explicate 
deconstruction to a literary audience and can be seen as something of a model 
text in this regard. In his summary of Derrida's work, Culler undertakes to 
translate deconstruction, both as a philosophy and as a critical theory, for an 
American literary audience. 
I will take some time now to discuss On Deconstruction for the 
influence it has had in defining deconstruction as a critical theory. Culler 
attempts to summarise and define the issues which have become central for 
American deconstruction. On Deconstruction demonstrates first of all the 
problem of coping with the sheer volume of Derrida's writings. One is forced 
to select certain issues and designate them as central, though such an effort is 
itself problematic because it creates a centre, an organising structure which 
privileges certain issues above others. Clearly, this is not what Derrida 
intended, but it does demonstrate the human tendency to centralise, to 
prioritise. 
I do not intend to summarise Culler's entire work, but to discuss some 
of the major issues he raises. He begins his second chapter by drawing a 
distinction between deconstruction as a philosophy and as a method of 
reading literary texts. His basic recommendation for the deconstruction of 
texts is "to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the 
20 
hierarchical oppositions on which it relies, by identifying in the text the 
rhetorical operations that produce the supposed ground of argument, the key 
concept or premise. "33 Culler's discussion of deconstruction as a literary 
theory is dependent on its distinction from the philosophy of deconstruction. 
He begins by commenting on deconstruction as a philosophy. He uses as an 
example of the deconstructive process the Nietzschean deconstruction of 
causality. In the Will to Power, Nietzsche argues that causality is not a given, 
but a result of a chronological reversal in the mind: the cause is imagined 
after the effect has occurred. This deconstruction of causality reverses the 
hierarchical oppositions of cause and effect. Culler writes, "The distinction 
between cause and effect makes the cause an origin, logically and temporally 
prior. The effect is derived, secondary, dependent upon the cause. "34 He 
describes Nietzsche's conclusions and relates them to the deconstructive 
method in which hierarchies are overturned: 
If the effect is what causes the cause to become a cause, then the 
effect, not the cause, should be treated as the origin. By showing 
that the argument which elevates cause can be used to favor effect, 
one uncovers and undoes the rhetorical operation responsible for 
the hierarchization and one produces a significant displacement. 
If either cause or effect can occupy the position of origin, then 
origin is no longer originary; it loses its metaphysical privilege. A 
nonoriginary origin is a "concept" that cannot be comprehended 
by the former system and thus disrupts it.35 
Culler points to this argument as an example of a deconstructive 
reversal, although, he admits, it is a problematic one. It is problematic in that 
causal sequence is a matter of temporal ordering (as all things are) rather than 





hierarchisation implied in temporal ordering. Furthermore, I am sure that 
no one would try to challenge Culler's statement that "the effect is what 
causes the cause to become a cause . . "36 However, can anyone argue 
convincingly that effects are temporally prior to causes? 
Culler explicates the privileging of writing over speech discussed by 
Derrida in Of Grammatology in this manner: "the threat posed by writing is 
that the operations of what should be merely a means of expression might 
affect or infect the meaning it is supposed to represent." 37 According to 
Culler, language is always mediation, distancing from meaning, but in 
speech, unlike writing, the signifiers disappear. There is no tangible 
obstruction to interfere with meaning. Furthermore, the speaker is present to 
explain ambiguities to the listener. He does not raise the point that, in the 
process of explaining, the speaker produces yet another wave of signifiers -- if 
signifiers only interfere with meaning rather than make one present to it, 
how does the presence of the speaker who can only produce signifiers make 
meaning more present? Culler asserts that writing, in contrast to speech, is 
regarded as merely a substitute for the absent speaker. He notes that the 
physical marks which make up writing may be ambiguous or may involve 
artful rhetoric, though he neglects to explain how this aspect causes writing to 
differ from speech. 
Culler next discusses the metaphysics of presence, which he locates in 
the following concepts: "the immediacy of sensation, the presence of ultimate 
truths to a divine consciousness, the effective presence of an origin in a 
historical development, a spontaneous or unmediated intuition, the 




in speech of logical and grammatical structures, truth as what subsists behind 
appearances, and the effective presence of a goal in the steps that lead to it. "38 
The metaphysics of presence is also contained in the belief that "the meaning 
of an utterance is what is present to the consciousness of the speaker, what he 
or she 'has in mind' at the moment of utterance. "39 Culler uses the example 
of the flight of the arrow (Zeno's paradox) to demonstrate the problem of 
presence. The arrow is clearly in motion, but at any given moment it is in a 
particular spot and therefore never in motion. Similarly, the notion of the 
present is not a given but the product of differences. Culler states his formula 
for the deconstruction of presence: "A deconstruction would involve the 
demonstration that for presence to function as it is said to, it must have the 
qualities that supposedly belong to its opposite, absence. Thus, instead of 
defining absence in terms of presence, as its negation, we can treat 'presence' 
as the effect of a generalized absence or ... of différance." 40 
Culler proceeds to explain Derrida's argument that meaning is based 
on differences. If one were to imagine the origin of language, one must 
imagine a world which has already been categorised, in which meaning still 
arises from difference. He explains Derrida's term "différance" as both a 
passive difference and the act of differing. It is simultaneously structure and 
movement. Culler refers to the Cours de linguistique générale, in which 
Saussure argues that linguistic systems are composed of differences, as both 
"an explicit affirmation of logocentrism and unavoidable involvement with 
it "41 and "a powerful critique of logocentrism."42 By logocentrism, Culler 






means in this instance the belief that linguistic systems are formed of positive 
units. Culler is using logocentrism in a very specific sense here, referring to 
an instance in language theory. Unable to be defined in all its diverse aspects 
in a straightforward manner, logocentrism is often defined by what it is not 
rather than by what it is, making it also a product of differences. 
According to Derrida, Saussure's concept of the sign is logocentric 
because it is based on the division between sensible and intelligible. This 
assumption, according to Culler, is that the signifier is subordinate to the 
signified. The signifier exists primarily to give access to meaning, and thus is 
dependent on the signified. Saussure, does not assert this point intentionally, 
however, but, as Culler argues, The concept of the sign is so involved with 
the basic concepts of logocentrism that it would be difficult for Saussure to 
shift it even if he wished to. "43 It is assumed that grounding the concept of 
the sign in the sensible/ intelligible division is logocentric -- indeed, that the 
division itself is logocentric. But what is the reason behind this assumption? 
This grounding of the sign in the logocentric sensible/ intelligible division is, 
according to Culler, linked in Saussure with the repression of writing, which 
is ingrained in the Western tradition. Culler argues that the fact that children 
learn to speak before learning to write and that many cultures are oral 
demonstrates "not just a factual or local priority of speech to writing but a 
more portentous general and comprehensive priority. "44 The Western 
concept of writing involves the potential for miscommunication, distance 
from the speaker and from writing. Here the logocentric connection between 
the repression of writing and the sensible/ intelligible division is based on a 




writing is that in speech the signifier and the signified seem to be unified. In 
contrast, writing is subject to interpretation. In speech, one hears and 
understands at the same time: "The signifiers do not separate me from my 
thought, but efface themselves before it. "45 Culler concludes that speaking 
provides the model for a logocentrism in which meaning dominates and 
controls form. Culler states that this s'entendre parler, this accident of 
hearing oneself speak, "serves as a model of presence and reveals the 
solidarity of phonocentrism, logocentrism, and metaphysics of presence ... "46 
The hierarchy of speech over writing is reversed -- this is the process of 
deconstruction. 
After identifying the key issues in deconstruction as philosophy, in the 
section entitled "Critical Consequences," he approaches the question, what 
application can deconstruction have for literary criticism? Culler admits that 
the implications of deconstruction for literary study are ambiguous, that they 
must be inferred. For instance, while Derrida's method of overturning 
hierarchical oppositions will not affect literary criticism per se, it does raise 
questions concerning the categories on which critics rely. Culler suggests 
various methods in which literary criticism can be influenced by 
deconstruction, which he calls "levels or modes of relevance. "47 The most 
important is deconstruction's influence on the concept of liteature itself. 
Philosophers have considered literary language to be distinct from ordinary 
or serious language, a distinction which is based on hierarchical oppositions 
such as literal/ metaphorical and truth/ fiction. Literary language is set apart 
from the pure language of philosophical discourse. One might point out, 





between criticism and the art of literature. Literary criticism must adopt the 
pure "scholarly" language similar to that used in philosophical discourse. 
Literature, while revered as the object text, is usually composed in a style of 
writing which would be considered unacceptable in criticism. 
Returning to Culler's argument, deconstruction allows philosophical 
discourse to be subjected to the type of reading which has normally been 
reserved for literature. In addition, deconstruction can affect the way we 
think about figurative language. As Culler argues, after deconstruction, the 
study of figures becomes the norm rather than the exception. Deconstruction 
furthermore challenges our perception of what is literal and what is 
figurative, a distinction which rests at the heart of literary criticism. 
Culler, like other theorists, is interested in the effect of deconstruction 
on mimesis, which holds different values in the aesthetic tradition. In 
Realism,48 a work may be seen as aesthetically pleasing in so far as it correctly 
depicts the original. In later movements, this is certainly not the case, as 
artists explore their own perceptions of reality. In the Middle Ages, the value 
of the work was dependent on what was being represented, as well as the 
representation itself.49 Derrida argues in "Economimesis," that the aesthetic 
tradition always depends on the separation between the represented and its 
representation. Furthermore, the represented, the original, is given a 
privileged position due to its priority over the work of representation. Culler 
questions whether there is ever an original since everything which is 
represented may very well be a representation itself. This possibility of 
infinite regress is, as Culler states, "a process that is arrested only by positing a 
48I refer in this instance to the 19th century movement which sought to 
represent the world as it appeared to be. 
49I refer the reader to Umberto Eco's discussion of medieval aesthetics in Art 
and Beauty in the Middle Ages and The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas. 
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divine origin, an absolute original. "50 From this conclusion, Culler suggests 
that the infinite mimetic regress disrupts the hierarchy of original and 
imitation. The original is already an imitation, but the distinction between 
represented and representation remains. Although Culler focuses on the 
overturning of a hierarchical opposition, what he really exposes in his 
discussion of Derrida's argument is the infinite regress inherent in 
representation. 
Culler explains that, in addition to challenging logocentric concepts, 
deconstruction can help critics to identify topics for discussion, for example 
writing and speech, presence and absence, origin, marginality, representation, 
and indeterminacy. He suggests specific techniques which critics might use in 
deconstructive readings of literary texts. First, he states, critics should identify 
conflict within the text, most notably between hierarchical oppositions. One 
should look for an instance where the privileged term is shown to be 
dependent on the second term. He determines that Derrida's discussions of 
literary works, such as "Living On: Border Lines" are not examples of 
deconstructive literary criticisms. Rather, deconstructive criticism will be 
based on Derrida's philosophical writings, and will involve the identification 
of certain types of structure within the text. Deconstruction, according to 
Culler, should attempt to challenge authoritative interpretations which rely 
on traditional binary oppositions. Authoritative or "logocentric" 
interpretations can be challenged by the overturning of these oppositions, and 
by concentrating on certain topics such as writing, difference, and self - 
reference, the exploration of how conflicts within the text lead to conflicts in 
and between readings of the text, and an emphasis on the marginal. Culler's 
method of deconstruction is above all a challenge to the traditional stance in 
50Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction, p.187. 
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American literary criticism, which is based on the goal of illuminating a 
literary work according to the intention of the author. Culler's main 
recommendation to the literary critic is to identify binary oppositions and to 
argue that the privileged term is in fact dependent on the relegated term. 
The application which Culler has suggested, while relevant to the field 
of literary criticism, clearly and deliberately differentiates itself from 
deconstruction as conceived by Derrida. Nevertheless, it has become "the" 
deconstruction practised in English departments. Has the use of 
deconstruction as a model for literary criticism inhibited its ability to produce 
radical readings? The purpose of this section has been to draw a distinction 
between deconstruction as a critical theory and deconstruction as a 
philosophy while at the same time considering the difficulty of erecting a 
borderline between literary theory and philosophy. Where can that line 
properly be drawn? 
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The other speaks back: Deconstruction and the Medieval Text 
The goal of deconstructionists is to apply deconstruction as a method of 
textual reading to literary texts ranging from Dante to Shakespeare to 
Wordsworth. However, by applying deconstruction to the whole spectrum of 
literature, critics open a Pandora's box of potential problems. While their 
ambition may be to validate deconstruction as a comprehensive theory by 
showing that it can be almost universally applied, such an attempt may lead 
to the realisation that texts from periods other than the postmodern and 
modern periods will resist the process of deconstruction. While some 
attempts have been made to apply deconstruction to medieval texts, few 
critics have ventured into this area. A deconstructive reading of a medieval 
text may appear either too easy or too difficult -- too easy, since the theological 
basis of most medieval texts implies a rather obvious logocentrism, or too 
difficult, for reasons that shall be explored in the following chapters. 
To say that the other speaks back implies that it has a voice, but the 
medieval text, buried by the centuries, can only wait in silence for someone to 
speak about it. Since the rise of deconstructive criticism, some critics have 
attempted to apply deconstruction to medieval literature. A few of these 
works, including the volume Sign, Sentence, Discourse: Language in 
Medieval Thought and Literature, which is dedicated to this purpose, will be 
discussed in this section. The bringing together of deconstruction and 
medieval literature presents many challenges. For example, if the critic 
chooses to deconstruct what many would see as a prime example of 
logocentrism, she should also aim to make a meaningful contribution to the 
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understanding of that text. She must also keep in mind that medieval 
thinkers were as serious about their studies of language and semiotics as we 
are today, and that an enormous body of work by medieval authors remains 
unaddressed by deconstructive critics. Above all, the medievalist must keep 
in mind the difference between our mindset and theirs. We cannot be 
trapped by the assumption that their world view was in any way comparable 
to ours. Thanks to deconstructive critics, we know what deconstruction can 
contribute to the reading of medieval texts. My question is, what can 
medieval texts contribute to the interpretation of deconstruction? Can we 
find among these ancient pages a response to postmodernism? 
An example of a possible relation between medieval philosophy and 
deconstruction can be found in one of Derrida's works. In the preface to 
Derrida's Speech and Phenomena, Newton Garver uses the medieval 
division of language into grammar, logic, and rhetoric as a base to explicate 
Derrida's work on the philosophy of language. Garver describes the current 
debates on the philosophy of language as stemming from the difference 
between logic and rhetoric, which both involve the use and interpretation of 
signs. Related to the central issue of logic and rhetoric are those of Sinn and 
Bedeutung, Ausdruck and Anzeigung, and temporal and nontemporal 
aspects of discourse. In this instance, Garver describes postmodern theories in 
medieval terms, referring to a medieval framework which is temporally (and 
ideologically) prior. Throughout this thesis, I will consider whether such 
similarities or connections are deliberate or purely coincidental. I also intend 
to examine whether other aspects of medieval philosophy can be used to 
explicate deconstruction, and vice versa. 
The fundamental difference between deconstruction and the 
ontotheology upon which medieval literature, and in the past, much of the 
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criticism of medieval texts, is based, results in tension and perhaps a certain 
anxiety for the medievalist. Deconstruction's coming was regarded by some 
critics as a threat to the integrity of literary criticism in general and the 
appreciation of medieval texts in particular. This position can aptly be 
summed up by David Benson's remark that "Still others, and I think this 
probably includes most medievalists, have largely ignored deconstruction and 
the other branches of recent literary theory, hoping that they were passing 
fads. If we wait them out, the reasoning goes, perhaps we can eventually go 
back to doing whatever it was we were doing before. "51 Such a response not 
only ignores the possibilities which deconstruction has opened up for the 
study of medieval literature, but is probably based on a misinterpretation or 
misreading (or possible non -reading) of deconstruction. Perhaps what we can 
learn from such an extreme rejection of deconstruction is caution. It is a 
reminder that different world views are at work, that postmodern theories 
are not always suitable for critiquing ancient texts. 
The necessity of caution is apparent when one considers some 
deconstructive readings which have appeared in the past. I would like to 
discuss to some degree the application of deconstruction to medieval texts by 
literary critics, to examine the benefits and problems of such application. 
Unfortunately, the coining of the term "logocentrism" has led to a situation 
in which some critics undertake a deconstructive reading which aims only to 
identify the logocentric aspects of a text. As we will see in the following 
discussion of selected critical passages, such readings may lead either to 
obvious conclusions or to unfounded ones. In discussing medieval literature 
and deconstruction together we are forced to engage a difficult question: from 
51David C. Benson, "Chaucer's Unfinished Pilgrimage," Christianity and 
Literature 37 (Summer 1988) p. 9. 
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whose perspective should we begin the discussion? At what point should we 
orient ourselves; what should we designate as the origin of our perspective, if 
we wish to appear as objective as possible. The following critics are divided 
on the issue, some centring themselves firmly in the present and others 
reaching to the past. Such critics are always in danger of being either poor 
medievalists or poor postmodernists. My intention in the following pages is 
to expose some crucial errors in the deconstruction of medieval texts, but also 
to establish a foundation for further discussions. 52 
Britton Harwood, in an article appearing in the volume of Style 
devoted to medieval semiotics53 entitled, "Sign and /as Origin: Chaucer's 
Nun's Priest's Tale," describes how the Christian ontology of the Middle Ages 
exemplifies and fits the pattern of the logocentrism defined by Derrida in Of 
Grammatology. He cites De Trinitate, Book XV as evidence of medieval 
logocentrism, specifically the privileging of speech over writing, the 
proximity of the Divine Logos to the spoken word, and the illusion of 
presence. In Chapter One of this thesis, I shall argue that this same passage is 
not evidence of medieval logocentrism. For Harwood, it appears that the 
only redeeming feature of medieval semiotics is that the realisation of 
Derrida's famous quote, "there is nothing outside the text "54 is "a possibility 
52I have given just a brief discussion of these critics' works. For a more 
thorough understanding of their arguments, the reader should consult these 
articles and books personally. 
53Style 17 (1986), no. 2. 
54Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins UP, 1976) p. 158. Derrida's announcement in De la 
grammatologie that "Il n'y a pas de hors -texte" demonstrates the possible 
misreadings invited by translation. Gayatri Spivak translates this phrase first 
as "There is nothing outside of the text" followed by "There is no outside- text" 
in brackets, together with the original French quote. Taken out of context, 
read together with the surrounding text, it remains both dangerous and 
baffling. At its very worst, it has led to the most literal interpretations and to 
accusations of nihilism. The refusal of this one crucial phrase to be 
satisfactorily translated leads inevitably to the question of whether the 
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already latent in one strand of medieval sign theory itself. "55 He identifies in 
the Nun's Priest's Tale the beginning indicators that Christian ontology 
would one day shrug off its logocentrism and turn into something better. He 
characterises medieval ontology by stating, The transcendental signified 
anchors all signs and ultimately turns up, like the corpse from the bottom of 
the cart. "56 However, even if medieval thinkers believed that God, as the 
creator of all things, was therefore ultimately responsible for creating all signs, 
they did not believe that God was the signified of all signifiers, nor did they 
hold the illusion that the relations between the signifiers and signifieds of 
verbal signs were anything but arbitrary or conventional, as Harwood seems 
to imply. 
Harwood's application of deconstruction to the Nun's Priest's Tale 
seems fruitful neither for the tale nor for deconstruction. He reads the scene 
in which the fox and the cock trick each other thus: "When the cock sings 
with his eyes closed, whatever his voice might be referring to in the external 
world has disappeared. Because the word 'cock' passes through the throat of 
the fox, the thing it signifies will not. The signum datum displaces the 
referent. "57 According to Harwood, both conclusions are based upon his 
interpretation of the statement that "there is nothing outside the text." As 
Bernard Harrison has argued, the English translation contributes to the 
misreading of the original, "Il n'y a pas de hors -texte." Harrison points out 
that this translation sometimes leads to absurd conclusions, for instance that 
meaning of this phrase can be grasped by the English speaker. Will the 
meaning of deconstruction itself be infinitely deferred? 
55Harwood, p. 195. 
56lbid, p. 194. 
57Ibid, p. 189. 
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there really is no external reality.58 According to this misreading, when the 
cock shuts his eyes the external world does indeed vanish, and the signs 
produced by his singing, being the only reality left, displace the illusion of the 
world around him. 
Not all such readings, however, so dramatically oppose deconstruction 
to medieval ontology. Some critics attempt to search out relationships 
between the two modes of thought. Sign, Sentence, Discourse: Language in 
Medieval Thought and Literature addresses the subject of "Medieval Studies 
After Derrida After Heidegger," the title of the introductory essay by RA 
Shoaf. He addresses the following questions: does deconstruction have a 
place in medieval studies? How should one reconcile a deconstructive 
approach to semiotics with the ontological nature of medieval philosophy? 
He compares Heidegger's "language as the relation of all relations" to Dante's 
four modes of exegesis discussed in the "Epistle to Can Grande." The four 
modes are evidence that Dante's text, like God's, is both full and empty; empty 
because the three extra -literal modes empty the text so that the reader may 
supply the meaning. His Heideggerean method is to break up the text by 
identifying relations between words, demonstrating that no word is an island, 
existing in isolation from other words. He also draws comparisons between 
58In "Deconstructing Derrida", Harrison argues that deconstruction as it was 
formulated by Derrida bears little resemblance to the way that it has been 
disseminated into the English -speaking world. He argues that some 
conclusions reached by English- speaking deconstructive critics are 
misreadings of derrida caused by problematic translations from the French 
texts. In his reassessment of Derrida, he argues the following: 1) that Derrida 
was not critiquing the New Criticism, as many deconstructive critics imply, but 
was addressing the tradition which regards language as non -essential to the 
constitution of meaning and meaning as directly present to consciousness; 
2) that derrida does not argue that texts do not refer to an extratextual world, 
but instead challenges the Platonic /Cartesian opposition between the sensible 
and the intelligible; 3) that in regard to his view of speech vs. writing, Derrida 
is simply arguing that "the text is readable ( lisible,, itérable) despite that 
absence -- the non -presence of its author." (Harrison, p. 7.) See 
"Deconstructing Derrida," Comparative Criticism 7 (1985) 
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Derrida and Jean de Meun, asserting that both would possess an "anxiety of 
the proper," a belief that a word is defined by its opposite, that differences exist 
and determine meaning. He further argues that "Jean de Meun as well as 
Jacques Derrida would recognize in the opposition fullness /emptiness an 
ever unstable ground, an energy of signification, an entropy of structuration, 
such that election of one 'meaning' over the other would be only a 
logocentric illusion masquerading as a law . . . "59 While Shoaf applies 
Derridean discourse to medieval texts, he does not overturn the text, nor the 
ontology presumed to be behind the text. Instead he demonstrates that both 
Dante and Jean de Meun did not practice logocentrism as it was defined by 
Derrida. 
Nevertheless there is always some fundamental irreconcilable 
opposition between the two, which leads to a power struggle in which 
deconstruction seeks to master the medieval text. I will cite passages from 
several articles in which critics have used the medieval text as a model for 
deconstruction. In "Intertextuality and Autumn / Autumn and the Modern 
Reception of the Middle Ages," which investigates the relations between the 
individual texts of the Cancioneros, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht writes: 
If one recalls Jacques Derrida, one might assert that in the decades 
between the Cancionero de Baena and the Cancionero de Llavia 
(and not only in the case of Plato!) begins that tradition of 
suppression of ecriture which continues unbroken to the present 
day. For the publisher - compiler withdraws from the textual 
structure for which he is responsible and thus contributes to the 
illusion of a "direct communication" between the individual 
authors and the (also probably) individual readers, because he 
59RA Shoaf, "Medieval Studies after Heidegger," in Sign, Sentence, Discourse: 
Language in Medieval Thought and Literature, eds. julian Wasserman and Lois 
Roney, (new York: Syracuse UP, 1989), p. 22. 
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suspects that these readers are interested in a lesson in faith -- that 
is, in a model for the moral restructuring of life.60 
In this case medieval texts are identified as the points of origin for a 
logocentric tradition which extends to the present day. Gumbrecht attributes 
the responsibility for the suppression of writing to the publisher -compiler, 
whose absence leads to an illusion of presence between the author and the 
reader. Gumbrecht is unusual among deconstructive critics in that he 
attempts to trace logocentrism to a specific period of time and even to a 
specific occupation, the publisher -compiler. 
H. Marshall Leicester, in "Oure Tongues Differance: Textuality and 
Deconstruction in Chaucer" treats Troilus and Criseyde as an example of a 
text in which the evident logocentrism is eventually overturned. In this case, 
he argues that the logocentrism of the first three books is overturned in the 
final two. The logocentrism of which Leicester writes is the idea, based on 
Passage I, 393 -99, that writing is the secondary medium but acts in a mode of 
presence, conveying the illusion that the speaker was present to the audience. 
The literary imitation of oral discourse found in Troilus and Criseyde serves 
for Leicester as a textual critique of logocentrism. He writes: "This drift from 
oral to written is roughly parallel to, and connected with, a drift from a 
traditional, face -to -face, logocentric culture of presence to a textual, 
disseminated modern culture of absence based in writing, where strangers 
read one another. "61 
60"Intertextuality and Autumn/ Autumn and the Modern Reception of the 
Middle Ages," trans. Michael Schultz, in The New Medievalism, eds. Marina S. 
Brownless, Kevin Brownlee, and Stephen G. Nichols, (Baltimore and London: 
Johns Hopkins, 1991), pp. 301 -30. 
61H. Marshall Leicester, "Oure Tongues Differance: Textuality and 
Deconstruction in Chaucer, " in Medieval Texts and Contemporary Readers, eds. 
Laurie A. Finke and Martin B. Schichtman (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 
1987), p.16. 
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Laurie A. Finke, in "Truth's Treasure: Allegory and Meaning in Piers 
Plowman," deconstructs Piers Plowman by demonstrating that the poem 
actually contradicts an ontotheological reading. She arrives at the following 
conclusion regarding the progression of the poem: "language does not 
progress toward an illumination of truth but falls into the deferral of its own 
rhetoric. Each sign produces the next sign in a repetitive sequence that never 
arrives at anything but the next trope. The more the poem's language 
attempts to describe the divine, the less referential -- and the more reflexive -- 
it becomes. "62 This is the trap of language for medieval and postmodern 
thinkers alike -- the further we push at the limits of expression the more we 
find ourselves staring back at our own limitations. This is the failure of the 
Grammatology and all such attempts to analyse language -- they cannot reach 
beyond the boundaries of signification, but can only turn in upon themselves. 
In critiquing medieval thought, deconstruction is not an exterior 
movement which threatens to disturb a system of thought which deceives 
itself into believing it is stable. Medieval thought is introspective, always 
acutely aware of its paradoxes and contradictions. What can deconstruction 
question which has not already been questioned by the medievals 
themselves, except perhaps the very existence of God? This thesis will not 
attempt to address such a massive question -- rather it will contain itself to 
the more modest task of examining medieval semiotic structure. 
In the past, deconstructive readings of medieval texts have begun with 
a basic assumption that deconstruction and medieval thought are 
fundamentally opposed to one another. In the absence of this one crucial 
assumption, where can a deconstructive reading of a medieval text begin? 
62 "Truth's Treasure: Allegory and Meaning in Piers Plowman," in medieval 
Texts and Contemporary Readers, p. 60. 
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This thesis will not begin with basic assumptions but with fundamental 
reversals. I will reverse the process of deconstructive criticism by reversing 
two assumptions: that medieval texts are necessarily logocentric and that 
deconstruction and medieval thought are essentially opposed. Furthermore, 
I will reverse the process of reading in which deconstruction, when 
interpreted poorly, is regarded as the active force which dismantles the 
passive, object text. 
One should begin a reading of the medieval text with caution, being 
aware of the huge temporal and cultural gap which separates us from them. 
We always face a temporal gap, and a gap in language, when we write about a 
literature whose language is no longer spoken, whose mindset is so distant. 
Medieval literature does present a foreign experience -- the experience of a 
presence which is no longer desired. Within this theological framework, 
however, rare ideas are expressed and explored. Naturally, it is impossible to 
ignore the theology implied in medieval texts, but we cannot judge them to 
be always, already logocentric, before they are even read. Such an abrupt 
dismissal will only widen the gap and perpetuate our own ignorance about a 
different world view. To look at medieval thought and see only logocentrism 
is to see blindly. To see only the stability of the exterior surface is to miss 
everything. 
The fact that medieval literature is so heavily theological makes any 
postmodern discussion of it problematic. It invites the reader to begin with a 
bias. If we assume that theology and logocentrism are synonyms we, first of 
all, render unnecessary any discussion of medieval literature and 
deconstruction, since the conclusions are obvious. A deconstructive reading 
based on an equation of logocentrism and theology would aim to uproot the 
theology behind the texts. It would also, unfortunately, render unnecesary 
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the whole of Derrida's enterprise, which is based on a radical mode of 
thinking and is not simply a rehashing of nihilism or atheology. An 
intelligent and thorough treatment of this issue would account for the 
possibility that a work can be theological without being logocentric, based on 
the assumption that theology and logocentrism share some common factors 
but are not identical. It is impossible to argue that medieval thinkers did not 
desire a transcendental signified. But it is more important to consider what 
part this yearning for a transcendental signified plays in logocentrism, what 
relevance it has to other aspects of logocentrism. What precisely is at the 
heart of logocentrism? Derrida associates phonocentrism with the division 
between sensible and intelligible and the theological Word. But is this 
association probable? 
The editors of Medieval Texts and Contemporary Readers attribute 
medievalists' hesitation to involve themselves with critical theory to a desire 
to locate stable meanings in medieval texts. The idea of stable meanings 
carries the connotation of a conservative or even backward approach, and 
implies that the distant past could or should be associated with conservative 
or backward thinking. Such an assumption is heavily dependent on a linear 
idea of time in which the forward progression of time leads to a forward 
progression in thinking. We should also question whether the search for 
stable meanings is a wishfulness on our part, the hope that the stability which 
we cannot find in our own age must exist in theirs. Medievalists have indeed 
portrayed the Middle Ages as a stable, or at the worst, stagnant, structure, 
resulting from a strong belief in divine power and regulation. However, the 
close reading of medieval texts should reveal that medieval thought is not so 
easily stereotyped, that there is indeed fluctuation, and more importantly, an 
awareness of that fluctuation. This thesis is an exploration of the medieval 
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awareness of their limitations and the movements which occurred in their 
desire to surpass those limits. 
Criticism begins with the assumption that the medieval text is 
logocentric. Thus the goal of many deconstructive critics of medieval 
literature has been to demonstrate how the text undermines its own 
logocentric (theological) basis -- but this goal is necessarily dependent on the 
assumption that the text is logocentric. The problem with many 
deconstructive readings of medieval texts is that they begin with many 
assumptions and end up with conclusions which would not be so radical had 
they not been based on a stereotyped and misguided view of the text. 
Whether regarded as complete and irreconcilable opposites or viewed 
as similar modes of thought, deconstruction and medieval ontology coincide 
at a number of points. While deconstruction can lead to a number of 
insightful readings of medieval texts, medieval texts can also serve as the 
parasite or the interrogator or the Inquisitor of deconstruction. I will examine 
the conflict and interplay which result when these two modes of thought are 
juxtaposed. What can be gained by bringing together the beginning and the 
end of the Western literary canon, by transforming the canon's linear history 
into a circle in which beginning and end join? The value is a renewed 
perspective in which our thinking is no longer bound by the limitations of a 
mode of thinking in which linear time privileges what is present as an 
improvement on what came before. 
This thesis begins with the premise that the other is only what we 
make it, whether empty, silent, barren, or whether valuable as a tool by which 
the self can be more thoroughly critiqued. The other can serve as the 
beginning point for an interrogation of the self. If we turn medieval 
literature into our logocentric other, with no voice and no chance of 
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speaking, then this opportunity is lost. If, on the other hand, we abolish the 
need to exclude, and allow medieval literature to enter our postmodern 
mindset, we will be rewarded with fresh perspectives which may be our last 
escape from the stagnation which this radical new force will eventually bring. 
This thesis must begin on a second premise, and perhaps this premise will 
lead to accusations of bias: we can never be imprisoned by the past; we can 
only be imprisoned by the present. The past is a shadow which lurks behind, 
but which remains distant and carries with that distance a certain objectivity. 
It also carries a certain safety from the possibility that we will be so locked into 
our own world view that the understanding of other perspectives becomes 
impossible. It is not enough to avoid cultural imperialism by simply refusing 
to discuss non -Western thought. This action or non -action leads only to a 
non -discussion and a non -consideration of other perspectives. 
The thinkers covered in this thesis range from Augustine to Dante. 
Their works cover the span of a millenium. I aimed to cover a wide 
chronological spectrum, beginning with the Patristics and ending in the Late 
Middle Ages. Nevertheless, these texts cannot be considered representative of 
the whole of medieval thought, as there are many significant thinkers who 
are not included in this work, such as Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, 
and Robert Grosseteste, not to mention Islamic and Jewish philosphers. The 
list could go on forever. Dante is the sole truly "literary" figure, and to justify 
this exclusion of his late medieval contemporaries (canonical poets such as 
Chaucer, Langland, etc.) I argue that the philosophical works of the other 
thinkers included in this thesis bordered on poetry, and can rightly serve as 
literary texts which can be read for their aesthetic qualities as well as for their 
philosophical arguments. These thinkers have in common a fascination 
with language, with grammar, logic, and rhetoric, and also with the inability 
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of language to truly express. In the Middle Ages, language was not assumed 
to be solely a tool for human communication but was something which could 
be analysed and discussed. Language was not only discourse but the object of 
discourse. In the following chapters, these thinkers as well as Jacques Derrida 
will become objects of discourse as well as object texts in which the signs 
engage in a (seemingly) infinite play of reference reaching 1500 years into the 
future or the past. In Umberto Eco's Foucault's Pendulum, someone 
remarks, "See here: if you look at the world in a certain way, everything is 
connected to everything else. "63 This thesis will search out the connections 
between deconstruction and medieval literature, connections which cannot 
be avoided even though the distance between these two modes of thought 
may appear uncrossable. 
63Foucault's Pendulum, trans. William Weaver, NY: Ballantine, 1989), p. 263. 
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Part One 
In the Beginning was the Word: 
Among the Origins of Logocentrism 
Chapter One 
"Deinde quibus signis, qua facie to quaeram ?" 
"Again, by what signs, under what aspect, shall I seek you ?" 
-- Amselm, Proslogion 
Sign und Zeit: The Augustian Semiotic Tradition 
This section will commence with an introduction to Augustinian sign 
theory, in which I examine whether medieval sign theory does or does not 
conform to the model of logocentrism described in Of Grammatology. 
Secondly, I will argue that the issue of speech and writing which has been 
accorded such a central place in the history of logocentrism actually diverts us 
from the deeper issues at stake here. A more fundamental issue would be the 
ontotheological quality of the Augustinian theory of signs in which signs 
refer to a transcendental signified, to the origin, the Word of God. While the 
issue of speech and writing lends itself easily to discussions in the field of 
literary criticism, the theological and ontological questions which rest just 
below the surface do not. Yet to focus solely on the issue of speech and 
writing, which in Of Grammatology come to function less according to their 
everyday meanings as modes of communication than as conceptual entities 
representing distinct modes of thought, would be to miss the issue which is at 
the heart of Derrida's argument, the conflict between Being and Becoming. 
One cannot address the issue of speech and writing without inevitably being 
forced into an encounter with the ontological problem, which surfaces 
whenever one speaks or writes about deconstruction. 
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The classification of signs 
This section will address several aspects of the logocentric fallacy and 
their relevance to Augustine and Augustinians: first, the belief that there is a 
fixed meaning between signifier and signified, and, by extension, the belief 
that what the speaker says coincides with what he or she intends to say. 
Augustine was responsible for formulating a theory of signs based on 
language by merging aspects of the theory of verbal language (ovouaza) and 
the theory of signs (6EpEta) which the Greeks regarded as distinct. These 
aspects became merged under the word signum, a sign as both a word and a 
symptom. 64 Augustine defines signum in a well -known passage from De 
Doctrina Christiana: "Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit 
sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem uenire ... " 65 [ "A sign is 
a thing which, apart from the impression that it presents to the senses, causes 
of itself some other thing to enter our thoughts. "]66 He also creates a 
distinction within the sign between signa naturalia and signa data, between 
natural signs and conventional signs.67 Signa naturalia "sunt, quae sine 
64See RA Markus, "St. Augustine on Signs," in Augustine: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. RA Markus, (Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1972), pp. 61 -91 and 
U. Eco, et. al., "On Animal Language in the Medieval Classification of Signs, in 
"On the Medieval Theory of Signs, eds., Umberto Eco and Constantino Marmo, 
trans. Shona Kelley and William Virtue, (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1989), 
pp.3 -42. 
65Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 32, 
ed. Paul Tombeur, (Turnholt: Brepols, 1968), p. 32. 2.1.1. All subsequent 
references to DDC in Latin will refer to this edition unless otherwise noted. 
66Christian Instruction, Writings of St. Augustine 4, trans. John J. Gavigan, 
(Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1947), p. 61. 
67Darrell Jackson states that data is most often translated as conventional, 
although he notes tat Engels has supplied "given (donnés) signs," or 
intentional. See "The Theory of Signs in St. Augustine's De Doctrina 
Christiana," in Augustine, A Collection of Critical Essays, 92 -147. 
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uolantate atque ullo appetitu significande praeter se aliquid aliud ex se 
cognosci faciunt, sicuti est fumus significans ignem." 68 [Natural signs "are 
those that, independently of any purpose or desire of being a sign of anything 
except themselves, cause something else to be recognized. Such is the case 
when smoke indicates fire. "]69 He gives other examples such as animal 
footprints and facial expressions which reveal emotions such as sadness and 
anger without the person's intent. In contrast, "Data uero signa sunt, quae 
sibi quaeque uiuentia inuicem dant ad demonstrandos, quantum possunt, 
motus animi sui uel sensa aut intellecta quaelibet. Nec ulla causa est nobis 
significandi, id est signi dandi, nisi ad depromendum et traiciendum in 
alterius animum id, quod animo gerit, qui signum dat." 70 [ "Conventional 
signs are those which living creatures give to one another. They thus 
indicate, as far as possible, either the operations of their minds or anything 
perceived by sense or intellect. The only reason we have for indicating by 
signs is that we may call forth and transfer to another's mind what is in our 
mind as we give the sign. "]71 RA Markus interprets the distinction in light of 
Augustine's triadic relationship of the sign: the sign itself, the thing (res) to 
which it refers, and the interpreter ( "the subject to whom the sign stands for 
the object signified ") who gives the sign meaning.72 Res has two meanings: 
the first, its proper meaning, is something which does not signify something 
else. The second, improperly and more generally, is anything which exists. 
Res can be translated as thing in two senses, a thing as opposed to signs and a 
68DDC, pp. 32 -3, 2.1.2. 
69Christian Instruction, p. 61. 
70DDC, p. 33, 2.2.3. 
71 Christian Instruction, p. 62. 
72 "St. Augustine on Signs," p. 74. 
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thing which exists, including signs and everything else.73 There is already an 
ambiguity, from the moment of res, in the distinction between signs and 
things, or between things which signify and things which do not. Augustine 
bequeaths the same ontological affirmation to signs as he does to things 
which do not signify. 
Signa naturalia possess a natural, perhaps fixed, relation which, 
according to Markus, involves the sign and the res. Signa data involve the 
sign and the one who interprets the sign, so that meaning is neither fixed nor 
completely arbitrary but dependent on the hearer, and therefore context - 
bound. Let us now recall that logocentrism involves a belief that "sounds are 
simply a representation of meanings which are present in the consciousness 
of the speaker.74 I will add to this a passage from Geoffrey Hartman: "The 
illusion of the logos is that saying and meaning coincide, that the exact or just 
word can be found and need not, or need only, be repeated. But writing is 
serpentine, that is, temporal. The serpent is the first deconstructor of the 
logos. He proves that the Word may have more than one sense or a sense 
other than intended." 75 
While Augustine would have acknowledged that there was some 
relation between the thought in the speaker's mind and the uttered word, he 
was careful to emphasise the role of the interpreter. He was also careful to 
distinguish natural signs, which do possess a direct relation between signifier 
and signified, from conventional signs. Augustine would not have argued 
that saying and meaning always coincide, or that writing or any form of 
human language is atemporal. And certainly, he would have known as well 
73See Jackson's discussion of res in "The Theory of Signs in St. Augustine's D e 
Doctrina Christiana.." 
74Jonathan Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure, p. 119. 
75Saving the Text, p. 8. 
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as anyone that there is more than one sense to logos. The fact that medieval 
thinkers referred to one class of signs as intentional tells us only that they 
perceived an essential distinction between types of signs, not that the 
intention of the speaker/ writer was destined to coincide with the meaning 
received by the hearer/ reader. In fact, it was made clear by Saussure and 
others before him that the relation in regard to words and other conventional 
signs is not fixed but arbitrary. In Not Saussure: A Critique of Post - 
Saussurean Literary Theory, Raymond Tallis argues that errors in 
poststructuralism can be exposed through a careful reading of Saussure. He 
asserts that fundamental to a correct reading of Saussure is the recognition of 
Saussure's distinction, often ignored by poststructuralists, between arbitrary 
(conventional) signs and natural ones. Natural signs, argues Tallis, unlike 
conventional ones, have meaning but are not systematised, which runs 
contrary to Barthes' argument that meaning implies system. 76 Furthermore, 
the designation given to the second category of signs as data or intentional or 
institutional by medieval thinkers does not mean that the words of the 
speaker actually coincide with what he or she intends to say. 
76See Tallis' argument in Not Saussure: A Critique of Post- Saussurean Literary 
Theory, (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 85. For a refernce to Barthes' argument 
see Jonathan Culler, Barthes, (London: Fontana, Modern Masters; Glasgow: 
Collins, 1983). 
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On the relation between words and things 
In this section I will argue that Derrida's preoccupation with the status 
of speech in relation to writing is not only, as Ellis argues, essentially about 
words and things, but about the ontological problems of Being and Becoming. 
Beginning with Aristotle, we find that the problem is not really speech, but 
the soul. In De Anima (APIETOTEAOYE IIEPI F'YXHE), Aristotle writes, 
"'H SE Own yroOoo no ea'tty e1.111r1)xov. tiwv yap ayrvxc.)v oD6sv Ocovet, aXX,a xa8 
oµotou to 7 Eye'tat Oovety ... " 77 ["Voice is a particular sound made by 
something with a soul; for nothing which does not have a soul has a 
voice ... "] 78 In this statement, Aristotle clearly draws a relation between the 
voice and the soul. Here he preserves the distinction between the sensible 
and the intelligible, but meanwhile establishes a crucial connection. Matter, 
like discourse, is in constant flux, always renewing and regenerating, and also, 
always dying, and so we see with the conceptual, the signifieds which are 
always in the process of Becoming -- they too will die. But here Aristotle 
postulates something (or not -thing) which evades Becoming and all that it 
brings with it -- perpetual death, the need for rebirth, the infinite imitation or 
re- enactment of the Phoenix and the Christ. It is not only the soul which 
then evades, but it brings with it the possibility for further evasion; it brings 
with it the possibility of Being. And it is a terrible paradox that the voice (vox, 
words, utterances) which constitutes the very essence of the most slippery 
7717EPl TYXHE (De Anima), trans. WS Hett, ed. TE Page, E Capps, WHD Rouse, (London: 
William Heinemann, 1935), p. 116, ii.viii. All subsequent references to the Greek text of De 
Anima will refer to this edition unless otherwise noted. 
78Aristotle, De Anima, trans. DW Hamlyn, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), p. 32, 
420b5. All subsequent references to the English translation of De Anima will 
refer to this edition unless otherwise noted. 
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form of Becoming, is for Aristotle causally dependent upon the soul for its 
existence (that is to say, for its brief appearance, and also for its demise). Then 
he goes on to describe the physical features by which the voice is made 
possible -- the lungs, the windpipe, the throat, the tongue -- the parts of the 
body which are already condemned to die, already in flux. Even the intellect, 
which is intangible like the soul, is also, always, in the process of Becoming. 
It is nothing until it thinks. Its very being is dependent upon action, 
thinking; it must become a verb, cogito, it must come into time. And 
presumably when it is done thinking it will become nothing once more. He 
writes: "onep auglatvat E7tt 'roo vov. Kat =TOG Se voritioa entity coonep 'ta 
VOTtra Ent µEV yap 1(0V avEV DXTIa TO avtO Eatit TO VOODV Kat TO VOOD EVOV. T1 
yap Entatiriµri Ti OEwptinKri Kat TO O'U'COXY ETCl6TT1TOV TO av'to En'tty .tiov Se µE aEt 
VoetV TO attitov E1ttaKE7t'teov. "79 [ "Now, being affected in virtue of something 
common has been discussed before -- to the effect that the intellect is in a way 
potentially the objects of thought, although it is actually nothing before it 
thinks; potentially in the same way as there is writing on a tablet on which 
nothing actually written exists; that is what happens in the case of the 
intellect. "] 80 That is why we can live with the intellect, because it follows the 
pattern of matter, even though it is immaterial. It follows the pattern of the 
always -in -flux. It has an infinite number of beginnings and endings, and so it 
is quite impossible for us to discern and privilege one beginning to call the 
origin, and one ending to call the End of the Universe. Each new beginning 
or ending is only the new eraser which wipes all the others out. 
The soul is all the more dangerous since Aristotle declares that the 
voice is dependent on it for its Becoming, and the existence of the voice is 
79p. 168, iii.iv. 
80De Anima, 429b29 
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something we cannot deny. In the very concept of the sign as composed of 
signifier and signified is embodied the difference which makes the voice 
dangerous through its relation to the soul: 
La notion de signe implique toujours en elle -même la distinction 
du signifié et du signifiant, fut -ce à la limite, selon Saussure, 
comme les deux faces d'une seule et même feuille. Elle reste donc 
dans la déscendance de ce logocentrisme qui est aussi un 
phonocentrisme: proximité absolue de la voix et de l'être, de la 
voix et du sens de l'être, de la voix et de l'idéalité du sens.81 
The notion of the sign always implies within itself the distinction 
between signifier and signified, even if, as Saussure argues, they 
are distinguished simply as the two faces of one and the same leaf. 
This notion remains therefore within the heritage of that 
logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism: absolute proximity 
of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice 
and the ideality of meaning.82 
What is so terrifying about Being that we must declare not only it dangerous 
but everything which comes into association with it? It is that Being 
threatens the infinite cycle, the movement of the universe and temporality 
itself. Being implies that Becoming is not really atemporal but temporal, 
because it, Being, is that essence which has never changed and never will. 
Thus Becoming, despite its seeming infinite regress of final endings, will die. 
And so what is at issue is not the repression of writing by voice -- they are 
merely extensions of a larger struggle. Voice is an unwilling collaborator who 
belongs as much to Becoming as writing does. Rather, the great fear is the 
repression of Becoming by Being, repression by Being's very existence, 
repression by the very imagination of its existence. And that is why the 
81De la grammatologie, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967), p.23 
820f Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore and London: 
Johns hopkins, 1974, 1976), pp. 11 -12. 
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irrelevant issue of phonocentrism83 has been included in the logocentric 
fallacy. 
Another passage in Aristotle's De Interpretatione (IIEPI EPMHNEIAE) 
gives Derrida yet another reason to tie phonocentrism to logocentrism: 
"Batt µev ow WC Ev 'cri OcovrI tiwv Ev 211 iVvxil Tcaßrlµatiwv avµßoXa, Kat 'ca 
ypaOoµeva cow Ev irk Owvri. Kai coa1tEp ODE ypaµµata zcaat tia avtia, ouSE 
4wvat at aatiat. wv ttev-cot 'tautia aeµeta irpwiwa, wuta earn rcaOi atia 
yrvxria, Kat wv tiaD'ca ottotwµatia, icpaypata 'ca'ota. "= [ "Now spoken 
sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of 
spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, 
neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of -- 
affections of the soul -- are the same for all; and what these affections are 
likenesses of -- actual things -- are also the same. "] 84 This passage links 
speech to the mind, while implying that writing is more distant from the 
mind. However, Aristotle did not state that speech was present to the mind, 
just as he did not state that writing was present to speech; and if one chooses 
to infer that this passage claims that speech is indeed present to the mind, 
then one is encouraged to believe that it claims that writing is present to 
speech. That writing is present to speech is not, however, part of the 
logocentric fallacy, and in fact such a belief would arguably place writing on 
the same privileged level as speech. Nevertheless, Derrida, in O f 
Grammatology, has selected this passage as Aristotle's contribution to 
logocentrism. In the following excerpt he explains the basis for Aristotle's 
logocentrism and extends it to medieval theology: 
83IIEPl EPMHNEIAE (De Interpretatione), trans. harold P Cooke, ed. TE Page, E Capps, WDH 
Rouse, (London: William Heinemann, 1935), p. 114. 
84De Interpretatione, trans. JL Ackrill, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), p. 43, 16a3. 
Dans tous les cas, la voix est au plus proche du signifié, qu'on le 
détermine rigoureusement comme sens (pensé ou veçu) ou plus 
lâchement comme chose. Au regard de ce qui unirait 
indissolublement la voix à l'âme ou à la pensée du sens signifié, 
voire à la chose même (qu'on le fasse selon le geste aristotélicien 
que nous venons de signaler ou selon le geste de la théologie 
médiévale déterminant la res comme chose crée à partir de son 
eidos, de son sens pensé dans le logos ou l'entendement infini de 
Dieu), tout signifiant, et d'abord le signifiant écrit, serait derivé. 85 
In every case, the voice is closest to the signified, whether it is 
determined strictly as sense (thought or lived) or more loosely as 
thing. All signifiers, and first and foremost the written signifier, 
are derivative with regard to what would wed the voice 
indissolubly to the mind or to the thought of the signified sense, 
indeed to the thing itself (whether it is done in the Aristotelian 
manner that we have just indicated or in the manner of medieval 
theology, determining the res as a thing created from its eidos, 
from its sense thought in the logos or in the infinite 
understanding of God). The written signifier is always technical 
and representative.86 
A further problem arises in this passage because Derrida argues that the voice 
is wed not only to the mind or the thought, but also to the thing itself, which 
would put the voice in a very privileged position indeed. However, even the 
best of the medieval logocentrics did not claim a direct relation between the 
word and the concept, as well as between the word and the actual thing. 
From Augustine until Bacon, there was a preference for the idea that words 
were related to concepts, and after Bacon, to the actual things. Lambert of 
Auxerre suggests that, while a sign signifies both the concept as well as the 
actual thing, the first consists of a direct relation, while the second is 
85De la grammatologie, pp. 22-3. 
860f Grammatology, p. 11. 
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mediated: "In this way, therefore, an utterance is primarily -- in itself -- and 
directly the sign of the thing; but in addition it is indirectly the sign of the 
thing ... Whatever is a sign of the sign is a sign of the thing signified. Thus, 
since an utterance is a sign of a concept, and a concept is a sign of a thing, in 
this way [the utterance] is a sign (signum /significatum) of the thing as 
well. "87 and "An utterance that is a sign of a sign -- i.e., of a concept -- will be 
a sign of the thing signified -- i.e. of the thing; it is, however, a sign of the 
concept directly but a sign of the thing indirectly. "88 Thus, I take it that what 
Derrida is concerned with is either the belief that there is a direct relationship 
between words and concepts, or that there is a direct relationship between 
words and the actual things. One branch of deconstruction would define 
logocentrism as the belief that there is a direct relation between words and 
concepts, and the other, that there is a direct relation (or perhaps any relation) 
between words and actual things. It appears that medieval thinkers before 
Bacon were logocentrics according to the first definition while those from 
Bacon onwards were logocentrics according to the second. 
But it is not merely the statement that the spoken word and the 
thought are somehow connected which is logocentric, but the very distinction 
between word and thought, signifier and signified, goes back to a distinction 
between the sensible and intelligible which is itself logocentric. On the one 
hand, it is logocentric to separate the sensible from the intelligible, for there is 
inherent in that division the potential for a hierarchisation which privileges 
the realm of ideas, reason, logic, God, over base matter. On the other hand, 
once the separation, though not necessarily the imposition of hierarchy, has 
87Lambert of Auxerre, "Summa Lamberti," in The Cambridge Translations of 
medieval Philosophical Texts, Vol 1: Logic and the Philosophy of Language, eds. 
Norman Kreutzmann and Eleonore Stump, (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1988), p. 
105. 
88Ibid, p. 105. 
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pervaded a culture, it is then logocentric to assume a relation between these 
separate realms, which should never have been separated in the first place. A 
further point is that, in the thought of Pseudo -Dionysius, for instance, the 
logocentric opposition between sensible and intelligible is precisely what 
brings about absence, the inability to signify, the ultimate non -presence of the 
transcendental signified. 
According to Derrida, logocentrism has so pervaded Western culture 
that we cannot conceive of anything else. He writes: 
Ainsi, à l'intérieur de cette époque, la lecture et l'écriture, la 
production ou l'intérprétation des signes, le texte en général, 
comme tissu de signes, se laissent confiner dans la secondarité. 
Les précédent une verité ou un sens dejà constitués par et dans 
l'élément du logos. Même quand la chose, le "référent ", n'est pas 
immédiatement en rapport avec le logos d'un dieu createur ou 
elle a commencé par être sens parlé -pensé, le signifié a en tout cas 
un rapport immediat avec le logos en général (fini ou infini), 
médiat avec le signifiant, c'est -à -dire avec l'exteriorité de l'écriture. 
89 
Thus, within this epoch, reading and writing, the production or 
interpretation of signs, the text in general as fabric of signs allow 
themselves to be confined within secondariness. They are 
preceded by a truth, or a meaning already constituted by and 
within the element of the logos. Even when the thing, the 
"referent," is not immediately related to the logos of a creator God 
where it began by being the spoken/ thought sense, the signified 
has at any rate an immediate relationship with the logos in 
general (finite or infinite), and a mediated one with the signifier, 
that is to say with the exteriority of writing.90 
However, if speech is truly privileged, if it shares the name logos with the 
divine word of God, then it is the privilege of the thought to rest in proximity 
with speech, not vice versa. And writing, according to the Aristotelian 
model, shares the same privilege of an immediate relationship with speech. 
89De la grammatologie, p. 26. 
900f Grammatology, p. 15. 
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But according to Derrida's model, speech is itself displaced, valued only 
because of its proximity to the concept, not because of any relation to God or 
to transcendence, only one step closer to the mind than writing, and still, only 
a symbol. But for Augustine, the logos is not speech, but the word which 
precedes speech. It is the word -before -speech which robs speech of its right to 
be called a word, the word. He writes: "Proinde uerbum quod foris sonat 
signum est uerbi quod intus lucet cui magis uerbi competit noment." 91 
["Accordingly, the word in its outward sounding is sign of the word that is 
inwardly luminous; and to this latter the name of "word" more properly 
belongs. "] 92 
Perhaps it would be worthwhile at this point to discuss the logocentric 
aspects of Augustine's theory of signs. Augustine did, as the 
deconstructionists have argued, merge his theory of signs with Christian 
theology, with the notions of the Providence of God and the Incarnation of 
the Word. However, upon analysis of some passages in Book XV of De 
Trinitate, we will see that his synthesis did not occur in the manner which 
they have described. In discussing the difference between wisdom and 
knowledge, Augustine embarks upon an explanation of the inner word: 
Quisquis igitur potest intellegere uerbum non solum antequam 
sonet, uerum etiam antequam sonorum eius imagines cogitatione 
uoluantur (hoc est enim quod ad nullam pertinet linguam, earum 
scilicet quae linguae appellantur gentium quarum nostra latina 
est), quisquis, inquam, hoc intellegere potest iam potest uidere per 
hoc speculum atque in hoc aenigmate aliquam uerbi illius 
91De Trinitate, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 15, ed. WJ Mountain, 2 vols, 
(Turnholt: Brepols, 1968), p. 486. All subsequent references to the Latin text 
will refer to this edition unless otherwise noted. 
92On the Trinity, Basic Writings of St. Augustine, 2, trans. AW Hadden, Rev WGT 
Shedd, 20 xi. All subsequent references to the English translation will refer to 
this edition unless otherwise noted. 
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similitudinem de quo dictum est: In principio erat uerbum, et 
uerbum erat apud deum, et deus erat uerbum. Necesse est enim 
cum uerum loquimur, id est quod scimus loquimur, ex ipsa 
scientia quam memoria tenemus nascatur uerbum quod eiusmodi 
sit omnino cuiusmodi est illa scientia de qua nascitur. Formata 
quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus uerbum est quod in corde 
dicimus, quod nec graecum est nec latinum nec linguae alicuius 
alterius, sed cum id opus est in eorum quibus loquimur perferre 
notitiam aliquod signum quo significetur assumitur. 93 
It is possible therefore to understand the meaning of a word, not 
only before it is uttered aloud, but even before the images of its 
uttered sounds are rehearsed in thought; for there is a "word" 
which belongs to no tongue, to none (that is) of the "tongues of 
the peoples," of which our Latin language is one. Any man that 
can understand this unspoken word, can see through this mirror 
and in this enigma a certain likeness of that Word of which it is 
written: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with 
God, and the Word was God." When we speak the truth, that is, 
say what we know, there must be born out of the knowledge held 
in our memory a word which corresponds in all respects to the 
knowledge of which it is born. The thought which has received 
for from the object of our knowledge is the word spoken in our 
heart -- a word that is neither Greek nor Latin nor of any other 
tongue.94 
According to Augustine, this inner word is potentially signifiable, 
either by words or by gestures, but has not yet been signified, nor is it the 
signifie (concept) with which we are familiar. Rather, this word, which 
comes before both the signifier and the signified, has neither a place nor a 
name in the present semiotic structure. This inner word cannot be voiced in 
any language, and thus from our standpoint is not a word at all. It fits so 
poorly into our epistemology that we have not even conceived of it. It is this 
theoretical word that Augustine has mysticised in this passage; it is this word 
which serves as the enigma and the mirror which might give humanity a 
93De Trinitate, pp. 486 -7. 
940n the Trinity, 19, pp. 145 -6. 
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glimpse of the divine Word. God has left his trace in this word, but both the 
trace and the word are absent. Here is the paradox: the moment the word 
obtains a signifier in a human tongue, it is erased; it becomes non -existent, by 
virtue of what it is. Therefore, Augustine's mystifying of the inner word 
cannot lead to a mystification of language and to logocentrism. Again he 
states: 
Perueniendum est ergo ad illud uerbum hominis, ad uerbum 
rationalis animantis, ad uerbum non de deo natae sed a deo factae 
imaginis dei, quod neque prolatiuum est in sono neque 
cogitatiuum in similitudine soni quod alicuius linguae esse 
necesse sit, sed quod omnia quibus significatur signa praecedit et 
gignitur de scientia quae manet in animo quando eadem scientia 
intus dicitur siculi est. 95 
We must arrive at that human word which is the word of a 
reasonable creature, the word of an image of God not born of God 
but made by him, a word neither producing itself in sound nor 
object of thought in a likeness of sound, such as must needs 
belong to a particular language; but the word that precedes all the 
tokens by which it is signified, and is begotten of the knowledge 
which remains in the mind, in the moment when that knowledge 
is spoken inwardly and with truth to itself.96 
Since this word is entirely beyond, or before, language, logocentrism has 
nothing to do with the difference between phonetic and non -phonetic 
writing. Augustinian logocentrism has no relation to phonocentrism. In the 
one passage which might possibly fit a deconstructive interpretation, he 
writes: "Sed haec atque huiusmodi signa corporalia suie auribus siue oculis 
praesentibus quibus loquimur exhibemus. Inuentae sunt etiam litterae per 
quas possemus et cum absentibus conloqui, sed ista signa sunt uocum, cum 
ipsae uoces in sermone nostro earum quas cogitamus signa sint rerum."97 
95De Trinitate, p. 489. 
960n the Trinity, 20xi, p.147. 
97De Trinitate, p. 486. 
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[ "These [gestures] and the like bodily tokens we apply to the ears or eyes of 
persons present and conversing with us; but we have also invented letters to 
enable us to converse with the absent -- letters being tokens of uttered sounds, 
whereas the uttered sounds themselves are tokens in our speaking of the 
realities which we think. "]98 But clearly, when he relates gestures to presence 
and writing to absence, he is distinctly referring to the presence or absence of 
listeners, not to the mystical presence of God nor to the ability of the gestures/ 
words/ text to properly signify. We may join our voices with him in asking, 
"Sed quid est quod potest esse uerbum et ideo iam dignum est uerbi nomine? 
Quid est, inquam, hoc formabile nondumque formatum nisi quiddam mentis 
nostrae quod hac atque hac uolubili quadam motione iactamus cum a nobis 
nunc hoc, nunc illud sicut inunentum fuerit uel occurrerit cogitatur ? "99 
[ "But what is this potential word that claims the name of word? What is this 
thing capable of form but still unformed, but a process in our mind, darting 
hither and thither with a kind of movement of passage, as we turn our 
thought from one object to another in the course of discovery or 
presentation ? "] loo We do not know what this potential word is. We have 
failed even to conceive it, and so are in no danger of its mystification. 
What precedes is not a critique of deconstruction but of the concept of 
logocentrism. While deconstruction may appropriately be called a revolt 
against structuralist criticism or "sémiologie," as Bernard Harrison has 
suggested, it cannot also be called a revolt against Western metaphysics in 
general. The fact is that Western metaphysics cannot be accurately 
generalised to the extent that Derrida has attempted. What may seem 
attractive for a theory which deals only in generalities may not be specifically 
980n the Trinity, 19, p. 146. 
99De Trinitate, p. 499. 
10oOn the Trinity, 25, p. 155. 
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practical. The aspects of medieval thought that can be identified with 
logocentrism -- a belief in God, an ontotheological semiotics of the Word, the 
privileging of sensible over intelligible -- have already been revolted against 
many times within the course of Western metaphysics, in philosophical 
treatises, literature, art, and ordinary discourse. In fact, neither the opposition 
between sensible and intelligible nor the differentiation between signifier and 
signified is dependent on a transcendental signified or an origin. Likewise, 
the belief in a transcendental signified or origin does not imply an opposition 
of sensible and intelligible, and certainly not in a linguistics which relies on 
the opposition of signifier and signified. Derrida is right to point out the 
repression of writing and the glorification of speech by Rousseau, and how 
that repression becomes, as he calls it, "l'ethnocentrisme le plus original et le 
plus puissant" 101 [ "the most original and most powerful ethnocentrism "] 102 
in the works of Rousseau and Hegel. 103 Derrida associates ethnocentrism 
with the entirety of Western metaphysics, including medieval theology, based 
on the assumption that ethnocentrism depends solely on geographical rather 
than temporal boundaries. There is no continuity in the Western 
metaphysical tradition such as he describes as logocentrism. Derrida selects a 
101De la grammatologie, p. 11. 
11320f Grammatology, p. 3. 
103To support his argument, Derrida cites passages from Rousseau and Hegel: 
"Ces trois manières d'écrire répondent assez exactement aux trois divers états 
sous lequels on peut considérer les hommes rassemblés en nation. La peinture 
des objets convient aux peuples sauvages: les signes des mots et des 
propositions aux peubles barbares; et l'alphabet aux peuples policés." (from 
Rousseau's Essai sur l'origine des langues, qtd in De la grammatologie, p. 11.) 
[ "Three ways of writing correspond almost exactly to three different stages 
according to which one can consider men gathered into a nation. The 
depicting of objects is appropriate to a savage people; signs of words and of 
propositions, to a barbaric people; and the alphabet to civilised people. "] (qtd. 
in Of Grammatolgy, p. 3.) 
"L'écriture alphabétique est en soi et pour soi la plus intelligente." (from 
Hegel's Encyclopédie, qtd in De la grammatologie, p. 11). [ "Alphabetic script is 
itself and for itself the most intelligent. "] (qtd in Of Grammatologie, p. 3). 
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few thinkers -- Plato, Rousseau, Hegel, Husserl -- to represent the entire scope 
of Western metaphysics, without considering the works of many significant 
thinkers who have been marginalised within (or outside of) the canon. My 
purpose in this chapter has been to interrogate the concept of "logocentrism" 
by demonstrating how Augustinian sign theory resists or evades the 
logocentric model. I have further argued, based on a reading of Aristotle's De 
Anima, that the issue of speech and writing which has become so central in 
literary criticism's conception of "logocentrism" merely disguises other, more 
fundamental issues. To deconstruct properly and meaningfully is not to 
point out the various aspects of logocentrism within a text, nor is it to focus 
on the opposition between writing and speech or the imagined repression of 
writing. It is to scrutinise, to turn, to overturn the text, to allow the critic to 
discover what even the text itself has forgotten. 
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Chapter Two 
"i ka ölelo no ke ola, i ka ölelo no ka make." 
"Life is in the word, death is in the word." 
-- Hawaiian saying 
Reconstructions of Self, Rebuilding the Word: The Confessions of St. 
Augustine 
The prose of many medieval thinkers can be characterised by a 
relentless interrogation of the limits of language. The contradiction between 
the desire to surpass language and the limiting, entrapping nature of 
language is evident not only in medieval texts but is a characteristic shared by 
texts from all periods. Life and death are embedded in language; language is 
not empty but filled with meaning, with experience. Medieval thinkers 
wished to express experiences which sometimes surpassed the limits of 
language, and to experience beyond the limits imposed by language. Derrida 
himself, wishing to be free from an entrapping structure, can only point to 
something beyond, something else. 
In his commentary on semiotics in the Western tradition, Todorov 
remarks that this tradition of semiotics is so vast that it cannot be known in a 
single lifetime. When one embarks on a study of medieval semiotics, it is 
most fruitful to approach with this same attitude of humility, with the 
suspicion that the tradition is so vast and complex that it refuses to be easily 
understood. If we have understood easily, we may suspect that we have not 
understood at all. In Théories du Symbole, Todorov discusses the semiotics 
of Augustine, concentrating on the texts he deems most important: D e 
Dialectica (De la dialectique), De Doctrina Christiana, and De Trinitate. 
Todorov quotes the following definition of the sign from De la dialectique: 
" «Un signe est ce qui se montre soi -même au sens, et qui, en dehors de soi, 
montre encore quelque chose à l'esprit. Parler, c'est donner un signe à l'aide 
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d'un son articule ».'-104 According to Todorov, Augustine's definition of the 
sign implies a division between the sensible and the intelligible, not found in 
Aristotle's theory of the symbol. Augustine's sign is a composite of relations 
between sign and thing and between speaker and listener. Todorov calls our 
attention to the difference between dicibile and dictio ; dicibile is a word 
which is perceived by the spirit rather than by the physical ear, and dictio is a 
word which is spoken by the mouth, which serves to signify something else. 
The prime function of the dictio is communication. 
Augustine draws a distinction between the word that is held within 
one's heart, to be understood by one's own spirit, and the word which is 
spoken, which is used to communicate with another person. Greater 
spiritual importance is attached to the interior word. The dictio, while 
necessary for communication with the outside world, serves a lesser purpose, 
and is only accessible through the physical ear. Thus the word which is 
spoken has the connotation of being something lesser, involving a greater 
distance from the spirit. In Augustinian semiotics, then, the spoken word 
does not hold the same status or function as does the word which is thought 
and perceived by the spirit. The spoken word is devalued and given a 
separate name. I will now consider this idea in light of Augustine's 
Confessions. 
104De la dialectique, chap. V, qtd in Todorov, Théories du symbole, (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1977), p. 34. 
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Reading Augustine: the Confessions 
In attempting to write autobiography, Augustine has undertaken an 
impossible task, that of representing himself faithfully. The Confessions 
begins with a conflicting purpose, in Augustine's case to reveal himself with 
the ultimate goal of revealing God. It is created through a conflicting process 
which involves both the egocentric, narcissistic fascination with the self 
combined with a denial of the self in which the creature is shown to be 
wholly dependent on the Creator. It ends in the transcendent goal of 
representing the self faithfully and truthfully, a goal which we know to be 
unattainable. This certainty arises when we hear the voice of one speaking 
with the semblance of truth, as we see in Rousseau's Confessions as he 
announces on the first page: "Voici le seul portrait d'homme, peint 
exactement d'après nature et dans toute sa vérité, qui existe et qui 
probablement existera jamais." 105 He further states, "Je forme une entreprise 
qui n'eut jamais d'exemple, et dont l'exécution n'aura point d'imitateur. Je 
veux montrer à mes semblables un homme dans toute la vérité de la nature; 
et cet homme, ce sera moi. "106 Rousseau's words illuminate the problems of 
a work dominated by the speaking subject. We feel instinctively that the 
point of objectivity lies not within the subject but without. Autobiography 
lacks the objective point, the voice exterior. Yet in the Confessions, we will 
see that Augustine attempts to speak outside himself, to extend the right of 
authorship to a creator God who in Augustine's mind lies both within and 
without. 
105Jean- Jacques Rousseau, Les Confessions, Oeuvres Complètes, eds. Bernard 
Gagnebin et Marcel raymond, (Paris: Gallimard, 1959). 
106Livre 1.1, p. 5. 
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Augustine's autobiography involves a process of turning inward to 
examine the soul, followed by an exteriorisation of the soul, its 
transformation into language. From the very beginning he conducts a 
relentless self- interrogation, attempting to describe what he cannot 
remember, to speak those parts of himself which not even he can reach. He 
begins the Confessions with recollections of his early childhood. Among the 
most important is the process of learning to speak: 
et memini hoc, et unde loqui didiceram, post adverti. non enim 
docebant me maiores homines praebentes mihi verba certo aliquo 
ordine doctrinae sicut paulo post litteras, sed ego ipse ordine 
doctrinae sicut paulo post litteras, sed ego ipse mente, quam 
dedisti mihi, deus meus, cum gemitibus et vocibus variis et variis 
membrorum motibus edere vellem sensa cordis mei, ut voluntati 
pareretur, nec valerem quae volebam omnia nec quibus volebam 
omnibus. pensabam memoria: cum ipsi appellabant rem aliquam 
et cum secundum earn vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, 
videbam et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, 
cum earn vellent ostendere. hoc autem eos velie ex motu corporis 
aperiebatur tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium, quae 
fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum ceterorumque membrorum actu et 
sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, 
reiciendis fugiendisve rebus.107 
This I remember, and have since observed, how I learned to speak. 
It was not that my elders taught me words (as, soon after, other 
learning) in any set method; but I, longing by cues and broken 
accents and various motions of my limbs to express my thoughts, 
that so I might have my will, and yet unable to express all I willed, 
did myself, by the understanding which Thou, my God, gayest me, 
practise the sounds of my memory. When they named any thing, 
and as they spoke turned towards it, I saw and remembered that 
they called what they would point out, by the name they uttered. 
And that they meant this thing and no other, was plain from the 
motion of their body, the natural language, as it were, of all 
nations, expressed by the countenance, glances of the eye, gestures 
107Confessionum libri tredecim, ed. Pius Knoll, (Vindobonae: Tempsky, 1898), I, 
VIII, 13. 
64 
of the limbs, and tones of the voice, indicating the affections of the 
mind, as it pursues, possesses, rejects and shuns. "108 
Speech is regarded as natural but also infantile, reflecting not the 
rational mind but the will as completely untempered and unrestrained. 
Augustine associates the voice with other means of communication which 
involve the body. The voice is carnal, reflecting the aggressive, selfish aspects 
of the human character. It is closest to the inner spirit; not the enlightened 
spirit but the carnal spirit which is yet to be redeemed. It is the spirit still 
controlled by the body. 
ita verba in variis sententiis locis suis posita et crebro audita 
quarum rerum signa essent paulatime colligebam measque iam 
voluntates edomito in eis signis ore per haec enuntiabam. sic 
cum his, inter quos eram, voluntatum enuntiandarum signa 
communicavi et vitae humanae procellosam societatem altius 
ingressus ...109 
And thus by constantly hearing words, as they occurred in various 
sentences, I collected gradually for what they stood; and having 
broken in my mouth to these signs, I thereby gave utterance to my 
will. Thus I exchanged with those about me these current signs of 
our wills, and so launched deeper into the stormy intercourse of 
human life... 110 
Augustine's mastery of speech pulls him further into the world, further into 
the presence of human beings and away from an idealised conception of 
presence. The process of learning to speak bars Augustine from a state of bliss 
which one may compare to the experience of the Wordsworthian child, in 
which the child alone can exist in an ideal state. In the ideal realm, speech is 
108Confessions, 







neither necessary nor possible. However, in the temporal, fallen world, 
speech becomes a necessary part of existence. It does not allow one direct 
access to God nor to any transcendent figure, but only to "the stormy 
intercourse of human life," which is neither harmonious nor perfect, but 
chaotic, difficult and frustrating. The speech which arises from necessity is 
not regarded as something necessarily positive, let alone transcendent. It is 
instead representative of the temporal chains with which humanity is bound. 
Augustine remarks, "Non omnino, non omnino per hanc 
turpitudinem verba ista conmodius discuntur, sed per haec verba turpitudo 
ista confidentius perpetratur. non accuso verba quasi vasa lecta atque 
pretiosa, sed vinum erroris, quod in eis nobis propinabatur ab ebriis 
doctoribus, et nisi biberemus, caedebamur nec appellare ad aliquem iudicem 
sobrium licebat.111 [ "Not one whit more easily are the words learnt for all 
this vileness; but by their means the vileness is committed with less shame. 
Not that I blame the words, being, as it were, choice and precious vessels; but 
that wine of error which is drunk to us in them by intoxicated teachers; and if 
we, too, drink not, we are beaten, and have no sober judge to whom we may 
appeal. "] 112 Though he describes words as "vasa lecta atque pretiosa" [ "choice 
and precious vessels "], Augustine also regards words as empty vessels, which 
can be filled not only with divine essence but with human folly and stupidity. 
We should question whether Augustine's view of language in this passage 
bears any resemblance to a logocentric view of language in which the human 
word reflects the divine. Some argue that a characteristic of late medieval or 
post -medieval views of language is an inherent mistrust of language.113 In 
1111, XVI, 26. 
112pp 16 -17 
113refer to Laurie Finke, "Truth's Treasure: Allegory and Meaning in Piers 
Plowman," in Medieval Texts and Contemporary Readers, p. 60. 
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this passage, Augustine displays not only a mistrust of language but a fear of it 
as something which can be contaminated. According to Augustine, the 
language of humanity is by no means infused with the divine word. 
Augustine's confession of his childhood sins involves an emptying of 
language, and a criticism of the human obsession with the Word. He prays, 
"Vide, domine deus meus, et patienter, ut vides, vide, quomodo diligenter 
observent filii hominum pacta litterarum et syllabarum accepta a prioribus 
locutoribus et a to accepta aeterna pacta perpetuae salutis neglegant ... "114 
[ "Behold O Lord God, yea, behold patiently as Thou art wont, how carefully 
the sons of men observe the covenanted rules of letters and syllables received 
from those who spake before them, neglecting the eternal covenant of 
everlasting salvation received from Thee. 1115 He describes how men are 
more concerned with the aspiration of the first syllable of "hominem" than 
with humans themselves, how a speaker will be more wary of his 
pronunciation of the word than of his feeling towards the real human being. 
Meditating on this human attitude towards language, he contrasts the ways of 
human beings to those of God: "quam to secretus es, habitans in excelsis in 
silentio, deus solus magnus ... "116 [ "How deep are Thy ways, O God, Thou 
only great, that sittest silent on high .. . "1117 Augustine calls attention to this 
divine characteristic, the silence of God. Silence is an attribute of a 
transcendent, divine language which is fundamentally different from the 
"pacta litterarum et syllabarum" [ "covenanted rules of letters and syllables "] 
of which human language is composed. 
1141, XVIII, 29. 
115p. 18. 
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In Augustine's account of his youth, one can see the extent of his self - 
interrogation. He does not reconstruct himself through writing in order to 
hide his vices. On the contrary, his aim is to expose them, to deliver what he 
perceives as an honest account of his life. His ruthless self- critique must in a 
sense legitimate his role as the "objective" witness, since he is clearly not 
trying to paint an idealised image of himself. Knowing that the reader will be 
his judge, he relinquishes the author's power of creation and searches instead 
for an objectivity which he hopes will reveal the truth. Yet, as Serge 
Doubrovsky comments, "in the modern autobiographical project (for this 
project has a history that we are only now beginning to trace), one sets out not 
so much to paint oneself as to write oneself ... "118 This comment applies 
not only to the modern autobiographical project, for as we see in these 
Confessions, the act of writing oneself is unavoidable when one attempts to 
write autobiography. 
In Book III, Augustine describes how his encounter with Cicero's book 
created in him a desire for philosophy. The book became for him a symbol of 
philosophy, not the philosophy which he would later call truth, but a 
philosophy which he later realises was merely a distraction from the truth. 
The book is deceptive, the illusive symbol of wisdom. In the following 
passage, he describes the philosophy of the Manichees as a deception 
masquerading as the truth: 
et diceb ant: "veritas et veritas" et multum earn dicebant mihi, et 
nusquam erat in eis, sed falsa loquebantur non de te tantum, qui 
vere veritas es, sed etiam de istis elementis mundi, creatura tua de 
quibus etiam vera dicentes philosophos transgredi debui prae 
amore tuo, mi pater summe bone, pulchritudo pulchrorum 
omnium. o veritas, veritas, quam intime etiam turn medullae 
animi mei suspirab ant tibi, cum te illi sonarent mihi frequenter et 
118Serge Doubrovsky, "Autobiography /Truth /Psychoanalysis," Genre 26 
(Spring 1993), p. 27. 
68 
multipliciter voce sola et libris multis et ingentibus! et illa erant 
fercula, in quibus mihi esurienti te inferebatur sol et luna, pulchra 
opera tua, sed tarnen opera tua quam ista corporea quamvis lucida 
et caelestia.119 
Yet they [Manichees] cried out "Truth, Truth," and spake much 
thereof to me, yet it was not in them: but they spake falsehood, not 
of Thee only, (who truly art Truth,) but even of those elements of 
this world, Thy creatures ... O Truth, Truth, how inwardly did 
even then the marrow of my soul pant after Thee, when they 
often and diversly, and in many and huge books, echoed of Thee 
to me, though it was but an echo? And these were the dishes 
wherein to me, hungering after Thee, they, instead of Thee, 
served up the Sun and Moon, beautiful works of Thine, but yet 
thy works, not Thyself, no nor Thy first works. For Thy spiritual 
works are before these corporeal works, celestial though they be, 
and shining.120 
According to this passage, Augustine's image of the book is hollow and 
carnal. The book is deceptive because it pretends to represent truth; it is the 
serpent in the garden which continually tempts him. Augustine's image of 
truth is beautiful but elusive. It is neither obvious nor easily obtained. The 
Manicheans' deceptive use of language, both spoken and written, forces 
Augustine to conceive of truth as something which cannot be revealed 
plainly through language. 
This difficulty of knowing and expressing truth lies at the heart of 
Augustine's Confessions. Language is at best inadequate or at worst deceptive 
when twisted or abused. In Augustine's experience, intimate communication 
with God cannot take place through the language which is reserved for 
temporal communication. In the following passage, Augustine describes 
silence rather than language as the most effective medium of communication 
with God: 
119III, VI, 10. 
120P. 38. 
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quae illa tormenta parturientis cordis mei, qui gemitus, deus 
meus! et ibi erant aures tuae nesciente me. et cum in silentio 
fortiter quaererem magnae uoces erant ad misericordiam tuam, 
tacitae contritiones animi mei. tu sciebas, quid patiebar, et nullus 
hominum. quantum enim erat, quod inde digerebatur per 
linguam meam in aures familiarissimorum meorum! numquid 
tumultus animae meae, cui nec tempora nec os meum sufficiebat, 
sonanbat eis? totum tamen ibat in auditum tuum, quod rugiebam 
a gemitu cordis mei, et ante te erat desiderium meum et lumen 
oculorum meorum non erat mecum. intus enim erat, ego autem 
foris, nec in loco illud. at ego intendebam in ea, quae locis 
continentur, et non ibi inueniebam locum ad requiescendum... 
121 
What were the pangs of my teeming heart, what groans, O my 
God! Yet even there were Thine ears open, and I knew it not: and 
when in silence I vehemently sought, those silent contritions of 
my soul were strong cries unto Thy mercy. Thou knewst what I 
suffered, and no man. For, what was that which was thence 
through my tongue distilled into the ears of my most familiar 
friends? Did the whole tumult of my soul, for which neither time 
nor utterance sufficed, reach them? Yet went up the whole to Thy 
hearing, all which I roared before Thee, and the light of mine eyes 
was not with me: for that was within, I without: nor was that 
confined to place, but I was intent on things contained in place, 
but there I found no resting -place ... 122 
The central idea of the Incarnation is the transformation of the Logos into 
something carnal. The Word was emptied and filled with another essence. 
The medieval hierachisation of language is not speech/ writing but rather 
silence/ language, silence being that form of language which creates the 
possibility of presence. However, even this distinction becomes blurred 
through the Incarnation. 
Augustine cannot articulate his most intimate feelings, his groans, in 
language. However, he is able to write about the experience of avoiding 
121 




language, of escaping language. Could writing be necessary in understanding 
this experience? Has this consolidation of experience through writing 
become a necessary part of the experience itself? Augustine declares through 
the written text that silence is the best and highest form of language. Speech, 
in contrast, has proved to be futile and results only in emptiness. It can even 
be argued that speech carries the illusion of presence, of being present to 
friends whom Augustine recognises can never fully understand him. Speech 
is empty and dissatisfying; Augustine can never fill himself with it. But the 
groans of silence can carry his spirit, and the written word consolidates the 
experience of transcending language. There is a partnership between silence 
(the transcendent non -language) and the written text, the temporal 
representation of silence. This coalition results in the exclusion of speech as a 
useless thing, soiled by its contact with humanity. Speech is an illusion, a 
stream of empty signifiers. As the medieval monks who swore vows of 
silence can(not) tell us, speech is an obstruction to the divine. Since the main 
purpose of language in the Middle Ages was not necessarily communication, 
the speech/ writing hierarchy which might be relevant in other contexts does 
not apply well to this one. 
Augustine interprets his conversion as an experience both of the voice 
and of the written word. He writes, "Dicebam haec et flebam amarissima 
contritione cordis me. et ecce audio vocem de vicina domo cum cantu 
dicentis et crebro repetentis quasi pueri an puellae, nescio : ' tolle lege, tolle 
lege.-123 [ "So was I speaking, and weeping in the most bitter contrition of 
my heart, when, lo! I heard from a neighbouring house a voice, as of boy or 
girl, I know not, chanting, and oft repeating, 'Take up and read, Take up and 
123VIII, XII, 29. 
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read.' ' 124 The voice, however, is unidentified, and the speaker is not present. 
Augustine concludes that the voice must be a command from God. His 
conversion occurs through the act of reading a sentence: "non in 
comisationibus et ebrietatibus, non in cubilibus et inpudicitiis, no in 
contentione et aemulatione, sed induite dominum Iesum Christum et canis 
providentiam ne feceritis in concupiscentiis. "125 [ "Not in rioting and 
drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying: 
but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the 
flesh... "] 126 He describes his conversion in terms of his experience with the 
text: "nec ultra volui legere nec opus erat. statim quippe cum fine huiusce 
sententiae quasi luce securitatis infusa cordi meo omnes dubitationis tenebrae 
diffugerunt. "127 [ "No further would I read; nor needed I; for instantly at the 
end of this sentence, by a light as it were of serenity infused into my heart, all 
the darkness of doubt vanished away. "] 128 Augustine identifies the text as the 
beginning of his conversion experience, locating it as the focal point on 
which his conversion turns. 
The Confessions is Augustine's attempt to know himself through the 
process of writing and reading himself. As the reader of his own text, he is 
both the author and the co- author, the author who produces his thoughts and 
the author who subsequently reads and rewrites them. He begins Book X 
with a prayer, "Cognoscam te, cognitor meus, congnoscam, sicut et cognitus 
sum... volo earn facere in corde meo coram te in confessione, in stilo autem 
124p. 170. 
125VIII, XII, 29. 
126p. 171. 
127VIII, XII, 19. 
128p. 171. 
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meo coram mutis testibus." 129 [ "Let me know Thee, O Lord, who knowest 
me: let me know Thee, as I am known... This would I do in my heart before 
Thee in confession: and in my writing, before many witnesses.1130 
Augustine acknowledges that he is already known by God, but that self - 
knowledge must come through the act of writing. His writing also serves as 
something which can be tested and verified by many witnesses, unlike 
speech, which vanishes the moment it comes into being. Speech is the 
discourse of a universe which is constantly in flux, which never is for more 
than a moment. Writing, on the other hand, can be associated with the 
human need to verify, to reveal as true. It reflects a mindset in which human 
beings try to arrest the flow of time to test the truth of the past, to freeze 
everything into Being rather than to be carried away by a continuous flux of 
matter. Writing is static and gives the semblance of eternity. 
tibi ergo, domine, manifestus sum, quicumque sim. et quo fructu 
tibi confitear, dixi. neque id ago verbis carnis et vocibus, sed verbis 
animae et clamore cogitationis, quem novit auris tua... confessio 
itaque mea, deus meus, in conspectu tuo tibi tacite fit et non tacite. 
tacet enim strepitu, clamat affectu. neque enim dico recti aliquid 
hominibus, quod non a me tu prius audieris, aut etiam tu aliquid 
tale audis a me, quod no mihi tu prius dixeris.131 
To Thee therefore, O Lord, am I open, whatever I am; and with 
what fruit I confess unto thee, I have said. Nor do I it with words 
and sounds of the flesh, but with the words of my soul, and the cry 
of the thought which Thy ear knowest ... My confession then, O 
my God, in Thy sight, is made silently, and not silently. For in 
sound, it is silent, in affection, it cries aloud. For neither do I utter 
any thing right unto men, which Thou hast not heard from me; 
nor dost Thou hear any such thing from me, which Thou hast not 
first said unto me.132 
129X, I, 1. 
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In this prayer, in this address to the other, Augustine stresses his belief that 
his confessions cannot be spoken. Clearly, a spoken confession would go 
against his desire to transcend the barrier of speech. 
Augustine continues, "Quid mihi ergo est cum hominibus, ut audiant 
confessiones meas, quasi ipsi sanaturi sint omnes languores meos? curiosum 
genus ad cognoscendam vitam alienam, desidiosum ad corrigendam suam. 
quid a me quaerunt audire qui sim, qui nolunt a to audire qui sint? "133 
[ "What then have I to do with men, that they should hear my confessions; as 
if they could heal all my infirmities? A race curious to know the lives of 
others, slothful to amend their own. Why seek they to hear from me what I 
am; who will not hear from Thee what themselves are ? "] 134 In this passage 
Augustine actually rejects speech as a lower form of communication which 
would leave him open to the questions and deceits of other human beings, 
and to a system of interrogation which is hypocritical and unjust. For 
Augustine, paradoxically, the act of confessing involves the act of evading 
speech. 
We can conclude that speech may be considered to be the privileged 
term if the primary goal of language is communication. However, the aim of 
the Confessions is not to communicate but to conduct an interrogation of the 
self, from which other human beings are excluded. In this context, presence 
arises not from speech but from silence. In the following passage, Augustine 
describes the feeling of being present to oneself which may come about 
through memory: 
Intus haec ago, in aula ingenti memoriae meae ibi enim mihi 
caelum et terra et mare praesto sunt cum omnibus, quae in eis 
sentire potui, praeter illa, quae oblitus sum. ibi mihi et ipse 
133X, III, 3. 
134P 205. 
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occurro meque recolo, quid, quando et ubi egerim quoque modo, 
cum agerem, affectus fuerim... "o si esset hoc aut illud!" "avertat 
deus hoc aut illud!": dico apud me ista et, cum dico, praesto sunt 
imagines omnium quae dico ex eodem thesauro memoriae, ne 
omnino aliquid eorum dicerem, si defuissent.135 
These things [the experiences of the senses] within, in that vast 
court of my memory. For there are present with me, heaven, 
earth, sea, and whatever I could think on therein, besides what I 
have forgotten. There also meet I with myself, and recall myself, 
and when, where, and what I have done, and under what 
feelings ... "O that this or that might be!" "God avert this or 
that!" So speak I to myself: and when I speak, the images of all I 
speak of are present, out of the same treasury of memory; nor 
would I speak of any thereof, were the images wanting.136 
Through the medium of memory, past and future are joined to the present. 
When different modalities of time are bound together in the same space, 
which modality is the privileged one? Is it the present or the past which is 
contained by memory? 
Augustine's ability to confess and to recount his life is dependent upon 
his memory. The power of memory is the power of recreation, of 
reconstructing one's past to match the desires of the present. But as 
Augustine discovers, even in the act of self- interrogation, one can never be 
completely present, even to oneself: 
Magna ista vis ets memoriae, magna nimis, deus, penetrale 
amplum et infinitum. quis ad fundum eius pervenit? et vis est 
haec animi mei atque ad meam naturam pertinet, nec ego ipse 
capio totum, quod sum. ergo animus ad habendum se ipsum 
angustus est, ut ubi sit quod sui non capit? numquid extra ipsum 
ac non in ipso? quomodo ergo non capit? multa mihi super hoc 








Great is this force of memory, excessive great, O my God; a large 
and boundless chamber! Who ever sounded the bottom thereof? 
Yet is this a power of mine, and belongs unto my nature; nor do I 
myself comprehend all that I am. Therefore is the mind too strait 
to contain itself. And where should that be, which it containeth 
not of itself? Is it without it, and not within? How then doth it 
not comprehend itself? A wonderful admiration surprises me, 
amazement seizes me upon this.138 
In this passage Augustine questions the division between exteriority and 
interiority. Although this division relates to his self -examination, it is now 
the process of examining his own mind which leads him to question it. He 
confronts a dilemma in which a seemingly infinite subject must contemplate 
a seemingly infinite object, which is to say itself, and in this situation the 
frontiers of interiority and exteriority collapse. 
Augustine's examination of his own memory, and his subsequent 
amazement at its power, suggest that memory is actually a tool which 
reconstructs reality. If one is dependent upon one's memory, as Augustine is, 
then one's perspective of reality can only be subjective. Objective reality is 
purely theoretical. Where, then, is the origin of reality? Can it be located 
solely within the memory? He writes: 
hic sunt et illa omnia, quae de doctrinis liberalibus percepta 
nondum exciderunt, quasi remota interiore loco, non loco; nec 
eorum imagines, sed res ipsas gero. nam quid sit litteratura, quid 
peritia disputandi, quot genera quaestionum, quidquid horum 
scio, sic est in memoria mea, ut non retenta imagine rem foris 
reliquerim aut sonuerit aut praeterit, sicut vox inpressa per aures 
vestigio, quo recolereturn, quasi sonaret, cum iam non sonaret . . . 
istae quippe res non intromittuntur ad eam, sed eorum solae 
imagines mira celeritate capiuntur et miris tamquam cellis 
reponuntur et mirabiliter recordando proferuntur.139 
138p. 212. 
139X VIII, 16. 
76 
Here also is all, learnt of the liberal sciences and as yet 
unforgotten; removed as it were to some inner place, which is yet 
no place. Nor are they the images thereof, but the things 
themselves. For, what is literature, what the art of disputing, how 
many kinds of questions there be, whatsoever of these I know, in 
such manner exists in my memory, as that I have not taken in the 
image, and left out the thing, or that it should have sounded and 
passed away like a voice fixed on the ear by that impress, whereby 
it might be recalled, as if it sounded, when it no longer sounded. . . 
For those things are not transmitted into the memory, but their 
images only are with an admirable swiftness caught up, and stored 
as it were in wondrous cabinets, and thence wonderfully by the act 
of remembering, brought forth.140 
So much is dependent on the memory. Augustine draws an analogy between 
things and the voice, both of which cannot be stored directly in the memory, 
but can be remembered through the mind's impressions. It is the absence of 
the thing itself which enables it to be recalled at a later time. 
According to Augustine, the images of sounds are present to the 
memory, but neither the voice of the speaker nor the things signified are. He 
emphasises the temporal aspect of the sounds themselves, which disappear 
only a moment after they are uttered: 
sonorum quidem, quibus haec verba confecta sunt, imagines 
teneo et eos per auras cum strepitu transisse ac iam non esse scio. 
res vero ipsas, quae illis significantu sons, neque ullo sensu 
corporis attigi neque uspiam vidi praeter animum meum et in 
memoria recondidi non imagines earum, sed, ipsas:141 
I do indeed hold the images of the sounds, of which those words 
be composed, and that those sounds, with a noise passed through 
the air, and now are not. But the things themselves which are 
signified by those sounds, I never reached with any sense of my 
body, nor ever discerned them otherwise than in my mind; yet in 
my memory have I laid up not their images, but themselves.142 
140p. 213. 
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Presence in this passage is not related to the voice or even to the presence of 
the speaker. Rather Augustine speaks of presence on a theoretical level; 
presence occurs only in the memory. He admits that while the image of the 
thing may be present in his memory, it is actually present neither temporally 
nor spatially. 
In the following passage, Augustine comments on the relation between 
sign and thing. He argues that although the actual thing may not be present, 
the image of the thing must be present to his mind in order that the thing be 
understood: 
nomino quippe lapidem, nomino solem, cum res ipsae non 
adsunt sensibus meis; in memoria sane mea praesto sunt 
imagines earum. nomino dolorem corporis, nec mihi adest, dum 
nihil dolet; nisi tarnen adesset imago eius in memoria mea, 
nescirem, quid dicerem nec eum in disputando a voluptate 
discernerem... neque enim imaginem imaginis eius, sed ipsam 
recolo: ipsa mihi reminiscenti praesto est. nomino memoriam et 
agnosco quod nomino. et ubi agnosco nisi in ipsa memoria? 
num et ipsa per imaginem suam sibi adest ac non per se 
ipsam? 143 
Thus, I name a stone, I name the sun, the things themselves not 
being present to my sense, but their images to my memory. I 
name a bodily pain, yet it is not present with me, when nothing 
aches. Yet unless its image were present to my memory, I should 
not know what to say thereof, nor in discoursing discern pain 
from pleasure... For I recall not the image of its image, but the 
image itself is present to me, calling it to mind. And where do I 
recognize it, but in the memory itself? Is it also present to itself by 
its image, and not by itself? 144 
Memory makes presence possible, not the presence of the thing itself but the 
presence of the mental image to the mind. Augustine attempts to search out 
the logical contradictions in his own theory, questioning, for instance, that if 
143X, XV, 23. 
144pp, 217-8. 
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he were to name forgetfulness and if forgetfulness were to be made present to 
him, would he then forget the meaning of forgetfulness? He concludes that 
when he thinks of forgetfulness, both the image of forgetfulness and his 
memory must be present. He then examines the resulting contradiction: how 
can forgetfulness be present to the memory? "an ex hoc intelligitur non se 
per ipsam finesse memoriae, cum earn meminimus, sed per imaginem suam, 
quia, si per se ipsam praesto esset oblivio, non ut meminissemus, sed ut 
oblivisceremur, efficeret?"145 ["Present then it is, that we forget not, and 
being so, we forget. It is to be understood from this, that forgetfulness, when 
we remember it, is not present to the memory by itself, but by its image: 
because if it were present by itself, it would not cause us to remember, but to 
forget..." p46 
Augustine argues that the thing itself must at one time have been 
present, enabling the image to be impressed upon the memory. Memory, 
then, has the power to make something which was present to the senses in 
the past, present to the mind in the present in the absence of the thing itself. 
Memory is the force which creates the possibility of making the past present. 
But even as he describes the power of memory, its logocentric power, he 
discards it in favour of transcendence. He prays, "ego ascendens per animum 
meum ad te, qui desuper mihi manes, transibo et istam vim meam, quae 
memoria vocatur, volens te attingere, unde attingi potes ... "147 [ "See, I am 
mounting up through my mind towards thee who abidest above me. Yea I 
145X, XVI, 24. 
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now will pass beyond this power of mine which is called memory, desirous to 
arrive at Thee, whence Thou mayest be arrived at ... 1148 
The sound of the voiced signifier and the communication of a thing 
through the voice clearly does not satisfy his longing, which remains for the 
thing itself. He writes: 
audivimus nomen hoc et omnes rem, omnes nos adpetere 
fatemur; non enim solo sono delectamur. nam hoc cum latine 
audit Graecus, non delectatur, quia ignorat, quid dictum sit; nos 
autem delectamur, sicut etiam ille, si graece hoc audierit, quoniam 
res ipsa nec graeca nec latina est, cui adipiscendae Graeci Latinique 
inhiant ceterarumque linguarum homines.149 
We hear the name, and we all confess that we desire the thing; for 
we are not delighted with the mere sound. For when a Greek 
hears it in Latin, he is not delighted, not knowing what is spoken; 
but we Latins are delighted, as would he too, if he heard it in 
Greek; because the thing itself is neither Greek nor Latin, which 
Greeks and Latins, and men of all other tongues, long for so 
earnestly. 150 
Augustine relates the arbitrary qualities of language to his desire for the thing 
itself, which remains the thing no matter what language it is expressed in. 
His longing is not for the signifier, which is completely arbitrary, a fact which 
is most evident in such a case where the signifier is a foreign word and 
cannot be understood. This desire for the presence of the thing, this 
dissatisfaction with an empty signifier, is, according to Augustine, a common 
condition of humanity. Yet it is something which he "confesses," which he 
now speaks openly even though he might have some purpose for concealing 
this truth. Is this the same longing for presence which Derrida characterises 
as a crucial element in logocentric thought, this desire of which Augustine 
148p. 220. 
149X, XX, 29. 
150pp. 222-3. 
80 
seems so acutely aware and is so ready to speak about? This non -mystical 
desire for the presence of the thing is clearly separate from Augustine's desire 
for God or for Christ, and according to Augustine everyone who uses 
language will desire the presence of the actual thing. 
Just as the signifier was of no great importance, Augustine did not 
regard the voice with any special consideration. He does not elevate it to the 
status of divinity. As he remarks in the following passage, speech is useful in 
that it can be compared with the logos; however, according to Augustine, the 
analogy is so inaccurate that the comparison is rendered useless. Human 
speech is in fact not representative of divine speech: 
Sed quomodo dixisti? numquid illo modo, quo facta est vox de 
nube dicens: hic est filius meus dilectus? illa enim vox acta atque 
transacta est, coepta et finita. sonuerunt syllabae atque transierunt, 
secunda post primam, tertia post secundam atque inde ex ordine, 
donec ultima post ceteras silentiumque post ultimam. unde claret 
atque eminet, quod creaturae motus expressit eam serviens 
aeternae voluntati tuae ipse temporalis. et haec ad tempus facta 
verba tua nuntiavit auris exterior menti prudenti, cuius auris 
interior posita est ad aeternum verbum tuum. at illa conparavit 
haec verba temporaliter sonantia cum aeterno in silentio verbo 
tuo et dixit: " aliud est longe, longe aliud est. haec longe infra me 
sunt nec sunt, quia fugiunt et praetereunt: verbum autem dei mei 
supra me manet in aeternum."15 i 
But how didst Thou speak? In the way that the voice came out of 
the cloud, saying, This is my beloved Son? For that voice passed 
by and passed away, began and ended; the syllables sounded and 
passed away, the second after the first, the third after the second, 
and so forth in order, until the last after the rest, and silence after 
the last. Whence it is abundantly clear and plain that the motion 
of a creature expressed it, itself temporal, serving Thy eternal will. 
And these Thy words, created for a time, the outward ear reported 
to the intelligent soul, whose inward ear by listening to Thy 
Eternal Word. But she compared these words sounding in time, 
with that Thy Eternal Word in silence, and said It is different, far 
different. These words are far beneath me, nor are they, because 
151XI, VI, 8. 
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they flee and pass away; but the Word of my Lord abideth above 
for ever. "152 
Augustine divides divine language from human speech. Unlike 
human speech, which contains separate sounds which are spoken 
successively and which reflect a changing temporal reality, divine language 
mirrors eternity. Divine language is not divided into separate phonetic 
sounds, but is spoken together, in one unbreakable sound. Thus there is no 
parallel between human speech and divine language. Divine language is 
associated with the Beginning: "cum autem redimus ab errorem, 
cognoscendo utique redimus; ut autem cognoscamus, docet nos, quia 
principium est et loquitur nobis. "153 ["But when we return from error, it is 
through knowing that we return; and that we may know, He teacheth us, 
because He is the Beginning, and speaking unto us. "] 154 Divine language is 
not human speech but a metaphor for something else which Augustine does 
not know how to name, but which involves his understanding of origin. 
The insurmountable difference between divine speech and human 
speech is the difference between infinity and temporality, between Being and 
Becoming. Only in infinity is there the possibility of presence. As Augustine 
asserts in the final line, the voice is not a tool of logocentrism. He writes: 
Qui haec dicunt, nondum te intellegunt, o sapientia dei, lux 
mentium, nondum intellegunt, quomodo fiant, quae per te atque 
in te fiunt, et conantur aeterna sapere, sed adhuc in praeteritis et 
futuris rerum motibus cor eorum volitat et adhuc vanum ets. 
quis tenenbit illud et figet illud, ut paululum stet et paululum 
rapiat splendorem semper stantis aeternitatis et conparet cum 
temporibus numquam stantibus et videat esse inconparabilem et 
videat longum tempus nisi ex multis praetereuntibus motibus, 





qui simul extendi non possunt, longum non fieri; non autem 
praeterire quicquam in aeterno, sed totum esse praesens; nullum 
vero tempus totum esse praesens: et videat omne praeteritum 
propelli ex futuro et omne futurum ex praeterito consequi et 
omne praeteritum ac futurum ab eo, quod semper est praesens, 
creari et excurrere? quis tenebit cor hominis, ut stet et videat, 
quomodo stans dictet futura et praeterita tempora nec futura nec 
praeterita aeternitas? numquid manus mea valet hoc aut manus 
oris mei per loquellas agit tam grandem rem ?155 
Who speak thus, do not yet understand Thee, O Wisdom of God, 
Light of souls, understand not yet how the things be made, which 
by Thee, and in Thee are made: yet they strive to comprehend 
things eternal, whilst their heart fluttereth between the motions 
of things past and to come, and is still unstable. Who shall hold it, 
and fix it, that it be settled awhile, and awhile catch the glory of 
that ever -fixed Eternity, and compare it with the time which are 
never fixed, and see that it cannot be compared; and that a long 
time cannot become long, but out of many motions passing by, 
which cannot be prolonged altogether, but that in the Eternal 
nothing passeth, but the whole is present; whereas no time is all at 
once present: and that all time past, is driven on by time to come, 
and all to come followeth upon the past; and all past and to come, 
is created, and flows out of that which is ever present? Who shall 
hold the heart of man, that it may stand still, and see how eternity 
ever still- standing, neither past nor to come, uttereth the times 
past and to come? Can my hand do this, or the hand of my mouth 
by speech bring about a thing so great ?156 
This passage contains Augustine's assertion that the known world is in 
constant motion, and the time of this world is in constant flux. As he writes, 
"a long time cannot become long," and the present cannot be contained for 
more than a moment. Only in Eternity can presence be realised, in a present 
which is not driven towards the past by an oncoming future. In the last two 
sentences of this passage, Augustine writes into his desire for presence the 
impossibility of obtaining it. 
155XI, XI, 13. 
156p. 260. 
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While the voice is regarded as an unsuitable metaphor for the divine 
voice, Augustine privileges the written word as giving a truer semblance of 
eternity: "[angelorum tuorum] vident enim faciem tuam semper et ibi legunt 
sine syllabis temporum, quid velit aeterna voluntas tua. legunt, eligunt et 
diligunt; semper legunt et numquam praeterit quod legunt. eligendo enim et 
diligendo legunt ipsam inconmutabilitatem consilii tui. non clauditur codex 
eorum nec plicatur liber eorum . . . "157 [ "For they [thine angels] always 
behold Thy face, and there read without any syllables in time, what willeth 
Thy eternal will; they read, they choose, they love. They are ever reading; and 
that never passes away which they read; for by choosing, and by loving, they 
read the very unchangeableness of Thy counsel. Their book is never closed, 
nor their scroll folded up ... "]158 There is a remarkable contrast in Book XIII 
between the eternal quality of the written word described in the preceding 
paragraph, and the temporal quality of speech mentioned in the following 
passage, which Augustine associates with the carnality of the flesh: " quibus 
omnibus vocibus corporaliter enuntiandis causa est abyssus saeculi et caecitas 
carnis, qua cogitata non possunt videri, ut opus sit instrepere in auribus. ita, 
quamvis multiplicentur volatilia super terram, ex aquis tarnen originem 
ducunt. "159 [ "The vocal pronouncing of all which words, is occasioned by the 
deep of this world, and the blindness of the flesh, which cannot see thoughts, 
so that there is need to speak aloud into the ears; so that, although flying - 
fowls be multiplied upon the earth, yet they derive their beginning from the 
waters. "] 160 The spoken word rather than the written one is relegated to a 
secondary position and associated with carnality. 
157XIII, XV, 18. 
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Augustine's self- examination further leads him to question the 
transcendental authority of the author, to realise the reader's power to create 
meaning and perhaps to locate the truth of a text. In his commentary on 
Scriptural interpretation, he writes: 
quae mihi ardenter confitenti, deus meus, lumen oculorum 
meorum in occulto, quid mihi obest, cum diversa in his vebis 
intellegi possint, quae tarnen vera sint? quid, inquam, mihi obest, 
si aliud ego sensero, quam sensit alius eum sensisse, qui scriptsit? 
omnes quidem, qui legimus, nitimur hoc indagare atque 
conprehendere, quod voluit ille quern legimus, et cum eum 
veridicum credimus, nihil, quod falsum esse vel novimus vel 
putamus, audemus eum existimare dixisse. dum ergo quisque 
conatur, id sentire in scripturis sanctis, quod in eis sensit ille qui 
scriptsit, quid mali est, si hoc sentiat, quod tu, lux omnium 
veridicarum mentium, ostendis verum esse, etiamsi non hoc 
sensit ille, quern legit, cum et ille verum nec tamen hoc 
senserit? 161 
And what doth it prejudice me, O my God, Thou light of my eyes 
in secret, zealously confessing these things, since divers things 
may be understood under these words which yet are all true, -- 
what, I say, doth it prejudice me, if I think otherwise than I say, 
doth it prejudice me, if I think otherwise than another thinketh 
the writer thought? All we readers verily strive to trace out and to 
understand his meaning whom we read; and seeing we believe 
him to speak truly, we dare not imagine him to have said 
anything, which ourselves either know or think to be false. 
While every man endeavours then to understand in the holy 
Scriptures, the same as the writer understood, what hurt is it, if a 
man understood what Thou, the light of all true -speaking minds, 
dost shew him to be true, although he whom he reads, 
understood not his, seeing he also understood a Truth, though 
not this truth? 162 
According to this passage, texts do not possess transcendent truths, and 
Augustine as the author of the Confessions wants to be both creator and 
everyman, to stand unique as the speaking subject and to stand nameless as 
161XII, XVIII, 27. 
162P. 273. 
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one among the multitudes. Autobiography can be called the first step towards 
the death of the author. The author who turns himself into text is one who is 
ready to relinquish his role as the author/ creator. Here Augustine has 
identified himself as a reader, and by doing so empowers his fellow readers, 
lending them the right and the power to interpret. 
As we saw in the preceding passage, the Confessions reveals not only 
Augustine's attitude towards writing and autobiography, but his view on 
reading and interpretation as well. According to Augustine, different 
interpretations of Scripture can be simultaneously valid; the reader's goal 
should not be to discover the intention of the author. Unlike some 
postmodern critics, he does not draw a relationship between the belief in a 
transcendental signified and the belief that authorial intention is 
transcendent. There is no fundamental relation between author and Author 
evident in this autobiographical text. In the medieval world view, to 
attribute to the human author the creative power and status of the divine 
Author would involve challenging God's uniqueness and omnipotence. 
Always aware of the weaknesses of his fellow human beings and of his own 
fallibilities both as an author and as a reader, Augustine de- privileges the role 
of the human author, and empowers the reader as an individual who is able 
to draw correct interpretations without the aid of the author. 
Augustine constructs his own method of reading in the Confessions, 
based on the assumption that authorial intention is not transcendent Truth. 
Furthermore, he does not privilege speech above writing, but does privilege 
divine language above human language, or in other words, eternal language 
above temporal language. He prays: 
ad haec tu dicis mihi, quoniam tu es deus meus et dicis voce forti 
in aure interiore servo tuo perrumpens meam surditatem et 
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clamans: "o homo, nempe quod scriptura mea dicit, ego dico. et 
tarnen illa temporaliter dicit, verbo autem meo tempus non 
accedit, quia aequali mecum aeternitate consistit. sic ea, quae vos 
per spiritum meum videtis, ego video, sicut ea, quae vos per 
spiritum meum dicitis, ego dico. atque ita cum vos temporaliter 
ea videatis, non ego temporaliter video, quemadmodum, cum vos 
temporaliter ea dicatis, non ego temporaliter dico. "163 
Thou art my God, and with a strong voice tellest Thy servant in 
his inner ear, breaking through my deafness and crying, "O man, 
that which My Scripture saith, I say: and yet doth that speak in 
time, but time has no relation to My Word; because My Word 
exists in equal eternity with Myself. So the thing which ye see 
through My Spirit, I see; like as what ye speak by My Spirit, I speak. 
And so when ye see those things in time, I see them not in time; 
as when ye speak in time, I speak them not in time. "164 
Augustine's division of language is not between two forms or media of 
language (i.e. speech and writing) but between temporal language and divine 
language, the latter being only a metaphor for something which Augustine 
can conceive of but not understand. In the method of reading suggested by 
Augustine, one should read not to determine authorial intention, but only 
with the hope that human language might lend a brief, temporal glimpse of 
divine language, which is, as best as we can determine, a metaphor for 
silence. 
163XIII, XXIX, 44. 
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The unspoken confessions? (A response to Taylor's Erring ) 
The following section will address Mark Taylor's argument in Erring 
in which he outlines a deconstructive approach to theology. His comments 
on autobiography and specifically about the Confessions may lend further 
insight to this discussion. According to Taylor, the present age can be 
characterised by the rise of death of God theology and the disappearance of the 
divine author. Taylor lists two polar responses to this movement: either 
people have become indifferent to questions of theology, or they hold to a 
traditionalist stance and refuse to discuss the subject openly. In contrast, 
Taylor asserts that deconstruction willingly addresses the issue of the death of 
God. 
Taylor views the many expressions of logocentrism as interrelated. He 
identifies four chief elements of theology: God, the self, history, and the book, 
each of which is ordered and organised around a centre. Historical narrative 
and autobiography are discussed in terms of the interrelation of these 
elements. Both, according to Taylor, strive to create coherence out of 
seemingly random events: "While autobiography presents an ordered 
account of an individual self made in the image of God, historical narrative 
strives to uncover the coherence of time as a whole." 165 To Taylor, it seems 
that the human tendency is to conceive of a course of events as an ordered 
narrative; thus history and autobiography must follow a coherent path. The 
alternative is what he describes as "serpentine wandering. "166 
It is fitting that he should begin a deconstruction of theology with 
Augustine's Confessions, which has served as so many other beginnings. He 
165Erring: A Postmodern A /theology, (Chicago and London: U of Chicago Press, 




cites the Confessions as the beginning of the epoch of selfhood, which ends 
with Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit. Taylor credits Augustine with the 
discovery of personal subjectivity, which is related to Augustine's recognition 
of the subjectivity of time. According to Augustine, there are three 
modalities of time which exist in the mind, but only one tense, the present. 
Taylor interprets the Confessions as an exercise in recollection, in knowing 
and discovering the self, emphasising the subjectivity which is involved in 
this process. The self, through the process of recollection, can recreate and 
redefine reality. Autobiography thus serves to unite one's various personal 
experiences into a whole and simultaneously calls the different modalites of 
time to the present. According to Taylor, autobiography can serve as a tool 
through which the author attempts to achieve self -presence through the 
process of recollection. He identifies Augustine's conversion experience as 
the unifying point of the Confessions, the point in time in which the past, 
present, and future of Augustine's experiences meet and in which Augustine 
achieves self -presence. 
According to Taylor, the process of recollection implies a necessary 
process of structuring and organisation. As he argues: 
Recollection joins what apparently is disjoined and connects what 
seems to be disconnected. When thought turns on itself, 
recollection enables the self to become present to itself by 
comprehending, gathering together, and unifying the three 
modalities of the present. The complex self -presence that results 
from self -recollection mirrors the intricacy of the present itself. 
Self, as well as time, is one substance with three modes.167 
Self- presence is achieved through this psychological restructuring of time. 
Seen in this regard, autobiography is indeed a unifying force, a construct and a 
167p. 44. 
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reconstruction of the self. As Taylor writes, In view of the imaginative 
coherence of autobiography, the centered self appears to be more a literary 
creation than a literal fact. "168 If we take Taylor's argument one step further, 
autobiography would involve the creation of self -presence through the 
manipulation of one's experience in the process of recollection. 
Autobiography further involves the fictionalising of the self, the 
turning of the self into text. Augustine, as the first Western autobiographer, 
is the first to invite the reader to rewrite his text, to rewrite him. The 
autobiography is the ultimate self- centred but anti -logocentric text. It 
demands that the author be utterly self- conscious to the point where the 
active subject becomes the passive object of scrutiny, where the author 
becomes the text, the thing, la chose, which may be described and judged, first 
by the author and then by each subsequent reader. The autobiographical self 
is a self without will, without intention, emptied of significance beyond 
signifiers. Even the Bible can be regarded as the autobiography of the 
Incarnate Word, the Word inviting the reader to rewrite it, submitting itself 
to be rewritten, and each reader through the process of rewriting becomes a 
part of the Book itself. 
Although he credits Augustine with the discovery of personal 
subjectivity, he also identifies the logocentric aspects of Augustine's 
autobiography. Autobiography functions to bring about self -realisation. It 
brings together one's various experiences and organises them into a cohesive 
whole. According to Taylor, Augustine's conversion experience serves as the 
unifying centre of the Confessions and is the source of organisation from 
168p. 45. 
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which the rest of his life derives meaning. This structured organisation 
makes the autobiographer's narrative into something which tends towards 
fiction. Taylor further argues that Augustine's Confessions are actually 
spoken, not written, to God, since, as he puts it, "Speech is the element of self - 
presence, the medium in which presence becomes fully present. "169 
Autobiography can perhaps be called not the accident of hearing oneself speak 
about oneself, but the accident of reading and writing the innermost word, 
the dicibile. 
Autobiography is not the attempt to make oneself present to the reader 
but involves the emptying out of the self; it is an invitation to the reader to 
judge the subject, to rewrite and transform the author into the object text. It is 
the voluntary slaying or suicide of authorial intention. Therefore Taylor is 
wrong when he argues that the Confessions is actually spoken, not written, to 
God. In the following passage, Taylor tries to demonstrate how the 
Confessions fits into a logocentric model in which speech is privileged above 
writing: "For Augustine, this full presence comes to complete expression in 
speech or voice. His confession is really an extended prayer spoken to God. 
Untainted by extraneous marks and unsoiled by extraneous signs, voice 
permits the self to become transparent itself by becoming visible to God. "170 
Taylor's argument is characteristic of a deconstructive criticism which 
interprets a text according to a logocentric model. There is little evidence to 
suggest that Augustine disliked the medium of writing and considered the 
Confessions to be verbally spoken rather than written. We should consider 
the question: why would Augustine choose to write if he was searching for 




Autobiography is the speaking or writing, the signifying to oneself 
about oneself, the aim being not the lesser goal of communication with 
another person, but the creation and recreation of the self. The author 
becomes a participant in his or her own making. In Augustine's case his 
Confessions constitute a revelation of the interior word. They are not 
spoken confessions to God, for surely Augustine believed that God had direct 
access to the interior word. Rather, Augustine's written Confessions are the 
words of Augustine's spirit brought directly onto the written text, without the 
barrier of speech. His primary purpose is not communication, in which case 
perhaps speech would be considered the preferable mode. Were Augustine's 
Confessions to be merely spoken, they would be lost to us forever. It is only 
through the written text that Augustine's interior word is preserved. 
If the prime function of language was always communication, then 
speech might be privileged in that it speeds up and simplifies the process of 
communication. However, if the aim of language serves a different purpose, 
then speech can no longer be regarded as the privileged term. The true 
logocentric use of language would not be communication but the 
transcendence of language. Speech would then be seen as an impediment to 
the divine. For a true logocentric writer, writing would be privileged as the 
medium which makes possible a sense of infinity, which lends a semblance of 
immortality to the author/ creator. Writing exteriorises the interior word in 
a form which mirrors eternity in its permanence. 
Even if Augustine would have preferred the Confessions to be spoken 
rather than written, the fact is that Augustine the person, his life and 
thought, comes to us only through the written text. The Middle Ages belongs 
to the distant past, and it is only through texts and remnants of texts that we 
have access to it. The lack of the actual presence of the medieval writers 
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themselves allows the postmodern reader to rewrite the Middle Ages 
according to our own models -- if we wish, to force it into a logocentric model 
which fits badly. In that case, deconstruction would become the tool of what 
might be termed postmodern imperialism, the instrument by which our 
ability to understand the Middle Ages is eradicated. The Middle Ages may 
then be transformed into an image, a shadow, of postmodernism. 
According to many deconstructive critics, and particularly Derrida 
himself, deconstruction is a critique of Western metaphysics only, not of oral 
traditions nor of ideogrammatically based writing systems. Were Western 
critics trained in the Western tradition to extend their sphere of commentary 
to include other cultural traditions, they would encounter numerous 
problems. The end result would be a form of cultural imperialism, the 
rewriting and re- representing of non -Western cultures to fit a Western 
mentality. However, despite taking such care to avoid cultural imperialism, 
postmodernists face the danger of committing a different type of cultural 
imperialism based on time rather than space. To avoid this error, 
postmodernists must maintain an awareness of the distance which separates 
the Middle Ages from the present. The languages of the Middle Ages, 
medieval Latin, Byzantine Greek, etc. are remnants of the past. Of all 
languages, these ancient ones are the least likely to carry a logocentric 
structure, since their vocal signifiers have disappeared forever, having left 
only their written traces for us to follow. 
The postmodern world view can feed off its image of the Middle Ages, 
can reconstruct itself as a logocentric shadow. But what is this logocentric 
shadow which wants to be what logocentrism is not, or what the Middle Ages 
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is not? This shadow of logocentrism is dependent not upon medieval 
theology, but upon its own reconstruction of logocentrism, for its identity and 
for its existence. The medieval text is rewritten into a postmodern text which 
is continually forced to rewrite its own history. The risk for every medieval 
writer is that he or she will be rewritten by every subsequent reader. The 
medieval writer, always conscious of his or her humanity, must always 
concede that his or her text is not final, that it is neither divine nor 
transcendent. The desire to write, for the medieval Christian, is an act of 
submission both to the reader and to God. 
Autobiography is the writing of the self, an expression in which life 
(bio) is trapped between the self and the letter. Augustine, as the first 
Western autobiographer, has given to the Western tradition a genre which 
ties writing to life. The deconstruction of a logocentric autobiography should 
seek to remove the attachement of life to the word and to make way for an 
autograph in which writing embraces the self; the author would announce 
the non -life of a project which turns the author into a text which is at once a 
semblance of eternity yet already not alive, never really having lived. 
Logocentrism, like deconstruction, involves process and movement. The 
Confessions describes the process of Augustine's turning toward the Word, 
even as he is turned into text, and the process of his turning is dependent on 




"4/3icoo3" --the measure of infinite space according to 
Johann Schultz, cited in Bernard Bolzano, 
Paradoxes of the Infinite 
i 
i 
In the Absence of Presence: Pseudo -Dionysius and Negative Theology 
Augustine's Confessions contains the revelation of a secret, the verbal 
expression of his innermost thoughts, but to whom, and for what purpose? 
In this discourse in which everything is intended or hoped to be secret, in 
which everything is better left silent, in which the very act of speaking is the 
desire against one's desire, what happens to language which was designed for 
human communication and not for the ears of God alone? What happens to 
language which is twisted into its opposite, not a vehicle for communication 
and for open expression but for confessing in the darkness of the inner room? 
It is this twisted language which we find not only in the Confessions but in 
the negative (mystical) theology which makes its appearance from time to 
time in the history of logocentrism. 
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Negative theology and the Middle Ages 
Negative theology rests on the margins of Western culture, 
threatening in its paradoxical character to evade nearly all claims about it. Yet 
it was an essential expression of medieval theology. David Thomson argues 
that there are some medieval philosophers, including Augustine, who 
inevitably adopt the idea of negation or negative theology.171 Mystics such as 
Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross embraced images of God as embodying 
the void. Thomson calls negative theology an exception to Christ as the 
verbum dei. Why is it that for so many medieval philosophers and mystics 
images of the void formed their vision of the divine? After all, wasn't the 
Christian God represented abstractly by images of light and concretely through 
a human? An investigation of negative theology in the Middle Ages will 
touch on the paradoxicality involved in all attempts to describe God, in any 
search for truth. 
Is there any value in an investigation of deconstruction in terms of 
negative theology or vice versa? Geoffrey Hartman poses the question: "Is 
Derrida's 'atheology' perhaps the equivalent of a negative theology? "172 We 
can safely say that Derrida's atheology and negative theology share some 
superficial characteristics but are fundamentally different. However, there is 
reason to note the similarities between the two. Derrida has skirted the 
question of negative theology in Margins of Philosophy, and addressed it 
directly in "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials," which will be discussed later in 
171David Thomson, "Deconstruction and Meaning in Medieval Mysticism," 
Christianity and Literature 40 (1991), 107 -122. 
172Geoffrey Hartman, "The State of the Art of Criticism," in The Future of 
Literary Theory, ed. Ralph Cohen, (London and NY: Routledge, 1989), p. 86. 
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this chapter. In the following passage he characterises negative theology not 
as a path which terminates in negation but as a force which has as its ultimate 
objective the affirmation of superessence. He describes negative theology as 
being "toujours affairée à dégager, comme on sait, une supraessentialité par - 
delà les catégories finies de l'essence et de l'existence, c'est -à -dire de la 
présence, et s'empressant toujours de rappeler que si le predicat de l'existence 
est refusé à Dieu, c'est pour lui reconnâitre un mode d'être superieur, 
inconcevable, inéffable. "173 [ "always concerned with disengaging a 
superessentiality beyond the finite categories of essence and existence, that is, 
of presence, and always hastening to recall that God is refused the predicate of 
existence, only in order to acknowledge his superior, inconceivable, and 
ineffable mode of being. "] 174 Derrida maintains that despite its use of 
negative language, negative theology is still fundamentally a theology. 
John Caputo, in "Mysticism and Transgression: Derrida and Meister 
Eckhart," discusses the position held by Derrida on negative theology. Caputo 
emphasises a strand in Derrida's thinking which he terms the "armed 
neutrality of differance," meaning that differance is always neutral in its 
stance towards God or existence, as opposed to negative theology, which 
always has as its root a belief in divine existence. Differance has no 
commitment; it is not interested in proving or disproving God. Caputo 
states, "The armed neutrality of differance means that it is even -handedly 
antagonistic to all claims of existence or non -existence. It plays no favorites 
when existence claims are afoot, but gives all parties to the dispute an equally 
173Marges de la philosophie, (Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1972), p. 6. 
174Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 
1982), p. 6. 
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hard time. "175 The difference between negative theology and differance lies 
in intention rather than in the image of God or existence. Differance is the 
tool of those who set out determined not to find, but only to question. 
Although one cannot seriously call deconstruction a form of negative 
theology, it is nevertheless interesting to examine how they both rely on 
paradoxicality and images of the void in their descriptions of existence. 
Peter Hawkins makes a similar distinction between positive and 
negative ineffability, the positive emerging from a religious base. According 
to Hawkins, evidence of positive ineffability can be found in the Judeo- 
Christian tradition of the unpronounceable YHWH and in the Platonic 
notion that ultimate reality cannot be expressed in speech. In Christian 
theology, God is unspeakable because transcendent, but through the 
Incarnation, fallen language is redeemed and God becomes accessible. 
Negative ineffability, on the other hand, is described as the absence of being, 
as "the linguistic equivalent of a 'black hole. "' 176 Hawkins recognises such a 
view of negative infinity in Mallarme's concept of the Book and in Derrida's 
theory of the infinitude of writing. Hawkins argues that the need humans 
have to express ourselves comes from a fear of this void of silence. In 
William Burroughs' Cities of the Red Night, Dink recalls a mystical 
experience of negative ineffability: "One day I was paddling on the lake and 
about to put out fishlines. I felt the weakness in my chest, silver spots 
appeared in front of my eyes with a vertiginous sensation of being sucked 
175John Caputo, "Mysticism and Transgression: Derrida and Meister Eckhart," 
Derrida and Deconstruction, ed. Hugh J. Silverman (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1989), p. 29. 
176Peter Hawkins, "Dante's Paradiso and the Dialectic of Ineffability," 
Ineffability: Naming the Unnameable from Dante to Beckett, eds. Peter S. 
Hawkins and Anne Howland Schotter, (New York: AMS Pres, 1984), p. 2. 
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into a vast empty space where words do not exist. "177 Later in the novel 
there occurs this statement: "We are the language. "178 As Dink understands, 
negative ineffability lacks any sense of a super language, of the overwhelming 
heaviness of an infinity of signs. It causes those who search for an infinity of 
signs to find that the only signs are within themselves, that they are indeed 
"the language." Throughout this chapter, I will examine the accuracy of this 
opposition between positive and negative ineffability. 
In "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials," Derrida finally addresses the 
issue of negative theology directly. As he tells us, an avoidance of the subject 
is no longer possible. His avoidance of speaking on negative theology now 
becomes the point of departure for his discussion. He questions not only the 
characteristics of negative theology, but its essence. In his interrogation of the 
very nature of negative theology, he writes: "Y a -t -il un discours à sa mésure? 
N'est -on pas astreint à parler de la théologie négative selon les modes de la 
théologie négative, de façon à la fois impuissante, épuisante et inépuisable? Y 
a -t -il jamais autre chose qu'une «théologie négative» de la «théologie 
négative ?" 179 [ "Is there some discourse that measures up to it? Is one not 
compelled to speak of negative theology according to the modes of negative 
theology, in a way that is at once impotent, exhausting, and inexhaustible? Is 
there ever anything other than a "negative theology" of "negative theology ? "] 
180The question of not speaking in or about negative theology, he argues, is 
not actually a question of not speaking but of speaking well. As Derrida 
177William Burroughs, Cities of the Red Night, (London: Pan, 1982),p. 119. 
1781bid, p. 151. 
179"Comment ne pas parler: Denégations," Derrida and Negative Theology, eds. 
Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, (NY: SUNY, 1992), p. 83. 
180Derrida, "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials," Derrida and Negative Theology 
Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, (NY: SUNY, 1992), p. 83. 
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phrases it, "Comment ne pas dire . . .? . . . comment ne pas parler, quelle 
parole éviter pour bien parler. "181 [ "how not to speak, and which speech to 
avoid, in order to speak well? "1182 This reversal of not speaking as a way of 
speaking well is a reflection of negative theology, which he argues is an act of 
negating essence in order to express hyperessence. 
He cites two paradigms, the Greek and the Christian, the latter 
containing traces of the former, as the central modes of Western negative 
theology. In the first paradigm, the Greek tradition, Derrida locates the 
concept of negative theology in the Platonic Good, in the epekeina tes ousias, 
which is neither neutral nor negative, but a suprapositive expression of 
Good. Derrida locates in Plato's Republic the Good which is beyond Being. 
He elaborates: "mais ce ne- pas -être n'est pas un non -être, il se tient, si l'on 
peut dire, au -delà de la présence ou de l'essence, epekeina tes ousias, de 
l'étantité de l'être. Depuis au -delà de la présence de tout ce qui est, il donne 
naissance à l'être ou à l'essence de ce qui est, à o einai etten ousian, , mais 
être lui- même. "183[ "But this non -being is not a non -being; one may say that 
it transcends presence or essence, epekeina tes ousias, beyond the beingness of 
Being. From what is beyond the presence of all that is, the Good gives birth to 
Being or to the essence of what is, to einai and ten ousian, but without itself 
being. 1 184 
The Christian paradigm, which includes Pseudo -Dionysius and Meister 
Eckhart, contains the traces of the Platonic hyperessential Good. This good 
can be found also in Augustine's statement quoted first by Meister Eckhart 
and now by Derrida: Saint Augustine dit: Dieu est sage sans sagesse (wise âne 
181Comment ne pas parler," p. 548. 
182 "How to Avoid Speaking," p. 85. 
183"Comment ne pas parler," p. 563. 
184"How to Avoid Speaking," p. 101. 
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wîsheit), bon sans bonté (guot âne gûete), puissant sans puissance (gewaltic 
âne gewalt). "185 [ "St. Augustine says: God is wise without wisdom [wise âne 
wîsheit], good without goodness [guot âne gûete], powerful without power 
(gewaltic âne gewalt). 1186 According to Derrida, in Christian theology, the 
negative mode of expression becomes a mode of expressing hyperessentiality. 
Thus, the Augustinian without carries in it the notion of presence. 
Derrida locates the crucial moment of difference in the prayer, the 
address to the other. Why is this prayer necessary? Not only, Derrida argues, 
to speak of union with God, but to speak of places (the Platonic notion of 
khora, which leaves its mark on the Christian paradigm) and all that place 
implies -- height, distance, proximity. Negative theology is dependent on the 
concept, he argues, of hyperessentiality, which is not not -being but the 
multiplication of a Being which is both distant and near. Taking it from 
another perspective, from the perspective of an active God, Derrida names 
the conclusion which may be implicit in negative theology, Dieu est à la fois 
participable et non participable."1ß7 [ "God at once permits and does not 
permit participation in Him. "] 188 And here Derrida quotes Pseudo - 
Dionysius: 
... comme le point central d'un cercle est participé par tous les rayons 
qui constituent le cercle, et comme les multiples empreintes 
(ektypomata) d'un sceau (sphragidos) unique participent à l'original, 
lequel est immanent tout entier et de façon identique dans chacune des 
185Maitre Eckart, Quasi stella matutina, qtd. in Derrida, "Comment ne pas 
parler," p. 542. 
186Meister Eckhart, Quasi stella matutina, qtd. in Derrida, "How to Avoid 
Speaking: Denials," p. 78. 
187 "Comment ne pas parler," p. 582. 
188 "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials," p. 119. 
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empreintes, sans se fragmenter d'aucune manière. Mais 
l'imparticipalité (amethexia) de la Deité, cause universelle, transcende 
encore toutes ces figures (paradeigmata).189 
as the central point of a circle is shared by all the radii, which constitute 
the circle, and as the multiple imprints [ektypomata] of a single seal 
[sphragidos] share the original which is entirely immanent and 
identical in eachof the imprints, not fragmenting itself in any manner. 
But the non -participation [amathexia] of the Deity, the universal cause, 
yet transcends all these figures [paradeigmata].190 
In arguing that the objective of differance is always to maintain neutrality, 
Derrida takes the position that all scholars strive to take, that of unbiased 
objectivity, of in- difference. This "armed neutrality" is the goal, ironically, 
not only of Derrida but of those who oppose him, of all scholars in general. Is 
armed neutrality a quality unique to differance and deconstruction or are all 
scholars, even non -deconstructionists, capable of a neutrality so fierce that 
one should describe it as "armed "? Is differance intended to be a transcendent 
neutrality, a Platonic neutrality which will always remain unbiased and 
objective? Can Derrida be the transcendent scholar to whom this concept 
attaches itself? 
"How to Avoid Speaking: Denials" is Derrida's differencing of himself 
from negative theology. His differance is not the Pseudo -Dionyisian 
difference nor the Pseudo -Dionysian non- Being. In his scramble to 
189Pseudo-Denys, Noms divins 644 a b, qtd. in Derrida, "Comment ne pas 
parler," p. 582. 
190pseudo- Dionysius, Divine Names, ch. 2:644aó, qtd. in Derrida, "How to Avoid 
Speaking: Denials," p. 119. 
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differentiate, we see that language allows for some differences to be expressed, 
but others are consumed by the sameness beyond language's limits. In the 
discourse of negative theology, is language so empty that it can only fail to 
signify or so full that it tends towards an infinity which can only be 
represented as nothingness? What of Derrida's language, which he attempts 
to demystify? Can presence hide in the guise of emptiness? The following 
section will examine the negative theology of Pseudo -Dionysius in an effort 
to articulate the meaning of this thinker's concept of absence. 
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Pseudo -Dionysius and the theology of the symbol 
The Byzantine theologian Dionysius the Areopagite, or Pseudo - 
Dionysius, (c. 5th -6th century), was an amazing and profound thinker who 
managed to verbalise an almost incomprehensibly complex theory of symbols 
based on negative theology. His writings are often regarded as enigmatic, yet 
despite the mystery surrounding his texts, his negative theology influenced a 
great number of prominent medieval thinkers, including Johannes Scotus 
Eriugena, Hugh of St. Victor, Robert Grosseteste, Thomas Aquinas, and 
Bonaventure.191 A reading of Pseudo -Dionysius will not show that 
deconstruction is negative theology. Rather, it will show that due to the 
structure of language, first contradiction and then ineffability will result in 
attempts to describe what is indescribable, what is essentially mystery. Always 
hidden in these traps of language is the possibility either of superessential 
Being or of differance. Whether we fall headlong into one or the other is a 
matter of will, or of fate. 
According to Pseudo -Dionysius, symbols were, first of all, like logos - 
words, imbued with the mystery of God, springing forth from the mind of the 
divine intellect for the purpose of revealing it to humanity: ". . . ti a 
v7tEpovata lteptxa kv7Ciovarl6 Kai popOca Kat tv7Cov6 tot6 aµop(cotota iE KW. 
caws tiota 7t£pt-ctOEotofia Kat 'Up/ urcEpcinm Kat am nia'WYCoV arck tritia tiri 
notxata TOW µEptatcov óvµßoXcov rarI6vovarió tE Kan StaTaatiov(TÌa." 192 
191-For a discussion on the subject and a more thorough listing see Jean 
Leclerq, The Influence and Non -influence of Dionysius in the West," in 
Dionysius' The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid, (NY: Paulist, 1987). 
192"De Divinis Nominibus," Corpus Dionysiacum I , ed. Beate Regina Suchla 
(Berlin and NY: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), p. 119. All subsequent references to 
the Greek text of "De Divinis Nominibus" will refer to the Suchla edition unless 
otherwise noted, 
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["and so it is that the Transcendent is clothed in the terms of being, with 
shape and form on things which have neither, and numerous symbols are 
employed to convey the varied attributes of what is an imageless and supra - 
natural simplicity. "] 193 Symbols did not contain the immediate presence of 
God, but rather provided an analogy by which the contemplator may attempt 
to comprehend God.194 Matter is regarded as the representation of concept, 
not making concepts immediately present but altering them to make them 
comprehensible. Representation: to make present again, as if there was a 
remembrance of a presence before. Presence is embedded in the word itself. 
One cannot get rid of the illusion of presence except to get rid of the word, 
perhaps to get rid of all words. I suggest others: mutation, analogy, imitation, 
but they are all imprecise. For symbols do not successfully merge the separate 
realms of sensible and intelligible, but mediate between them, presenting the 
intelligible as sensible so that it might be intelligible. "avticov avayeaOcu icpoa 
Tab auXouó apxETUntaa avop.otcoa coo. EtpTycat Twv oµotoTrlTwv 
Exkocaavo1Evcov xat Tow auTwv ou tau'cwa, avap ioviwo SE Kai otxEtwa Ent Twv 
voEpwv TE Kat ataT itwv tSlotrycwv opt(opEvwv." 195 [ "Using matter, one may 
be lifted up to the immaterial archetypes. Of course one must be careful to 
use the similarities as dissimilarities, as discussed, to avoid one -to -one 
correspondences, to make the appropriate adjustments as one remembers the 
great divide between the intelligible and the perceptible. "] 196 An important 
193Dionysius, "The Divine Names," in The Complete Works, 592c. All subsequent 
references to the English translations of Dionysius' works will refer to the 
Luibheid translation unless otherwise noted. 
194[But as for now, what happens is this: we use whatever appropriate symbols 
we can for the things of God. With these analogies we are raised upward toward 
the truth of the mind's vision, a truth which is simple and one. "] "Divine 
Names," 592D. 
195 "De Coelesti Hierarchia," Corpus Dionysiacum H, eds. Gunter Heil and Adolf 
Martin Ritter, (Berlin and NY: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), 144C 
1961bid, 144C. 
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point has been indicated by Pseudo -Dionysius. Symbols mediate not only 
between separate realms but over paradox, "the great divide." For Derrida, 
the postulation of a "great divide" between the sensible and intelligible is a 
crucial wrong turn. But in the theology of Pseudo -Dionysius and of 
Coleridge, symbols were composed of both realms, closing the gap between 
the self and transcendent otherness. From this paradox flows the beauty of 
symbols: similarities can only be expressed as dissimilarities, brought forth 
from the poetic imagination. 
In the cosmology of Pseudo -Dionysius, elaborated in the "Divine 
Names," the fabric or creation contains images which, coming from God, also 
lead back to him. Logos as both origin and terminus obscures the notion of 
causality: "Aoyoall SE o e oa D tvettat itpoa TOW Epwv 2.oyi.00v ou povov, Ott Mt 
AoyoD Kea voD Kat aoOtaaa ECM xopÌ yo , a%1,%1I1 Ott Km TONY itav`Lwv at'ttaó av 
camtiw µovo etSwa 7tpoetkriOE xat Ott Startav'rwv xwpEtf Sttxvovµavoa..." 197 
[ "God is praised as 'Logos' by the sacred scriptures not only as the leader of 
word, mind, and wisdom, but because he also initially carries within his own 
unity the causes of all things and because he penetrates all things, reaching, as 
Scripture says, to the very end of all things. 1 198 Divine order was a 
hierarchical web that led not to a series of aimless relations, but to relations 
that (theoretically) aimed toward a central signified. Relations could be 
considered causal, but not the way we understand causality, for causality here 
does not imply linearity. God was the origin who produced things - that was 
truth. But human understanding could not begin with the origin. Rather, it 
began with things that led the mind to conceive of God. 199 Thus, on a 
cognitive level, the cause -effect relation in which things began with the 
197"Divinis Nominibus," pp. 198 -9. 
198"Divine Names," 872C. 
199See De Trinitate 15.10. 
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origin was reversed. For the human being, understanding began with the 
images of creation. The illusion of causality was not, as some might think, an 
illusion of linear relations. If there is any illusion at all, it would be an 
illusion of relativity itself. 
Yet paradoxically, symbols failed to fulfill the purpose for which they 
were created. Pseudo -Dionysius did not believe that symbols indicated a 
direct correspondence with God. In his theology dissimilarity could lead to a 
better comprehension of similarity. He postulated a system of differences 
which gave symbols meaning: "tat 'crly £'t£po'tlyca 'ccov notttkcov Tov 6£o1) 
Kam tiaa nokv£t8£ta opaaeta axrl iaticov £'repa titva 'rota Oatvoµ£vota, napll o 
tatvovtiat, arum-way ouircov.200 [ 'Difference' means that the many visions 
of God differ in appearance from one another and this difference must be 
understood to indicate something other than what was outwardly 
manifested. "]201 Perhaps Pseudo -Dionysius even believed that God could 
only be signified through difference, given the paradox that lay at the heart of 
his theology: the Word could not be spoken, the giver of signs could not be 
signified: "tat £6T1.1/ av'cov tat v01lata Kai Xoyox tat £n16'LTlµ11 tat enallrl tat 
alai-1,51a tat 8o 4c tat 1)avtaata tat ovopc Kea to akka navta, tat ovrE 
voet'tat ovtie Xeyetat out£ ovo ux etiat. "202 [ "Of him there is conception, 
reason, understanding, touch, perception, opinion, imagination, name, and 
many other things. On the other hand he cannot be understood, words 
cannot contain him, and no name can lay hold of him. "]203 This concept of 
difference as is a crucial element not only in Pseudo -Dionyisus' theology but 
in others as well. In his study of the Pseudo -Dionysian tradition, Gersh 
200"Divinis Nominibus," p. 210. 
201 "Divine Names," 913A. 
202 "Divinis Nominibus," p. 198. 
203 "Divine Names," 872A. 
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illuminates the importance of the concepts of difference and otherness in 
Maximus the Confessor and Eriugena.204 Maximus the Confessor interprets 
the created world as a series of dichotomies, in which Christ lies beyond 
creation and difference. God is differentiated in a unified manner. According 
to Maximus, God's unity implies differences among created thing:s "Who . . . 
would not recognise that the one Logos is many logoi [reasons] distinguished 
in the undivided difference of created things through their unconfused 
individuality in relation to each other and themselves? And again who 
would not consider the many logoi as one through the relationship of all 
things to him existing unconfusedly in himself. "205 (Max, Ambig, 7, 1077C 
quoted in Gersh). According to Eriugena, there will be difference even in the 
New Creation; at the Resurrection, the unification of all things will be 
combined with a degree of difference.206 
For Pseudo -Dionysius, creation is independent of God's causation. 
Difference arise not because of God but from the differentiation of the 
participants of creation. 207 Language is the divine intermediary, the basis for 
all possibilities of knowing, yet it is the cloth in the Temple which cannot be 
torn. The plurality of names with which Pseudo -Dionysius identifies God 
demonstrates the imprecision of his attempt at representation. There is 
204Stephen Gersh,From lamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the 
Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo- Dionysian Tradition, (Leiden: EJ Brill, 
1978) 
205Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua, 1077C, qtd. in Gersh pp. 240 -1. Eriugena's 
translation into Latin reads: "non multas cognosceret causas unam causam 
eorum quae facia sunt inseperabiliter cumdiscretam differentia per eorum et 
inter se inuicem a seipsa inconfusam proprietatem. Et iterum unam multas 
omnium ad earn relatione per seipsum inconfuse subsistens..." (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1988), p. 27. 
206Eriugena, Periphyseon (De Diuisione Naturae), Book I, ed. and trans. I.P. 
Sheldon -Williams, Scriptores Latini Hiberniae 7 (Dublin: The Dublin Institute 
for dvanced Studies, 1969), 881B. 
207 "Divine Names," 644B. 
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always difference and distance. In Mystic Theology, Moses ascends Mt. Sinai 
but is not allowed to contemplate God directly, but only the place where God 
rests. The seat of God is representative of the distance which Pseudo - 
Dionysius felt must always exist between God and humanity. 
The role of difference can also be seen in the philosophy of Richard of 
St. Victor. According to Victorine philosophy, visible/ corporeal things are 
used to ascend to non -visible things. While the desire of contemplatives is 
clearly for non -visible things, visible things are acknowledged as essential, as 
a precondition to non -visible things. Thus while reinforcing the binary 
opposition, Richard of St. Victor privileges the lower terms as a precondition 
of the higher, even as he speaks of his desire for the intelligible. He writes: 
You certainly see that they discover spiritual pastures not only in 
interior things, but even in exterior and corporeal things. 
Without doubt corporeal goods, in so much as they have a 
similarity to invisible and incorporeal goods, are able to provide 
spiritual pastures for spiritual persons, and no wonder. For if 
visible goods were to have no similitude at all to invisible things 
for the investigation of invisible things, by no means would 
they be able to assist us, nor would what is read concerning them 
be evident, namely, that the invisible things of God from the 
creation of the world have been seen, being understood by means 
of those things which have been made (Rom 1:20). Again, if these 
things did not disagree with those by many dissimilitudes, 
without doubt they would not be perishable, transitory, and 
insufficient. Nevertheless, the dissimililtude of these to those is 
incomparably richer than the similitude. 208 
What is the status of sensible things if they are both similar to and different 
from intelligible things, if they are both the essential pathway to intelligible 
things yet not the ultimate goal. The result is an indeterminate logocentrism 
built on an unfulfilled desire for intelligibles and on a recognition of the 
208The Mystical Ark (De Arca Mystica), trans. Grover Zinn, (London: SPCK, 
1979), pp. 198 -9. 
109 
value of sensible things. Similarly, one can identify in Richard's text a certain 
logocentric nostalgising of the concept of the Way. Though not the final 
destination the path to the terminus is also considered sacred. 
It is important to understand the essential quality of Pseudo -Dionysian 
difference. The Pseudo -Dionysian symbol is dependent on difference for 
representation, because it wants to represent what is by definition 
unrepresentable. Representation cannot be based on likeness, because the 
likeness of an unrepresentable thing is inconceivable. Striving for greater 
and greater likenesses, Pseudo -Dionysius would find himself moving further 
away from his goal. Instead, he chooses to embrace the concept of difference. 
The Pseudo -Dionysian difference functions according to an inverse law of 
representation in which the quantities are infinite. The greater the distance 
between meaning and representation, the more the skill of the author is 
tested. The author must attempt to represent difference through likeness. 
However, if that distance is infinite, then the author must admit the 
impossibility of creating a veritable likeness and resort to an even greater 
difference which highlights the impossibility of representation. This inverse 
principle of representation is the opposite of what one finds in Victorian 
realism, in which authors preferred to depict representable quantities in a way 
which was faithful to "truth." Should medieval authors also have limited 
themselves to representable things, to avoid the risk of creating an 
unpleasing representation based on an inverse law of difference? Moreover, 
should they have realised that their success in representing the infinite may 
have involved them in a logocentrism which strives to make transcendent 
meaning present, even though their desire for the transcendent was based on 
the knowledge that they could not attain it. 
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Pseudo -Dionysius asserts that it is not his purpose to discuss the Being 
in transcendence, simply stating that the subject is beyond words, beyond 
even unity itself. It is a catch -22 of cosmic proportions, yet curiously one 
without despair. At the centre of the Dionysian paradox the void is 
contemplated with wonder. The treatise which he devotes to the various 
names of God concludes paradoxically that there are no names. Gazing into 
the abyss, dark and empty of discourse, Pseudo -Dionysius writes: "xat µrly, et 
xpEt -cccov ECM 7cavioa ñ,oyo1 xat rcaafia yvcoama xat D7cEp vovv xaOoXo1 xat 
ovatav tcpDtat naviwv µ2V ovaa IcEptXrllctctxrl xat aDX? 111c'ctxrl xat 
icpokrltntxrl, Traat SE au'rrl xaOoXoD aXrlrcioa xat oUtiE ataOrlata cxuti a catty 
o10E Iarraata OUTE 8o4a oiyrE oVOµa oD'CE Xoyoa ODYE eicc i-1 ov`cE 
Entairlµrl "209 [ "How then can we speak of divine names? How can we do 
this if the Transcendent surpasses all discourse and all knowledge, if it 
abides beyond the reach of mind and of being, if it encompasses and 
circumscribes, embraces and anticipates all things while itself eluding their 
grasp and escaping from any perception, imagination, opinion, name, 
discourse, apprehension, or understanding? "]210 
At the point where he draws close to the mind of God, he finds not a 
flurry of signifiers, but the death of language. Pseudo -Dionysius' theology 
illustrates the nature of the profound paradox which formed the core of 
medieval thought. At the coincidence of infinity and finitude, of language 
and unspokenness, the Logos was at once present yet not present, the divine 
Word spoken and unsignifiable silence. On a theoretical level, Pseudo - 
Dionysius resolved the paradox by stating that God transcended the 
contradiction that was inescapable for humanity: " TE2 oa SE coo TOD EVEK xat 
209"Divinis Nominibus," pp. 115 -6 
210"Divine Names," 593A -B. 
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1tEpaa 7tVTCDV xat altetpta naari a cotsptptaa xat 7tEpatoa D1tEpoXtxCOa T(AV coa 
av'ttxetµevt,)v. "211 [ "He is the boundary to all things and is the unbounded 
infinity about them in a fashion which rises above the contradiction between 
finite and infinite.1212 He begins by naming God as Word, mind, wisdom, 
using only approximations of ineffability, and progressing deeper into the 
abyss, finds that words are empty. He begins to grope for non - 
approximations, but at the end there is only silence. The origin can never be 
named, by virtue of what it used to be, because were the words to describe it 
present at its becoming, they would have only described themselves. There is 
a logic at work in the work of Pseudo -Dionysius, the logic of failure, the logic 
that calls failure a triumph and rejoices at it. Symbols fail to represent; not 
only fail, but contradict themselves. Yet his response is joy. 
211 "Divinis Nominibus," p. 189. 
212 "Divine Names," 825B. 
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The Negative Theology of Johannes Scotus Eriugena 
Pseudo -Dionysius' negative theology influenced a number of thinkers, 
among them Johannes Scotus Eriugena. Eriugena (c.810 -877) was concerned 
with the division and classification of nature based on a fundamental 
distinction between beings who create and beings who are created. The strong 
influence of Pseudo -Dionysius on his thought will be evident in the 
following discussion of Periphyseon.213 
In Book I of the Periphyseon, Eriugena rightly explicates negative 
theology as a superessential theology. God is set apart because he has no 
opposite. Eriugena determines that the nature of opposites is that they begin 
to be and end at the same time.214 Contradictory pairs are temporal: they will 
come into being and they will pass away. Eriugena argues that God is distinct, 
lacking an opposite and not subject to becoming. He concludes: "Nam ea 
quae a se ipsis discrepant aeterna esse non possunt. Si enim aeterna essent a 
se inuicem non discrepant. Nam aeternitas sui similis est act tota per totum 
in se ipsa una simplex indiuiduaque subsistit. Est enim omnium unum 
principum unusque finis in nullo a se ipso discrepans. "215 [ "For those things 
213In Latin, the work is Divisione Naturae , i English, On the Division of 
Nature. I am again using the Scriptores Latini Hiberniae bilingual edition, ed. 
and trans. by I.P. Sheldon. 
214"Nam opposita per relationem ita sibi semper oppositat sunt ut simul et 
inchoare incipiant et simul esse desinant, siue eiusdem naturae sint ut 
simplum ad duplum, subsesqualterum ad sesqualterum, aut diuersae naturae ut 
lux atque tenebrae, aut secundum privationem ut mors et uita, uox et 
silentium." (459A 132 -6) 
"For opposites by realation are always opposed to one another that they both 
begin to be at the same time and cease to be at the same time, whether they are 
of the same nature, like single to double or 2/3 to 3/2, or of different natures, 
like light and darkness, or in respect of privation, like life and death, sound 
and silence." (pp. 75, 77.) 
215459B, 
1. 6 -10. 
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which are in discord with one another cannot be eternal. For if they were 
eternal they would not be in discord with one another, since eternity is always 
like what it is and every eternally subsists in itself as a single and indivisible 
unity. For it is the one beginning of all things, and their one end, in no way 
at discord with itself. "]216 Eternity contains no contradiction, no binary 
oppostions, since it holds no possibility of becoming or passing away. God, 
likewise, has no opposition, so to speak of him in terms of negative theology 
is really to speak of a superessence, beyond words but likewise beyond 
contradiction. 
Essentia igitur dicitur [deus] sed proprie essentia non est. Esse 
enim oppornitur non esse. YIIEPOYEIOS igitur est, id est 
superessentialis item bonitas dicitur sed proprie bonitas non est. 
Bonitati enim malitia opponitur. YIIEPAI,AOOS igitur, id est plus 
quam bonus et `I'IIEPAFAOOTHS, id est plus quam bonitas. Deus 
dicitur sed non proprie deus est. Visioni enim caecitas opponitur 
et uidenti non uidens. Igitur YIIEPOEOS, id est plus quam deus. 
eEOS enim uidens interpratuatur.217 
Thus, [God] is called Essence, but strictly speaking He is not 
esssence: for to being is opposed not being. Therefore He is 
vlcEpouatos, that is, superessential. Again, He is called Goodness, 
but strictly speaking He is not goodness: for to goodness 
wickedness is opposed. Therefore (He is) ultEpacyaOos, that is, 
more -than -good, and unepacyaeo'trls, that is, more -than -goodness. 
He is called God, but He is not strictly speaking God: for to vision 
is opposed blindness, and to him who sees he who does not see. 
Therefore He is 'wtEp0Eos that is, more -than -God --for 6Eos is 
interpreted "He who sees. "218 
216P it 
217459B, 
1. 31, 460A, 1. 2. 
218PP. 77, 79. 
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Eriugena goes on to point out the contradiction in these names of God, that 
they are both positive and negative. Thus "superessential" lacks the negative 
form but is negative in meaning -- it describes what is not. 
As God is outside of all the characteristics applied to him, similarly he 
is above the categories of space and time. Eriugena states that God is part of 
neither space nor time, but as the cause of all places and times, Place and 
Time serve rightfully as a metaphor for him. Motion is measured in relation 
to God as the static point; God as the Prime Mover is never moved. God as 
the unmoved is evidence that He is above time and space: "Omne enim 
quod in mundo est moueri tempore loco diffiniri necesse est, et locus ipse 
diffinitur et tempus mouetur; dues autem ne mouetur nec diffinitur. "219 
[ "For everything that is in the world must move in time and be defined in 
place; even place itself is defined and time itself moves. But God neither 
moves nor is defined. "]220 Carlo Riccati's work on Eriugena and Nicholas of 
Cusa suggests that their conceptions of creation as a theophany can be related 
to their negative theologies, in that creation becomes the visible metaphor for 
the invisible God. In the theology of Duns Scotus, ineffability arises because 
"Chaque nom a son opposé, mais Dieu, à qui rien n'est opposé (cui nihil 
oppositum), ne peut pas être signifié par des noms qui sont entr'eux 
contraires. "221 God's ineffability results because he has no opposite; lacking 
an opposite, God's contradiction becomes existence itself: "Dieu est le 
suressentiel, le nihil par excellentiam car il peut être signifié seulement par la 
219468D, 
1. 37 -39. 
220pp_ 97, 99. 
221Carlo Riccati, "Processio" et "Explicatio ": La Doctrine de la Création chez 
Jean Scot et Nicholas de Cues, Istitutio Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici VI, 
(Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1983), p. 15. Refer also to Periphyseon 459 BC. 
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negation de tout ce qui et même de tout ce qui n'est pas; en ce sens la 
meilleure connaissance de Dieu est par ignorance. "222 
Dionysian negative theology involves a situation in which the Platonic 
divide remains intact but in which other oppositions merge together. At the 
point of the disappearance of language the categories of division also 
disappear. At the moment of the disappearance of speech, there is writing, 
but at the moment of the disappearance of language, is there anything which 
can be properly named or identified? What is the difference between 
superessence and nothingness after language has disappeared? Without 
signs, can we say that there are any differences at all? The fundamental 
difference between deconstruction and negative theology is dependent on our 
inability to know -- on not -knowing, not -expressing, not -seeing, not wanting 
to know, being unable to know. By not knowing, all we understand are 
superficial differences in a subject where everything which is not superficial 
is hidden. This dependence on limiting the knower creates a paradox for the 
seeker of truth, who desires to know but not to speak about that knowledge, 
in a logocentric structure in which one knows at the moment one hears 
oneself speak. For Pseudo -Dionysius, Being is actually beyond the 
possibilities of language, so that it cannot be known or categorised in any way. 
What, then, is Being? Can one answer this question simply by stating, "Being 
is ... "? What is not -Becoming? What is outside of motion, time, and place? 
Pseudo -Dionysius' response is that this uncategorisable thing can only be 
identified by what it is not. 
As much as the writer engages negative theology, negative theology 
engages the writer. What one postulates beyond the limits (whether of space, 
time, or knowledge) is a kind of prophecy, and so when Derrida argues about 
222Ibid, p. 16. Refer also to Periphyseon. 686D -687A. 
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the superessentiality of negative theology, he too is transformed into a 
prophet. In determining the difference between negative theology or super - 
or hyperessentiality and a deconstruction in which non -essence is possible, 
one not only argues about the limits of human knowledge, but speaks or 
writes a prophecy about what is beyond. Even in his involvement in 
explicating, unmasking and analysing negative theology, Derrida becomes a 
partaker in the secret. 
In negative theology as it was formulated by Pseudo -Dionysius, 
ontotheological semiotics, the semiotics of the Word, both empowers 
language and strips it. In the negative theology which Hartman associates 
with "willy -nilly" words, the mystical presence in logos -language is 
undermined and overwhelmed by the sheer powerlessness of language to 
truly signify. Language becomes inadequate and empty of meaning; the 
centre, the origin by far out of reach. For now we see through a glass darkly. 
The of the centre of in 
the infinity of possible signifiers comes face to face with the infinitely 
unspeakable Word. There was even for the great logocentrics who followed 
this tradition an uneasy emptiness in language, a deep void, an abyss which 
left them staring into nothingness (le néant) and back at themselves, carried 
on by dreams of the ineffable, dreams without pictures. On the one hand, 
there was the mystification of language through the polysemous concept of 
Logos, resulting in a great love of semiotics, and of grammar, logic, and 
rhetoric, and a tremendous amount of scholarly activity in these fields. But 
language was also the entrapping, rather than liberating, structure, that 
imprisoned its users in the shadow. The centre of paradox was called the 
origin, the Alpha and the Omega, the Word and the unspoken secret, 
presence and absence. What one names truth is clothed in illusion, and what 
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one sees as presence is absence for another. The body, standing in the light of 
the sun, casts its shadow upon the wall. As the infinity of signifiers touches 
silence, deep and endless, any attempt at description confusedly falls into 
opposites. Total presence and absence meet but do not merge, as the two 
worlds of a mirror, and the onlooker may have but one name to give it. One 
may also consider, as Umberto Eco argues in The Limits of Interpretation, that 
for the medieval mind the contradiction of God was not ontological but 
semiotic, that God himself did not rest in essential contradiction, but could 
only be spoken about in such terms.223 But the inability of humanity to know 
without signs and the inability of God to be properly signified meant that the 
contradiction lay neither in the ontological nor the semiotic but in the point 
of meeting which was also the point of division. 
Everyone who speaks or writes about negative theology is locked into a 
discourse of opposites in which everything is and isn't. To be both is and 
isn't in the same moment of time (one assumes the present) is an empirical 
impossibility and a necessity. One cannot do otherwise. Negative theology 
and deconstruction together demonstrate the possible presence behind 
negation or the absence behind the positive. The contradictions which 
language present point simultaneously towards presence and absence. In the 
medieval universe, where God is immanent, God as the transcendent One is 
relegated to the Other. Yet God is always transcendent. A worldview in 
which God must be both transcendent and immanent forces a contradiction 
which cannot be resolved. The two opposites must reconcile while also 
remaining opposite. On the level of the human mind, of the world, of the 
surface, opposites appear as opposites which must necessarily reconcile 
223Eco writes, "for medieval theology both contradictoriness and ambiguity 
are merely semiotic, not ontological." The Limits of Interpretation, 
(Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 1990), p. 10. 
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themselves on another level. Thus medievals somewhat schizophrenically 
co- exist: on the one hand in the midst of contradiction; on the other hand 
with the expectation that contradiction is not falsehood, but truth. 
The problem of ineffability, wanting to express what cannot be properly 
expressed, is a problem not only for negative theologians but is present in the 
foundation of language itself, so that anyone who uses language is also 
restricted by it. The problem of ineffability was a concern of Augustine, who 
attempted to analyse it in De Doctrina Christiana. Augustine writes: 
Diximusne aliquid et sonuimus aliquid dignum deo? Immo uero nihil 
me aliud quam dicere uoluisse sentio; si autem dixi, non hoc est quod 
dicere uloui. Hoc unde scio, nisi quia deus ineffabilis est? quod autem a 
me dictum est, si indem dicendus est deus, quia est hoc cum dicitur, 
aliquid et fit nescio qua pugna uerborum, quoniam si illud est 
ineffabile, quod dici non potest, non est ineffabile, quod uel ineffabile 
dici potest. Quae pugna uerborum silentio cauenda potius quam uoce 
pacanda est.224 
Have we spoken or announced anything worthy of God? Rather I 
feel that I have done nothing but wish to speak: if I have spoken, I 
have not said what I wished to say. Whence do I know this except 
because God is ineffable? If what I said were ineffable, it would 
not be said. And for this reason God should not be said to be 
ineffable, for when this is said something is said. And a 
contradiction in terms is created, since if that is ineffable which 
cannot be spoken, then that is not ineffable which can be called 
ineffable. This contradiction is to be passed over in silence rather 
than resolved verbally.225 
Augustine's conclusion is that the question of ineffability cannot be resolved 
through language. The only resolution is in the absence of language. 
224De Doctrina Christiana, ed. Joseph Martin, Corpus Christianorum 32, 
(Turnholti: Brepols, 1962) I, VI, 6. 
225Christian Instrucion, Writins of St. Augustine 4, trans. John J. Gavigan, 
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1947), p. 11. 
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Nevertheless, ineffability is a problem that, in the absence of a perfect 
silence, we attempt to resolve through language and through literary texts. 
How would we respond to the question, "why should ineffability be the 
concern of literature or of literary criticism ?" Isn't the whole point of 
literature to articulate, to stretch the boundaries of language and not to 
solidify its limitations. In this field in which language is given a privileged 
position and regarded as a tool which possesses so much power, ineffability is 
failure, shame, defeat. Perhaps ineffability is a topic which is better left 
avoided. Yet if critics tried to make ineffability the subject of avoidance, we 
would end up just as Derrida did in concluding that avoidance is no longer 
possible. We will find that this topic which is better left untouched is that 
which is the most central to literature. Ineffability defines the limits of 
language. It is the source of all our failures to express or to understand truth, 
but if there are truths, it will be the blind spot behind which those truths are 
hidden. 
The problem of ineffability seems to lead inevitably to a logocentric 
position. It is the conception of the divine as the transcendent ineffable being 
which leads many thinkers to see the world in binary oppositions, and also to 
conceive of a transcendent of which, in Anselm's words, "maius cogitari non 
potest." [ "than which nothing greater can be conceived. "] It is that same 
ineffable nature which may disrupt those oppositions, in a sense make them 
invalid. Writers from all historical periods faced the problem of expressing 
the unexpressible. This is especially true for medieval thinkers, who were 
constantly exploring ways to express and define the divine. For Dante, it was 
perhaps the most challenging aspect of the Paradiso. The question of 
ineffability in literature is addressed in the volume Ineffability: Naming the 
Unnamable from Dante to Beckett. Hawkins essay, entitled "Dante's Paradiso 
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and the Dialectic of Ineffability" appropriately begins the volume.226 He 
states that the Paradiso is characterised by a "dialectic of ineffability" which 
recognises the boundaries of language, then leaps into silence. As I will argue 
in Chapter Six, the Paradiso is all about the poet's attempt to express the 
inexpressible, and while conceding the impossibility of achieving this goal, 
claims that words can serve as a reflection of the divine. 
The philosophy of superpresence and the philosophy of the void are 
structurally different but psychologically similar, in the same way that infinity 
and nothingness are both meaningless and mean the same thing in temporal 
realms. Ineffability is potentially bipolar -- we face the inability to describe the 
void and the divine, since both are inexpressible in words. Perhaps this 
difference can be mathematically represented by infinity and zero. A question 
emerges from this predicament: to what degree is the human author able to 
transcend his or own awareness, to distinguish between infinity and zero. By 
demanding that he or she do so, we turn the author into a transcendent 
being. Against the backdrop of infinity or zero, the author must use language 
as a barrier to form limits around himself. 
226Peter S. Hawkins, "Dante's Paradiso and the Dialectic of Ineffability," in 
Ineffability: Naming the Unnameable from Dante to Beckett, eds. Peter s. 
Hawkins and Anne Howland Schotter, (New York: AMS Press, 1984). 
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The Mystery of two -fold purpose 
Symbolic theology revolves around the idea of mystery, a sense of 
unknowing which arises when language is inverted -- that is, used as a barrier 
to conceal rather than as a vehicle for communication. The symbol serves a 
dual purpose, to conceal as well as to reveal. On the intellectual level of 
symbolic theology, the novice might confuse the symbol with the pure 
intelligibility of what is being symbolised. No such danger exists on the 
material level, however, as the sheer difference between symbol and 
symbolised protects the uninitiated from confusion. The divine must remain 
hidden and inexplicable: only through difference and negation can God be 
described. The notion of writing as a secret had an important purpose -- to 
protect the minds of the uninitiated. Thus medieval symbol and allegory 
served both an aesthetic and a necessary function. The seriousness of this 
purpose can be seen in this passage from Origen: 
sed quoniam si in omnibus indum enti huius, id est historiae, legis 
fuisset consequentia custodita et ordo servatus, habentes continuatum 
intelligentiae cursum non utique. crederemus esse aliud aliiquid in 
scripturus sanctis intrinsecus praeter hoc quod prima fronte 
indicabatur inclusum: ista de causa procurauit divina sapientia 
offendicula quaedam vel intercapedines intelligentiae fieri historialis, 
impossibilia quaedam et inconvenientia per medium inserendo; ut 
interruptio ipsa narrations velut obicibus quibusquam legent resistat 
obiectis, quibus inteligentiae huius vulgaris iter ac transitum neget, et 
exclusos nos ac recussos revoce ad alterius initium viae... 227 
2270rigenes, De Principiis, trans. Rufinus (from Greek into Latin), ed. ER 
Redepenning, (Lipsiae: Bibliopolio Dykiano, 1836) IV, XV, Sect. 173. 
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But if in every other detail of this outer covering, that is, the actual 
history, the sequence of the law had been preserved and its order 
maintained, we should have understood the Scriptures in an 
unbroken course and should certainly not have believed that there was 
Consequently the divine wisdom has arranged for certain stumblig- 
inserting in the midst a number of impossibilities and incongruities, in 
order that the very interruption of the narrative might as it were 
pathway of the ordinary meaning, and so, by shutting us out and 
debarring us from that, might recall us to the beginning of another 
..228 
In the prose of Jacques Derrida, in which clarity is not the foremost 
concern, one may suspect that he, too, conceals as well as reveals. As Derrida 
discusses the notion of secret in Pseudo -Dionysius' writings, is he aware of 
the secret which remains locked within his own prose? He comes 
dangerously close to describing himself when he writes: 
Denys évoque ici une double tradition, un double mode de 
transmission ( ditten paradosin): d'une part indicible, secret, interdit, 
reservé, inaccessible (aporreton) ou mystique (mystiken), "symbolique 
et initiatique ", d'autre part philosophique, demonstratif 
(apodeiktiken), exposable. la question critique devient évidemment 
celle -ci: comment ces deux modes se rapportent -ils l'un à l'autre ?229 
Dionysius evokes a double tradition, a double mode of 
transmission (ditten paradosin); on the one hand unspeakable, 
secret, prohibited, reserved, inaccessible (aporreton) or mystical 
(mystiken), "symbolic and initiatory "; on the other hand, 
philosophic, demonstrative (apodeiktiken), capable of being 
shown. The critical question evidently becomes: How do these 
two modes related to each other ?230 
Are all of us partakers in the secret? "Avoid speaking." This, according to 
Derrida, is Pseudo -Dionysius' recommendation to Timothy. Why does 
228Origen, First Principles, trans, GW Butterworth, (London: SPCK, 1936) pp. 
285 -6. 
229 "Comment ne pas parler," pp. 556 -7. 
230"How to Avoid Speaking: Denials," p. 94. 
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Pseudo -Dionysius want to turn his experience of Being into a secret? The 
secret is not only dangerous, but the secret, the speaking of the secret, will 
become the very barrier to the secret itself. Experience is silent, and talking 
interrupts the silence which can be the only medium for the experience of 
Being. Thus Pseudo -Dionysius' language can only tie itself up. In reaching 
for Being it evades Being. It does not know that it must first become silence 
itself. The two -fold purpose of concealing and revealing will arise again in 




Towards a Temporary Terminus 
and a Secondary Beginning 
Chapter Four 
" 'Se questa abbazia fosse uno speculum mundi, avresti già la risposta.' 
'Ma lo è ?' chiesi. 
'Perché vi sia specchio del mondo occorre che il mondo abbia una forma,' 
concluse Guglielmo, che era troppo filosofo per la mia mente adolescente." 
"'If this abbey were a speculum mundi, you would already have the answer.' 
'But is it ?' I asked. 
'In order for there to be a mirror of the world, it is necessary that the world 
have a form,' concluded William, who was too much of a philosopher for my 
adolescent mind. 
-- Umberto Eco, Il nome della Rosa 
Tracing the Trace: Representation in the Philosophy of Bonaventure 
In the Middle Ages, figurative language, particularly symbol, allegory, 
and metaphor, was necessary for representing what was considered to be 
ineffable, or what could not be described literally. However, its place of 
importance in medieval literature derived not only from its important 
function but from the aesthetic pleasure it lent to both author and reader. 
Medieval thinkers' recourse to figurative language arose from a desire to 
construct a difference between the signifying object or word and the thing 
signified. Since quite often medieval thinkers made it their aim to represent 
what was considered unrepresentable, the difficulty of this task demanded the 
use of tropes, both in poetry and theological treatises alike. Medieval 
theological and philosophical works often challenged the boundary between 
theology/ philosophy and literature, by not only employing tropes but 
depending on them. 
In this chapter I will mention a few of the many medieval thinkers 
whose employment of metaphor can be compared to the techniques used by 
medieval poets as well as poets of other ages. This chapter will deal mainly 
with the philosophy of Bonaventure (1221- 1274). In contrast to the images of 
ambiguity which appeared in the negative theology of Pseudo -Dionysius, 
Bonaventure's conception of the universe was filled with images of clarity 
and light. I have organised this chapter around three images, the book, the 
trace, and the mirror, which occured in his theological and poetical works as 
representations of the divine, and which re -occur in a non -theological form 
in Derrida's work. These images, although inherently theological, work to 
balance as well as to contrast the concepts of presence and absence in 
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Bonaventure's texts. Derrida also uses them as metaphors but de- theologises 
them. However, is true de- theologisation possible? Can Derrida succeed in 
completely removing the theological traces from these signs? It is the 
question raised by Derrida himself in "Comment ne pas parler?" 
The difference between Derrida's metaphors and Bonaventure's is 
indicative of what is fundamentally different between deconstruction and 
medieval theology in general. Derrida intends to construct images which are 
deliberately non -logocentric, which do not refer to a divine logos. Yet to 
show that these metaphors are empty is essentially to do no more than these 
medieval poets and philosophers did. To say that medieval metaphors were 
empty is not to say that they were void, whether of aesthetic beauty or of 
meaning, but rather that in the case of the medieval metaphor, meaning was 
temporarily and temporally deferred. Medieval mimetic theory is based on 
the principle that the logos cannot be truly represented. All representations 
are therefore only approximations. Representation is dependent on difference 
for meaning, as well as on a certain space or distance which could certainly be 
termed as absence or nothingness or non -Being. 
The division between sensible and intelligible, or, we might say, 
between the known and the unknown, results from a difficulty in 
representation, and results in a situation in which we must constantly fall 
back upon metaphor, upon figures of speech. The images of the book and the 
mirror which are so common in medieval texts always remind us of the 
difference between what is knowable and what is infinitely displaced from 
cognition. I hope that this discussion will result in the answer to a related 
question: why do literary critics always make recourse to paradox when 
discussing the relation between medieval thought and deconstruction? Also, 
just as medieval thinkers are limited or trapped by their tropes, in what ways 
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is Derrida trapped by his own tropes? Instead of pointing out what is wrong 
with Western metaphysics, perhaps Derrida has called attention to what is 
necessary and inevitable in the human condition. 
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"Omnis mundi creatura quasi liber et pictura ..." 
In Chapter One, I argued that the speech/ writing issue which was so 
central in Of Grammatology is actually secondary to other, more important 
issues. In the first chapter of Of Grammatology entitled "La fin du livre et le 
commencement de l'écriture ' [ "The End of the Book and the Beginning of 
Writing"], there is a point where Derrida seems to pause over his argument. 
He addresses what at first appears to be an exception to his argument that the 
prioritising of speech is a condition of logocentrism. During the period from 
Plato to Descartes (and particularly in the Middle Ages), there is evidence of a 
mystical appreciation of writing and a heralding of writing as representative 
of the divine. This phenomenon appears to reverse the roles assigned by 
Derrida to speech and writing. 
Rather than acknowledging the exception as a valid challenge to his 
argument, however, he posits a new hierarchical opposition between human, 
temporal, artifical writing and divine, natural, infinite writing. In such cases 
where writing is not secondary to speech, he argues, there exists what he 
terms as a "metaphoric mediation" which becomes like speech in its role as 
the privileged counterpart and simulates immediacy. For example, in Plato's 
Phaedrus, bad writing (i.e. literal, sensible, "la mauvaise écriture") is opposed 
to true writing. Such instances are for Derrida logocentrism disguised in 
metaphoric form, in which a higher writing is, and can only be, represented 
through metaphor. The metaphor of the Book or of God's Pen conceals 
logocentrism -- it refers to a type of writing which claims to be immediate, 
which aspires to the non -temporal. In the Middle Ages as in the Phaedrus, 
this metaphoric writing is opposed to a writing which does not need to be 
addressed metaphorically, what Derrida calls "fallen writing," the human 
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product. Logocentric writing is, according to Derrida, always represented 
through metaphor; he describes it as: "d'abord pensée dans une présence 
éternelle. "231 [ "first thought within an eternal presence. "]232 He continues, 
"L'idée du livre, c'est l'idée d'une totalité, finie ou infinie, du signifiant; cette 
totalité constituée du signifié lui préexiste, surveille son inscription et ses 
signes, en est indépendante dans son idéalité. "233 [ "The idea of the book is 
the idea of a totality, finite or infinite, of the signifier; this totality of the 
signifier cannot be a totality, unless a totality constituted by the signified 
preexists it, supervises its inscriptions and its signs and is independent of it in 
its ideality." ]234 
The concept of the Book, the cosmos as the Book of Nature, and the 
mind as the Book of Memory, is fundamental not only in the Middle Ages, 
but as Derrida points out, is part of the whole history of logocentrism. In the 
logocentric era, writing, according to Derrida, does not possess value in itself 
but only as a metaphor for an idealised writing. The term which Derrida 
chooses to describe "real" as opposed to idealised writing is "literal." He 
argues, "Bien entendu, cette métaphore reste énigmatique et renvoie à un 
sens 'propre' de l'écriture comme première metaphore ... Il ne s'agirait donc 
pas d'inverser le sens propre et le sens figuré mais de déterminer le sens 
'propre' de l'écriture comme la métaphoricité elle -même. "235 [ "Of course, 
this metaphor remains enigmatic and refers to a 'literal' meaning of writing 
as the first metaphor ... It is not, therefore, a matter of inverting the literal 
meaning and the figurative meaning but of determining the 'literal' meaning 
231De la grammatologie, p. 30. 
2320f Grammatology, p. 18. 
233De la grammatologie, p. 30. 
2340f Grammatology, p. 18. 
235De la grammatologie, p. 27. 
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as metaphoricity itself. "]236 Derrida's selection of the term "literal" is 
significant when considered in light of Dante's discussion of the literal sense 
of allegory, which will be covered in the following chapter. In this chapter I 
will examine the concept of the book in medieval philosophy, particularly in 
the thought of Bonaventure, and will question its place in the history of 
logocentrism. 
2360f Grammatology, p. 15. 
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Bonaventure and the Book of Nature 
Bonaventure articulates a philosophy of light in his treatise, 
Collationes in Hexameron, in which he describes the cosmos in terms of its 
luminosity. In the Twelfth Collation of the Hexameron, Bonaventure 
elaborates his conception of the book as a symbol of the created cosmos. As 
Bonaventure notes, in Hebrews and Jeremiah, the prophet and the apostle 
state metaphorically that God writes his laws upon the hearts of men. The 
mortal bodies of men are inscribed with divine writing. The book of life 
which Bonaventure envisions is composed of an elevated writing, a writing 
which surpasses its own sign system. This transcendent book is distinct from 
what he refers to as the "book of the conscience," the thoughts and words of 
humanity. Through the book of life, the book of the conscience is read, and 
the book of life becomes the standard by which mortal signs are measured. 
He writes, "Per librum vitae habet anima vivere et iudicari; et si liber 
conscientiae concordat cum libro vitae, approbatur; si autem discordat, 
reprobatur. "237 [ "Through the power of the book of life, the soul lives and is 
open to judgement; and if the book of the conscience coincides with the book 
of life, it is approved; but if they differ, it is reproved. "]238 He further claims 
that the book of life is composed of words which are eternal, which existed 
237Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaemeron, Opera Omnia Tome 5, ed. RP 
Bernadini, (Claras Aquas: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1891), 
collation 12, section 8. All subsequent quotes are taken from this edition. 
238Bonaventure, Hexameron: Collations on the Six Days, The Works of 
Bonaventure, trans. Jose de Vinck, (Paterson, NJ: St. Anthony Guild Press, 
1970), p. 176. All subsequent quotes in English translation are taken from this 
edition. Page numbers will be given instead of section numbers. 
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beforehand, and in his words, are "non de novo scribentur. "239 ["not written 
anew. "]240 
Bonaventure proceeds to a discussion of God (cause) as art. God, as the 
Exemplar, is art which represents a multitude of beings. Bonaventure is able 
to discuss his subject only in terms of paradox, claiming that "Haec etiam 
causa, quia est una, est summe simplex; et eo quod summe simplex, est 
infinita, quia 'virtus vel causa, quanto magis unita et simplex, tanto magis 
infinita. "'241 [ "This same cause, also, because it is one, is supremely simple; 
and because supremely simple, infinite, for 'a power or cause, the more it is 
one and simple, the more it is infinite ... "']242 He further describes the cause 
as a light which is unreachable yet nearer to the soul than it is to itself, 
unconfinable yet intimate. 
This vision of art is accessible only to visionaries, who are not limited 
in their view of infinity: "Hoc autem videre non est nisi hominis suspensi 
ultra se in alta visione; et quando volumus videre simplici intuitu, quomodo 
illa ars est una, et tarnen multiplex; quia immiscet se phantasia, cogitare non 
possumus, quomodo infinita sit nisi per distensionem: et ideo videre non 
possumus simplici intuitu nisi ratiocinando. "243 [ "This can be seen by none 
but a man suspended beyond himself in a lofty vision; and when we wish to 
see by means of simple intuition how such art is one and yet manifold, we 
cannot conceive how infinite it is, except in terms of extension, because the 
imagination interferes. "]244 In some ways his notion of art bears similarity to 
Coleridge's concept of beauty as Multeity in Unity, in which "the many, still 
239co11. 12, sect. 8. 
240p. 176 
241 coll. 12, sect. 10. 
242p. 177 
243co1l. 12, sect. 11. 
244p. 178 
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seen as many, becomes one. "245 A similar concept is found in the 
Pythagorean notion of beauty, which Coleridge expresses as "THE 
REDUCTION OF MANY TO ONE. "246 Bonaventure states, "melius videbo 
me in Deo quam in me ipso. Est tarnen summe una. "247 [ "I will see myself 
better in God than in myself. And yet it is supremely one. "]248 God as mirror 
and art is the representation of beings, beings which are realised in the cause 
they stem from. He describes the cause as both first and immediate, 
immediate because superior to the intermediary. In this causal relation the 
intermediary is surpassed and the oneness and infinity of the first cause 
become, in a simple way, in the logic of the divine, the same. The art which 
is a cause carries in it the representation of things which can be caused. 
Bonaventure describes the interaction as an art which represents the 
changeable as changeless, the material as immaterial, accidents as substance, 
the body as spirit, the temporal as eternal, and discordance as harmony. In art 
one opposition is so dependent upon the other that they are reconciled. 
Multiplicity is expressed in unity. 
Although Bonaventure calls the art immediate, it is clear that 
something which encapsulates the qualties of the ineffable as well as the 
expressible should be inconceivable except through the traces left behind in 
this divine representation. The first trace is the sensible world. He writes: 
Quantum ad primum totus mundus est umbra, via, vestigium et 
est liber scriptus forinsecus. In qualibet enim creatura est 
refulgentia divini exemplaris, sed cum tenebra permixta; unde est 
sicut quaedam opacitas admixta lumini. Item, est via ducens in 
exemplar. Sicut tu vides, quod radius intrans per fenestram 
245Coleridge, Principles of Genial Criticism, Essay Third 
2461bid, third principle. 
247co11. 12, sect. 9. 
248p. 177 
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diversimode coloratur secundum colores diversos diversarum 
partium; sic radius divinus in singulis creaturis diversimode et in 
diversis proprietatibus refulget;249 
As regards the first, the whole world is a shadow, a way, and a 
trace; a book with writing front and back. Indeed, in every 
creature there is a refulgence of the divine exemplar, but mixed 
with darkness: hence it resembles some kind of opacity combined 
with light. Also, it is a way leading to the exemplar. As you notice 
that a ray of light coming in through a window is colored 
according to the shades of the different panes, so the divine ray 
shines differently in each creature and in the various 
properties.250 
The image he describes is of the world as a text, in which God's creatures are 
signs which lead to higher signs, in which meaning is hidden in the art 
which can be grasped only through the trace. A similar image of the world as 
a book which can be read and deciphered was expressed by Alan of Lille in his 
poem "Omnis mundi creatura": 
Omnis mundi creatura 
quasi liber et pictura 
nobis est in speculum: 
nostrae vitae, nostrae mortis, 
nostri status, nostrae sortis 
fidele signaculum. 
Nostrum statum pingit rosa, 
nostri status decens glosa, 
nostrae vitae lectio: 
quae dum primo mane floret, 
defloratus flos effloret 
vespertino senio.251 
249co11. 
12, sect. 14. 
250p 179 
251"Omnis mundi creatura," Psalterium Profanum, ed. and trans. (into German) 
Joseph Eberle, (Zurich: Manesse Verlag, 1962), p. 126. 
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This is Alan of Lille's representation of the divine Book of nature, which is 
composed of a writing which is not actually transcendent but which is very 
much a part of everyday life, encompassing our lives and our deaths, 
signifying all human activities. 
Bonaventure stated previously that representation occurs on the level 
of the divine. God as art represents the many beings, the different signs 
which make up the book of the world. Thus a search for meaning begins 
with God and shifts back to us, as the "meaning" behind divine 
representation. It shifts ultimately back to God, however, and we as signs are 
merely temporal vessels of meaning. Bonaventure writes, "Unde creatura 
non est nisi sicut quoddam simulacrum sapientiae Dei et quoddam sculptile. 
Et ex his omnibus est quidam liber scriptus foris. "252 [ "Wherefore the 
creature exists only as a kind of imitation of God's wisdom, as a certain plastic 
representation of it. And for all these reasons, it is a kind of book written . . . 
without. "]253 Strangely enough, the sensible world appears in this elaborate 
system of signs to be writing both front and back, the signifier and the 
signified of a divine reality. 
In his next sentence, Bonaventure states that natural philosophers do 
not have the vision to discern the essence of things, implying that a vision of 
the world as a series of logocentric oppositions belongs to the realm of 
philosophers who do not possess sufficient knowledge to read the narrative 
structure of the cosmos: "Quando ergo anima videt haec, videtur sibi, quod 
252co11. 12, sect. 14. 
253p 179 
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deberet transire ab umbra ad lucem, a via ad terminum, a vestigio ad 
veritatem, a libro ad scientiam veram, quae est in Deo. Hunc librum legere 
est altissimorum con temp lativorum, non naturalium philosophorum, quia 
solum sciunt naturam rerum, non ut vestigium. "254 [ "And so, when the 
soul sees these things, it seems to it that it should go through them from 
shadow to light, from the way to the end, from the trace to the truth, from the 
book to veritable knowledge which is in God. To read this book is the 
privilege of the highest contemplatives, not of natural philosophers: for the 
former alone know the essence of things, and do not consider them only as 
traces. "]255 According to Bonaventure, the philosopher sees things not in 
reality but as shadows and signs. While capable of reading signs, he cannot 
pursue the traces to their ending points. 
The second way to the exemplar designated by Bonaventure is the 
spiritual creature. A counterpart to sensible creatures, the spiritual creature 
"est ut lumen, ut speculum, ut imago, ut liber sciptus intus. "256 [ "resembles 
light, a mirror, an image, a scroll written within. "]257 The contemplative 
moves from sensible, exterior writing to spiritual, interior writing. In this 
medium between way and end, final meaning is postponed, and yet all things 
are represented here: 
Omnis substantia spiritualis lumen est; unde in Psalmo; 
Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine. Simul etiam 
cum hoc est speculum, quia omnia recipit et repraesentat; et habet 
naturam luminis, ut et iudicet de rebus. Totus enim mundus 
describitur in anima. Et est etiam imago. Quia ergo est lumen et 
speculum habens rerum imagines, ideo est imago. Ex hoc est 
etiam liber scriptus intus. Unde ad intimum animae nullus 
254co11. 
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potest intrare, nisi sit simplex; hoc autem est intrare ad 
potentias;258 
Every spiritual substance is light. Hence, the psalm: the light of 
Thy, countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. [Ps 4:7] At the same 
time, it is a mirror, for it receives and represents all things; and it 
has the nature of light, so that it may even pass judgment on 
things. For the whole world is described in the soul. It (the 
spiritual creature) is also an image. Since it is both light and 
mirror containing images of things, it is image too. And hence it 
is a scroll written within. And for this reason nothing can 
penetrate the intimate center of the soul, unless it is simple -- 
meaning that nothing can penetrate its powers.259 
In this poetic definition of the spiritual substance, Bonaventure brings 
together the images of light, mirror, and text. The soul, according to 
Bonaventure, is a vast text in which the whole world can be read. It is at the 
same time the light by which one reads. In its role as a mirror it acts both as a 
signifier which represents all things and as a signified which receives all 
things. As an image it also contains the images of things. 
The third help he designates is Scripture. In the following passage, he 
describes Scripture as both the tongue and the pen of God: "Est autem omnis 
Scriptura cor Dei, os Dei, lingua Dei, calamus Dei, liber scriptus foris et 
intus. "260 [ "For the whole of Scripture is the heart of God, the mouth of God, 
the tongue of God, the pen of God, a scroll written within and without .. . 
The heart is of God, the mouth of the Father, the tongue of the Son, the pen 
of the Holy Spirit. For the Father speaks through the Son or Tongue, but that 
which fulfills and commits to memory is the Pen of the Scribe. "]261 Speech 
and writing come together in Bonaventure's philosophy to act as 
258c011. 12, sect. 16. 
259P 180 
260co11. 12, sect. 17. 
261P 180 
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representations of something which cannot be represented because it is 
mysterious. 
Item, est lingua, unde mel et lac sub lingua eius. Quam dulcia 
faucibus meis eloquia tua, super mel ori meo! Haec lingua cibos 
saporat; unde haec Scriptura comparatur panibus, qui habent 
saporem et reficiunt. Item, est calamus Dei, et hoc est Spiritus 
sanctus; quia, sicut scribens potest praesentialiter scribere 
praeterita, praesentia et futura; sic continentur in Scriptura 
praeterita, praesentia et futura. Unde est liber scriptus foris, quia 
habet pulcras historias, et docet rerum proprietates; scriptus est 
etiam intus, quia habet mysteria et intelligentias diversas.262 
Again, Sacred Scripture is a tongue, hence: Sweetmeats and milk 
are under your tongue -- How sweet to my palate are your 
promises, sweeter than honey to my mouth! This tongue enjoys 
the taste of food, wherefore these same Scriptures are compared to 
loaves of bread that nourish and are pleasant to the taste. Also, it 
is God's Pen, that is, the Holy Spirit, for as the writer may write in 
the present events past, present and future: so in Scriptures are 
contained the past, the present and the future. Wherefore it is a 
scroll written ... without, because it contains beautiful stories and 
teaches the properties of things, and also written within, because it 
contains mysteries and different possible interpretations.263 
In Scripture, which is written both within and without, such oppositions 
become meaningless. So too does the opposition speech/ writing, for the 
Trinity represents both. Thus it is the essential Trinity, rather than the Logos, 
which is the deconstructor of the binary opposition. 
In the Thirteenth Collation, Bonaventure extends his discussion to 
interpretation. He comments on the four senses of a word in Biblical 
exegesis, which Dante also discusses in the "Epistle to Can Grande," the 
literal, the figurative, the moral, and the anagogical. To represent these four 
senses Bonaventure borrows the image of the four living creatures 
262co11. 




envisioned by the prophet Ezekiel. He describes the scene which begins the 
book of Ezekiel, in which the prophet sees four creatures in a cloud of fire, 
possessing four faces and four wings. He mentions that a wheel appears 
beside each one. The text from the book of Ezekiel reads: "Each appeared to 
be made like a wheel intersecting a wheel . . . When the living creatures 
moved, the wheels beside them moved; and when the living creatures rose 
from the ground, the wheels also rose. Wherever the Spirit would go, they 
would go, without turning as they went. "264 Bonaventure interprets the 
four creatures as the writers of Scripture, and the four faces as the four modes 
of interpretation. The harmony of the four faces signifies the harmony of the 
four senses. The first face, the human face which Bonaventure terms 
"natural," represents the literal meaning. The lion represents the allegorical, 
the ox the tropological, and the eagle the anagogical. 
The interpretation of Scripture is dependent upon this plurality of 
senses, for according to Bonaventure, in other sciences it is possible to have 
only the literal sense. God's message, however, cannot be contained in only 
one sense, since God, the Trinity, himself is manifested in a threefold 
manner. He writes, "Hae quatuor sunt quasi visio maris propter spiritualium 
intelligentiarum primitivam originationem, profundissimam altitudinem et 
profluentissimam multiformitatem. Unde sicut sunt tres personae in una 
essentia, sic tres intelligentiae in una superficie litterae. "265 [ "These four are 
like the appearance of the sea because of the primitive origination, the most 
profound depth, and the abundantly flowing multiformity of the spiritual 
meanings. And so, as there are three Persons within the single Essence, there 
are three meanings beneath the single surface of the letter. 
264Ez 1:16, 1:19 -20. 




continues, "Hae quatuor intelligentiae sunt quatuor flumina maris Scipturae, 
a quo derivantur vel oriuntur et revertuntur. Unde sacra Scriptura est 
illuminativa omnium et reductiva in Deum, sicut primo fuit creatura. "267 
[ "These four meanings are the four rivers of the sea in Scripture: they derive 
or originate from the sea, and they return to it. Hence sacred Scripture sheds 
lights on all things and retraces them all back to God, thus restoring the 
original state of creatures. "]268 
In his comparison of the divine Essence to the letter, the literal 
meaning of the text, Bonaventure argues that the true meaning would be lost 
by focusing on the one. He emphasises the abundance and profundity of 
meaning which hides beneath the letter. He also reasserts in this passage his 
model of the world as a trace which both represents God and leads back to 
him. Scripture, as the final help or way back to God, acts as the retracer for 
traces to recover the origin. He describes it as, "Hic autem liber est Scripturae, 
qui ponit similitudines, proprietates et metaphoras rerum in libro mundi 
scriptarum. Liber ergo Scripturae reparativus est totius mundi ad Deum 
cognoscendum, laudandum, amandum. "269 [ "Such a book is Scripture 
which establishes the likenesses, the properties, and the symbolism of things 
written down in the book of the world. And so, Scripture has the power to 
restore the whole world toward the knowledge, praise, and love of God. "]270 
Bonaventure's theology of the book can be characterised by a 
reconciliation of opposites, by the diminishing of irrelevant oppositions. The 
267co11. 








end result of this reconciliation is a universe of text in which different senses 
(i.e. the four senses of Scripture) can co -exist harmoniously. There are certain 
oppositions which remain necessary from the human standpoint in any 
temporal situation. The first of these is measurable/ immeasurable. 
Whether the Universe is finite or infinite, we are left with the dilemma that 
there are some things which cannot be measured, most notably the universe 
itself. There are other oppositions related to this one which I also ascertain to 
be necessary: visible/ invisible and sensible/ insensible. These oppositions 
are based purely on the limitations of human senses which must function in 
a temporal world. They are probably not structurally necessary in a universal 
sense, but are the product of our physically and technologically limited 
species. Proceeding from these are other oppositions, which are also inherent 
in our perception (or lack of it), but may also be structural and universal. The 
opposition finite/ infinite results from our inability to measure the entire 
universe in terms of space and time. Bonaventure was interested not in 
opposing opposites but in observing how they coincided. There is a tension 
in the Hexameron between humanity's desire for the infinite and humanity's 
blindness, which leads always to finitude. Deconstruction would also chase 
after an endless play of signs; yet at any given moment only a limited number 
can be perceived. According to Ewert Cousins, in Bonaventure's thought 
"the opposites are differentiated and united in such a way that their very 
coincidence intensifies their differences. "271 
271Ewert H. Cousins, Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites, (Chicago: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1978), p. 207. 
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Postmodern visions of the book 
In the following section, I will examine the postmodern conception of 
the medieval book, questioning on what evidence this postmodern 
formulation is based. For this I will return again briefly to Mark Taylor's 
deconstruction of theology in Erring. His characteristation of the postmodern 
age as signalling the closure of the Book is both radical in its implications yet 
conformist to the model of the logocentric Book envisioned by other 
deconstructionists. He uses the image of the library found in Leibniz's 
Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the 
Origin of Evil to create a contrast with the postmodern images in Borges' 
Labyrinths. Taylor describes Leibniz's portrayal of the library as a coherent 
system in which each part mirrors the whole. Leibniz's library serves as a 
metaphor for a harmonic universe. In contrast, Borges' library is a labyrinth, 
chaotic and infinite, which Taylor describes as "reminiscent of a carnival fun 
house. "272 Borges' image of the library in "The Library of Babel" represents a 
universe in which nothing is comprehensible, and in which nothing is 
structured. Each element is almost random in its existence, and each can be 
interpreted and misinterpreted according to the whims of scholars who seem 
to wander aimlessly through the library. Taylor juxtaposes Borges' library 
with Leibniz's to demonstrate the fundamental difference between 
postmodernism and logocentrism. The postmodern age, the age of the 
closure of the Book, is radical, defiant, and free. Unfettered by the chains of 
logocentric idealism, this new age obtains its liberation by embracing chaos. 
Deconstruction depends on this contrast between the postmodern image and 
272Taylor, p. 76. 
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the logocentric one, which has become a stereotype of sterility, order, and 
simplicity. 
We might also add to this discussion the image of the library in Eco's 
The Name of the Rose. Eco's library is as labyrinthine and confounding as 
Borges', but it contains many contrasts and contradictions. The library in The 
Name of the Rose, unlike that of Borges', is not representative of a 
postmodern world, but of a medieval one. The medieval library represents 
an infinity so complex as to bewilder the human mind. His description, 
narrated through the voice of the young monk Adso, is contained in the 
following passage: 
Sino ad allora avevo pensato che ogni libro parlasse delle cose, 
umane o divine, che stanno fuori dai libri. Ora mi avvedevo che 
non di rado i libri parlano di libri, ovvero è come si parlassero fra 
loro. Alla luce di questa riflessione, la biblioteca mi parve ancora 
più inquietante. Era dunque il luogo di un lungo è secolare 
sussorro, di un dialogo impercettibile tra pergamena e pergamena, 
una cosa viva, un ricettacolo di potenze non dominabili da una 
mente umana, tesoro di segreti emanati da tante menti, e 
sopravvissuti alla morte di coloro che li avevano prodotti, o se ne 
erano fatti tramite.273 
Until then I had thought each book spoke of the things, human or 
divine, that lie outside books. Now I realized that not 
infrequently books speak of books: it is as if they spoke among 
themselves. In the light of this reflection, the library seemed all 
the more disturbing to me. It was then the place of a long, 
centuries -old murmuring, an imperceptible dialogue between one 
parchment and another, a living thing, a receptacle of powers not 
to be ruled by a human mind, a treasure of secrets emanated by 
many minds, surviving the death of those who had produced 
them or had been their conveyors.274 
27311 nome della rosa, (Milano: Bompiani, 1980), p. 289. 
274The Name of the Rose, trans. William Weaver, (London: Mandarin, 1994), 
p. 286. 
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Thus Eco's library is perhaps a much more fitting picture of the logocentric 
library than is Leibniz's, at least concerning medieval logocentrism. It is a 
more fitting metaphor for the medieval world view because it hints neither 
at Leibniz's simple harmony nor at Borges' postmodern chaos but at an image 
of harmony so profound that it can only appear as chaotic to the human 
mind, as Eco puts it, "Il massimo di confusione raggiunto con it massimo di 
ordine: mi pare un calcolo sublime. "275 [ "The maximum of confusion 
achieved with the maximum of order: it seems a sublime calculation. "]276 
Taylor argues that the Western image of the book involves the idea of 
harmony and order. He writes, "Inasmuch as the book forms an ordered 
totality, it is, like history, logocentric. Although characterised in many 
different ways, the logos of the book invariably constitutes the principle of 
preestablished harmony, which forms the structural foundation of the 
volume's unity and coherence. "277 He describes the relationship between the 
author and the book in terms of ownership: the Western author is the owner 
and creator of his or her book; the author possesses the work. Taylor 
associates this concept of the author with an economy based on private 
property. Relating this idea to theology, he concludes that books derive their 
worth from their relation to the Book and to God as the first and final 
Author. 
His thesis is interesting, but can it be applied to the Middle Ages? In 
the medieval world view, God indeed was the Author of authors and the 
Bible was exalted above other books. However, the first part of his argument, 
27511 nome della rosa, p. 220. 
276The Name of the Rose, p. 217. 
277p. 78 
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which attempts to relate the concept of divine authorship to the human 
author's relation to private economy, appears to run contrary to the medieval 
view. The medieval economy was not based on a system of private property 
and capitalism, nor on a world view which emphasised the individual and 
his or her possessions. Instead, the will of the individual was less important 
than public well- being. Furthermore, the author did not possess his or her 
text -- this can be seen in the willingness of so many writers to remain 
anonymous or obscure. Even in the case of texts in which the author can be 
identified, oftentimes the authorial voice or intention is obscured. In many 
cases the medieval author regards himself as a scribe, and his work is an act of 
transcription rather than creation. 
Taylor conceives of the image of the book as something coherent and 
unified, complete and perhaps planned from beginning to end. He cites 
Hartman's description of a book as "solidly constructed, unified, and with an 
intellectual space defined by clear and resolute boundaries. "278 The 
deconstructionist argument is dependent on precisely this image of the book 
as unified and clearly bounded. However, this is precisely what the Bible, the 
supposed Book of books, is not. It is rather the opposite, the very model of 
disunity. If logocentrics were to take the Bible as their model, their image of 
the book would be nearer to what one finds in the Canterbury Tales or Piers 
Plowman, a text which is fragmented, not unified temporally nor even 
thematically. The medieval book is in reality not a unity, not a bound text in 
which every word is perfectly placed and chapters follow a logical order. In 
practice, the medieval text is somewhat like the Bible in that we must rely on 
278Geoffrey Hartman, Saving the Text, p. 2, quoted in Taylor, p. 91. 
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ourselves to piece together the order of the text. We must be the creators of 
unity in the text, working from our own desire for and from our own 
conception of unity. 
Where does the postmodern idealisation of the Bible as a model of 
coherence and unity begin, and where does it lead to? In the following 
passage from The Absence of the Book, Maurice Blanchot argues that the 
Bible is the model for the concept of the harmonious Book: 
The book begins with the Bible, in which the logos is inscribed as 
law. Here the book achieves its unsurpassable meaning, including 
what extends beyond it everywhere and cannot be surpassed. The 
Bible takes language back to its origin: whether this language is 
written or spoken, it is always the theological era that opens with 
this language and lasts as long as biblical space and time. The Bible 
not only offers us the highest model of a book, the specimen that 
will never be superceded; the Bible also encompasses all books, no 
matter how alien they are to biblical revelation, knowledge, 
poetry, prophecy, proverbs, because it contains the spirit of the 
book; the books that follow it are always contemporaneous with 
the Bible: the Bible certainly grows, expands with itself in an 
infinite growth that leaves it identical, permanently sanctioned by 
the relationship of unity, just as the ten laws set forth and contain 
the monologos, the one law, the law of Unity that cannot be 
transgressed and never can be denied by negation alone.279 
Is it possible for the Bible to be both in a state of "infinite growth" and yet, to 
borrow Hartman's description of the book, "solidly constructed, unified, and 
with an intellectual space defined by clear and resolute boundaries "? 
The postmodern image of the book, Blanchot's image, is perhaps 
deceptively simple. Beneath this seeming surface of harmony is a concept of 
the Book which contains the logos inscribed as law, as a sort of law, but it is 
also a representation of infinity which cannot, refuses to be, represented. We 
279Maurice Blanchot, The Absence of the Book (excerpt), in Deconstruction in 
Context: Literature and Philosophy, ed. Mark Taylor, (Chicago and London: U. 
of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 388. 
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find in medieval literature a sense of incompleteness, a journey not 
completely finished, an ending which ends not with God but on earth. The 
lines of the manuscript rush towards an infinity which they are always 
already prevented from reaching. The continual glossing of the manuscript 
counters a sense of finality. The manuscript is never closed; there is always 
the possibility of another commentary, another reader and another author. 
Taylor's concept of the book is of an ordered text, organised around a 
centre. But is the "centre" determined by the author or by the reader? Does 
the author intentionally construct the narrative around a central point, or is 
it the reader who re- organises the story according to his or her own ideas? 
Who locates the centre in history, or in any narrative structure? Taylor 
writes: 
Insofar as becoming is justified at every moment, the eternal play 
of differences has no firmly fixed center. In the absence of 
beginning and end, there can no more be a secure center than 
there can be a genuine beginning and end apart from a definite 
midpoint. I have stressed that narrativization ties together the 
dangling threads of chronicle by forming a centered structure. The 
overall coherence of historical narrative requires a specific center, 
one that refers back to an inaugural moment and ahead to a 
conclusive moment. The center governs the pattern of the plot by 
forming the prism through which all events are reflected and 
refracted. 2ß0 
Who is the origin of Taylor's theoretical centre? In history, is it the 
participants of history who find themselves alive in the present, or God? The 
reader reads the organising structure into the text in the absence of the 
author. It is the human being alive in the present who finds an organising 
structure in the absence of the Creator. The organising structure and the 
structure's centre are always imposed afterwards, not on the present by those 
280Erring, p. 156. 
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existing in the present, but by those in the present desiring to organise the 
past. There is no liberation from time. 
History can be described as the imposition of unity and order by a later 
period onto an earlier one, classifying and categorising according to its own 
preferences. Postmodernism is intent on the interrogation of other epochs, 
with the assumption that in its present state it has achieved a new level of 
open- mindedness, a new level of freedom (for the epoch of logocentrism has 
ended). It scrutinises and observes that which is outside and temporally prior 
to itself. In contrast, medieval thought is introspective. We can identify in 
the Middle Ages a desire for order and a tendency to structure the world 
through the imposition of order upon itself. The medieval universe was 
conceived as harmonious. In our own age, however, we accept the 
randomness and chaos of our own universe while imposing order and 
structure on other epochs and other cultures. The other is defined and 
limited, categorised to fit a logocentric model, but the postmodern age has 
elevated itself to a new and previously unrealised liberation. 
The separation of the interior from the exterior is a condition and a 
result of medieval self- examination. The individual is focused on himself; 
the self becomes both subject and object, and all other objects are shut out so 
that attention may devoted to self -examination. Thus there is a necessary 
division between that which is within oneself and that which is without. In 
the postmodern age the exterior is privileged; the interior disappears, as does 
the need for a division between the interior and the exterior. The whole 
world is an object. 
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The trace of the trace 
What leads Derrida to his choice of the "trace" as the term which 
would become so important in his deconstruction of Western metaphysics? 
"Trace," like other philosophical terms, has been pre -mysticised, pre - 
theologised, so Derrida must be careful to redefine his trace away from those 
theological and logocentric connotations. However, complete de- 
logocentrising may not be possible. The justification for his choice of terms, 
Derrida writes in Of Grammatology: "Linguistics and Grammatology," comes 
from a historical strategy. In the case of the trace, this term derives meaning 
from other (contemporary) discourse. He refers to Levinas' critique of 
ontology, in which the trace demonstrates the "rapport à l'illéité comme à 
l'altérité d'un passé qui n'a jamais été et ne peut jamais être vécu dans la 
forme, originaire ou modifiée, de la présence. "281 [ "relationship to the illeity 
as to the alterity of a past that never was and can never be lived in the 
originary or modified form of presence. "2ß2] In the Heideggerian mode, the 
trace is the undermining of the ontology which determines being as presence. 
Derrida also mentions Nietzsche and Freud, and refers to scientific fields, 
especially biology. 
According to Derrida, metaphysics and all that it implies (binary 
oppositions, the privileging of speech as presence) is the history of one 
striving towards the reduction of the trace. He writes: 
La subordination de la trace à la présence pleine résumée dans le 
logos, l'abaissement de l'écriture au- dessous d'une parole rêvant 
sa plénitude, tels sont les gestes requis par une onto- théologie 
281De la grammatologie, p. 103. 
2820f Grammatology, p. 70. 
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déterminant le sens archéologique et eschatologique de l'être 
comme présence, comme parousie, comme vie sans différance: 
autre nom de la mort, historiale métonymie où le nom de Dieu 
tient la mort en respect.283 
The subordination of the trace to the full presence summed up in 
the logos, the humbling of writing beneath a speech dreaming its 
plenitude, such are the gestures required by an onto -theology 
determining the archeological and eschatological meaning of 
being as presence, as parousia, as life without differance: another 
name for death, historical metonymy where God's name holds 
death in check.284 
In this next section I will dig further into the past to uncover a notion of the 
trace which exists but which has been forgotten, which Derrida has neglected 
(quite understandably) in his own history of the trace. The medieval trace, 
conceptualised by Bonaventure, unconsciously leaves its mark on any future 
traces, on Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Levinas, but especially on Derrida, 
who opposes his own trace to the history of logocentrism. This opposition, 
trace/ ontology, like the oppositions speech/ writing, sensible/ intelligible, 
etc. lacks an origin. That is, we are not sure with whom this opposition first 
begins to be conceived, whether with Plato or with Derrida, at the beginning 
of the history of metaphysics or at its closure. 
In this section I will return to the philosophy of Bonaventure to 
discuss his Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, which describes the process of the 
ascent to God through the mind. According to Bonaventure, the world 
functions as a ladder, and the images of the world, corporeal things included, 
are the steps which lead to God. In chapter one of the Itinerarium, he 
283De la grammatologie, p. 104. 
2840f Grammatology, p. 71. 
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outlines a three -fold process for the ascent, which can be symbolised by the 
three -day journey into the wilderness. First, he instructs, one should use the 
traces in the world to gain an understanding of God. One should then enter 
one's own mind, which is "imago Dei aeviterna, spiritualis et intra nos "285 
[ "the eternal image of God, spiritual and internal . . . 1286 Finally, by 
following this process, one may transcend the world and gain a full 
comprehension of God. Bonaventure's philosophy shows evidence of the 
medieval consciousness of the boundaries of the mind, and the search so 
common in medieval thought to transcend those boundaries. In 
determining a means of overcoming the boundaries of the mind, 
Bonaventure postulates that the Other which is beyond his boundaries is 
capable of being infused with what is within. 
Bonaventure identifies three modes of theology -- the symbolic, by 
which sensible things are made to represent the spiritual; the literal, by which 
intelligible things may be read and interpreted literally; and the mystical, by 
which one is enabled to contemplate God directly. There are also three modes 
by which ascension is made possible: contemplation, belief, and reasoning. In 
contemplation, one notices the physical characteristics of things: their weight, 
number, and measure. This trinity leads to the understanding of other 
properties of things, also grouped into three's: mode, species, and order; and 
substance, power, and operation. Bonaventure advises that the seeker can 
use these things as traces in the ascent to God. 
285Bonaventure, Itinerarii Mentis in Deum, Opera Omnia, Tome 5, ed. RP 
Bernadini, (Claras Aquas: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1891), Cap. 
I, 2. 
286The Mind's Road to God, trans. George Boas, (Indianapolis and New York: 
Bobbs -Merrill Co., 1953), p. 8. 
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The word "trace" contains several implications. First, it implies the 
absence of something which has disappeared. It is a mark, whether concrete 
or insubstantial, which has been left behind as the remnant of a present 
absence. Therefore, it contains the hint, the possibility, even the hope that 
presence will be renewed. A trace is a clue which can be followed and is 
assumed to lead to presence. It can be associated neither with pure absence 
nor with pure presence. The concept of the trace is essential to 
Bonaventurian philosophy as well as to deconstruction, but in both cases the 
implications of this term are ambiguous. Is Bonaventure's trace a longing for 
an absent presence and Derrida's the affirmation of absence, or vice versa? 
Already present in Bonaventure's trace is Derrida's notion of the trace as 
absence, as the mark left behind of something or someone who or which has 
departed. However, as the prefiguration of Derrida's trace, by reasons of an 
unstoppable chronology and temporality, Bonaventure's trace has already 
left its mark on Derrida's. Likewise, by reasons of an unstoppable chronology 
1 and temporality, Derrida's trace, now containing the power of the present, 
leaves its mark on Bonaventure's. The postmodern trace contains 
unknowingly and against its will the possibility of presence, the possibility 
that the trace leads to an infinity which is as yet unknown, unnamed and 
I undiscovered. In our inability to know the nature of infinity, we may find 
that the postmodern trace leads first to an infinity of other traces but may 
finally end in presence. 
Bonaventure continues his description of the process of ascension by 
describing the second mode of theology, which involves a belief in the three 
modes of history. Through belief, he states, one is able to perceive the origin, 
course, and terminus of the world. Belief is necessary because the origin and 
terminus of time are beyond ordinary human understanding. The third 
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mode involves discerning the essences of things, whether they are corporeal 
or spiritual, mutable or immutable, corruptible or incorruptible. Throughout 
this discussion his prose is unified by his affinity for the number three, a 
reflection of his love of order and proportion. 
The process of knowing through sensibles is tied to his concept of 
aesthetic pleasure. He names the process by which the external sensibles 
enter the soul as apprehension. This process, Bonaventure argues, occurs not 
through the substances of the sensibles, but through their similitudes. To his 
aesthetic sense, it results in a delight which manifests itself in varying 
degrees, through the senses. He writes, "Quoniam igitur prius est ascendere 
quam descendere in scala Iacob, primum gradum ascensionis collocemus in 
imo, ponendo totum istum mundum sensibilem nobis tanquam speculum, 
per quod transeamus ad Deum ... "287 ["Since, then, we must mount Jacob's 
ladder before descending it, let us place the first rung of the ascension in the 
depths, putting the whole sensible world before us as a mirror, by which 
ladder we shall mount up to God .. . 1288 
The next step is judgement, in which one determines the source of 
delight in the sensibles, which Bonaventure attributes to equality of 
proportion. Through judgement, the sensibles can enter the intellect by 
purification and abstraction. Through this process, Bonaventure claims that 
the whole world can enter an individual's soul. He reminds us, however, 
that the world is only a trace, and brings not the true image of God but a 
reflection. Bonaventure argues that God can, like the sensibles, generate a 




likeness which is absorbed by the soul. It is this likeness which he compares 
to a mirror through which one is able to see God. Bonaventure's philosophy 
leads not only to a love of the spiritual but to an aesthetics which is based on 
the sensible. He writes: 
Ex his duobus gradibus primis, quibus manuducimur ad 
speculandum Deum in vestigiis quasi ad modum duarum alarum 
descendentium circa pedes, colligere possumus, quod omnes 
creaturae istius sensibilis mundi animum contemplantis et 
sapientis ducunt in Deum aeternum, pro eo quod illius primi 
principii potentissimi, sapientissimi et optimi, illius aeternae 
originis, lucis et plenitudinis, illius, inquam, artis efficientis, 
exemplantis et ordinantis sunt umbrae, resonantiae et picturee, 
sunt vestigia, simulacra et spectacula nobis ad contuendum Deum 
proposita et signa divinitus data; quae, inquam, sunt exemplaria 
vel potius exemplata, proposita mentibus adhuc rudibus et 
sensibilibus, ut per sensibilia, quae vident, transferantur ad 
intelligibilia, quae non vident, tanquam per signa ad signata.289 
From these two initial steps by which we are led to seeing God in 
His traces, as if we had two wings falling to our feet, we can 
determine that all creatures of this sensible world lead the mind of 
the one contemplating and attaining wisdom to the eternal God; 
for they are shadows, echoes, and pictures, the traces, simulacra, 
and reflections of that First Principle most powerful, wisest, and 
best; of that light and plenitude; of that art productive, 
exemplifying, and ordering, given to us for looking upon God. 
They are signs divinely bestowed which, I say, are exemplars or 
rather exemplifications sent before our yet untrained minds, 
limited to sensible things, so that through the sensibles which 
they see they may be carried forward to the intelligibles which they 
do not see, as if by signs to the signified.290 
Bonaventure argues that creatures act as signs of God on the principle 
that "omnis effectus est signum causae, et exemplatum exemplaris, et via 
finis, ad quem ducit; "291 [ "the effect is the sign of its cause, the 
289Cap. 2, 11. 
290p. 20 
291Cap. 2, 12. 
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exemplification of the exemplar, and the way to the end to which it leads . . 
1292 Each person and thing is transformed into a sign, so that everything 
becomes part of a chain in which each link is a thing and a sign, and nothing 
can be properly viewed as the terminus. That is to say, each thing which can 
be perceived always refers beyond itself. Thus, both Bonaventure and Derrida 
can be considered as signs which are to be read and intepreted. In 
Bonaventure's aesthetic, this process of reading the world brings delight to 
the senses as well as to the soul. 
The third step in the process which Bonaventure outlines involves 
entering into one's own mind. The mind is the mirror through which one 
can see God. Although Bonaventure does not imply that a direct vision of 
God is possible, his image of the mirror is a positive one: "hinc est, quod iam 
tertio loco, ad nosmetipsos intrantes et quasi atrium forinsecus relinquentes, 
in sanctis, scilicet anteriori parte tabernaculi, conari debemus per speculum 
videre Deum; ubi ad modum candelabri relucet lux veritatis in facie nostrae 
mentis, in qua scilicet resplendet imago beatissimae Trinitatis. "293 [ "Now in 
the third place, as we enter into ourselves, as if leaving the vestibule and 
coming into the sanctum, that is, the outer part of the tabernacle, we should 
strive to see God through a mirror. In this mirror the light of truth is shining 
before our minds as in a candelabrum, for in it gleams the resplendent image 
of the most blessed Trinity. "]294 
Bonaventure's metaphor of the mirror in the Itinerarium is not the 
barrier or the clouded glass which one finds in other medieval texts, but 
292p. 21 
293Cap. 3, 1. 
294p 22 
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works in conjunction with his metaphor of the ladder, as the means of 
following the trace to God. Thus this common medieval metaphor for the 
barrier to God can also be conceived as the pathway. The mirror exemplifies 
the situation in which a metaphor wears two faces and contains two opposites 
which seem irreconcilable. He writes: 
Sed quoniam circa speculum sensibilium non solum contingit 
contemplare Deum per ipsa tanquam per vestigia, verum etiam in 
ipsis, in quantum est in eis per essentiam, potentiam et 
praesentiam; et hoc considerare est altius quam praecedens: ideo 
huiusmodi consideratio secundum tenet locum tanquam 
secundus contemplationis gradus, quo debemus manuduci ad 
contemplandum Deum, in cunctis creaturis, quae ad mentem 
nostam intrant per corporales sensus.295 
But since with respect to the mirror of sensible things it happens 
that God is contemplated not only through them, as by His traces, 
but also in them, in so far as He is in them by essence, potency, 
and presence; and to consider this is higher than the preceding; 
therefore a consideration of this sort holds next place as a second 
step in contemplation, by which we should be led to the 
contemplation of God in all creatures which enter into our minds 
through the bodily senses.296 
For Bonaventure, the act of gazing into the mirror of sensible things is an act 
of mystical contemplation. Alan of Lille portrays creation as a mirror which 
reflects both presently, as the looker comes face to face with his own image, 
and absently, as he sees his image at a distance, never touching or 
merging.297 On the one hand are the signified things which are present to us 
now without mediation -- our life and our present condition. On the other 
hand are those things that we are separated from through time -- our death 
and our passing on. 
295Cap. 2, 1. 
296p. 14 
297Refers to the poem "Omnis mundi creatura." 
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Bonaventure's metaphor of the mirror is unusual in that its referent is 
the human mind. Memory plays an essential role in the transformation of 
the human mind as a tool for the ascent to God. Bonaventure's theory on 
memory can be summarised in the following statement: "Operatio autem 
m e m o r i a e est retentio et repraesentatio non solum praesentium, 
corporalium et temporalium, verum etiam succedentium, simplicium et 
sempiternalium. "298 [ "The operation of memory is retention and 
representation, not only of things present, corporeal, and temporal, but also of 
past and future things, simple, and eternal. "]299 Memory extends not only to 
the present and the past but to the future through foresight.300 According to 
Bonaventure, memory can retain simple principles, such as the point, the 
instant, and the unit, on which more complex concepts are built, and also has 
the power to retain principles eternally. It is through the memory that the 
298Cap. 3, 2. 
299p 22 
300Bonaventure outlines the three principles of memory: 
1) "Ex prima igitur retentione actuali omnium temporalium, 
praeteritorum scilicet, praesentium futurorum, habet effigen aeternitas, cuius 
praesens indivisibile ad omnia tempora se extendit." (Cap. 3, 2) 
[ "From the first actual retention of all temporal things, namely, of the past, 
present, and future, it has the likeness of eternity whose indivisible present 
extends to all times. "] (p. 23) 
2) "Ex secunda apparet, quod ipsa non solum habet ab exteriori formari 
per phantasmata, verum etiam a superiori suscipiendo et in se habendo 
simplices formas, quae non possunt intrare per portas sensum et sensibiorum 
phantasias." (Cap 3, 2). 
"From the second it appears that it is not only formed from without by images 
[phantasms], but also by receiving simple forms from above and retaining 
them in itself -- forms which cannot enter through the doors of the senses and 
the images of sensible things." (p. 23) 
3) "Ex tertia habetur, quod ipsa habet lucem incommutabilem sibi 
praesentem, in qua meminit invariabilium veritatum." (Cap. 3, 2) 
[ "From the third it follows that it has an undying light present to itself in 
which it remembers unchangeable truths. "] (p. 23) 
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mind can participate in the image of God: "per operationes memoriae 
apparet, quod ipsa anima est imago Dei et similitudo adeo sibi praesens et 
cum habens praesentem, quod eum actu capit et per potentiam 'capax eius est 
et particeps esse potest. "'301 [ "through the operations of the memory, it 
appears that the soul itself is the image of God and His likeness, so present to 
itself and having Him present that it receives Him in actuality and is 
susceptible of receiving Him in potency, and that it can also participate in 
Him. "] 302 According to Bonaventure, intelligence arises from memory, and 
from these two together come love. Through these things one is able to 
contemplate God. Here the mirror again serves as the representation of the 
means of ascent: "Dum igitur mens se ipsam considerat, per se tanquam per 
speculum consurgit ad speculandam Trinitatem beatam . . "303 ['When 
therefore the mind considers itself, it rises through itself as through a mirror 
to the contemplation of the Blessed Trinity . . . "]304 Nevertheless, 
Bonaventure concedes that a vision of God is unlikely, due not to the 
inadequacy of the process of ascent but to the limitations of the human mind: 
"Sed ratio est in promptu, quia mens humana, sollicitudinibus distracta, non 
intrat ad se per memoriam; phantasmatibus obnubilata, non redit ad se per 
intelligentiam ... Ideo totaliter in his sensibilibus iacens, non potest ad se 
tanquam ad Dei imaginem reintrare. "305 [ "For the human mind, distracted 
by cares, does not enter into itself through memory; obscured by phantasms, it 
does not return into itself through intelligence ... Thus, lying totally in this 
sensible world, it cannot return to itself as to the image of God. "]306 
301Cap. 3, 2. 
302p. 23 
303Cap. 3, 5. 
304p 26 
305Cap. 4, 1. 
306p 28 
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Bonaventure conceives of God as Being which is fixed, and completely 
opposite from non -Being, which is to say, nothingness. He notes that "esse 
purissimum non occurrit nisi in plena fuga non -esse "307 [ "the purest Being 
occurs only in full flight from Non -Being ... "]308 This contemplation of 
Being, however, is obstructed by the concrete forms of particular beings: "quia 
assuefactus ad tenebras entium et phantasmata sensibilium, cum ipsam 
lucem summi esse intuetur, videtur sibi nihil videre; non intelligens, quod 
ipsa caligo summa est mentis nostrae illuminatio, sicut, quando videt oculus 
puram lucem, videtur sibi nihil videre. "309 [ "Because accustomed to the 
shadows of beings and the phantasms of the sensible world, when it looks 
upon the light of the highest Being, it seems to see nothing, not 
understanding that darkness itself is the fullest illumination of the mind 
[Psalms 138:11], just as when the eye sees pure light it seems to itself to be 
seeing nothing. "]310 This is Bonaventure's explanation for the visions of 
darkness which may occur in the minds of those who seek light; indeed, 
darkness may perhaps be the highest form of light itself. 
The metaphors of humanity as a book, a trace, and a mirror are also 
present in the thought of Robert Grosseteste. According to Grosseteste, 
creatures are words and letters which can be read as text. Through this living 
text one can reach an understanding of sensible causes which lead to images 
of the divine. Creatures are also mirrors which carry reflections of the divine. 
He writes: "Omnis creatura speculum est de quo resultat similitudo creatoris, 
307Cap. 5, 3. 
308p. 35 
309Cap. 5, 4. 
310p. 36 
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unitatis scilicet et trinitatis. "311 Creation is also a vestige, a trace, of the divine 
nature. According to Grosseteste, creatures serve as traces of the divine 
according to their similarities to the divine. Unlike Pseudo -Dionysius, who 
emphasised the degree of difference in relation to the divine, Grosseteste 
preferred images of the spiritual which displayed their distance from crude 
matter. Pseudo -Dionysius and Grosseteste disagreed on whether the divine 
should be represented by concrete images in which one might discover a 
likeness to the spiritual, or by concrete images which were so different from 
the divine that they magnified its unrepresentable quality. What Grosseteste 
and Bonaventure conceived of was a world in which all concrete things were 
themselves signs and traces, words and symbols of intelligible things. In the 
creatures of the world, then, sensible and intelligible things join as a signifier 
to its signified. Furthermore, creatures portrayed as signs function both as 
readers and as the text itself. In this conception of the world, the distinction 
between author/ reader/ text becomes blurred. 
311Grosseteste, Dictum 60: omnis creatura speculum est, qtd. in Servus Gieben, 
"Traces of God in Nature According to Robert Grosseteste," Franciscan Studies 
24 (1964), p. 153. 
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Towards the Late Middle Ages and a changing world view 
Symbol and allegory in the Middle Ages represent well the problem of 
the division between sensible and intelligible and its appearance in questions 
of literary theory. Both Umberto Eco and Julia Kristeva identify a shift in 
medieval mentality during the High /Later Middle Ages which relates to this 
issue. Kristeva puts forth an interesting thesis in "From Symbol to Sign," 
arguing that during the 13th to 15th centuries, the sign replaced the symbol as 
the foundation of thought. This transition point marks the emergence of the 
Late Middle Ages.312 She terms what existed before as the "semiotics of the 
symbol," which she describes as: 
une pratique sémiotique cosmogonique: ces éléments (les 
symboles) renvoient à une (des) transcendance(s) universelle(s), 
irreprésentable(s), et méconnaissable(s); des connexions 
univoques relient ces transcendances aux unités qui les évoquent, 
le symbole ne 'ressemble' pas à l'objet qu'il symbolise; les deux 
espaces (symbolisé -symbolisant) sont séparés et 
incommunicable.313 
a cosmogonic semiotic practice where the elements (symbols) refer 
back to one or more unknowable and unrepresentable universal 
transcendence(s); univocal connections link the transcendences to 
the units evoking them; the symbol does not 'resemble' the object 
it symbolizes; the two spaces (symbolized -symbolizer) are separate 
and cannot communicate.314 
312Kristeva's distinction between symbol and sign is based on the formulations 
of C.S. Pierce and Saussure. She describes it thus: "dans le symbole, l'objet 
signifié est REPRÉSENTÉ à travers une relation -fonction de restriction par 
l'unité signifiante; tandis que le signe, comme nous le verrons plus loin, feint 
de ne pas assumer cette relation qui est d'ailleurs affaiblie et peut être 
envisagée, à la rigeur, comme arbitraire." "Du symbole au signe," Le texte du 
roman: Approche sémiologique d'une structure discursive transformationelle, 
(The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1970), p. 26. 
313"Du symbole au signe," p. 26. 
314"From Symbol to Sign," The Kristeva Reader, ed. Toril Moi, trans. Seán Hand, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 64. 
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According to Kristeva, the symbol functions by relating "units of 
restriction" to the symbolised universals. In its vertical dimension, the 
relation of universals to markings is one of restriction; however, in its 
horizontal dimension, the relation of signifiers among themselves, the 
relation escapes paradox. She argues that between the 13th and 15th 
centuries, the symbol was assimilated into the sign. During this period, 
"L'unité transendentale qui supporte le symbole -- sa paroi d'outre- tombe, 
son foyer émetteur -- est mise en question. "315 [ "The transcendental unity 
supporting the symbol -- its other -worldly wrapping, its transmitting focus -- 
was called into question. "]316 The change from symbol to sign can be 
associated with a shift in the larger ideological structure of the age. It was not 
merely the symbol which was questioned; the entire transcendental 
foundation of the Middle Ages was disrupted. 
Kristeva postulates a difference which distinguishes the Late Middle 
Ages from the preceding periods: the loss of stability and a tendency towards 
disorder. The emergence of disorder paved the way for the advent of the sign. 
She writes, "La sérénité du symbole est relayée par l'ambivalence tendue della 
connexion du SIGNE qui prétend à une ressemblance et à une identification 
des éléments qu'elle relie, malgré leur différence radicale qu'elle postule 
d'abord. "317 [ "The serenity of the symbol was replaced by the strained 
ambivalence of the sign's connection, which presents the elements as similar 
and identical, despite the fact that it first postulates them as radically 
different. "]318 According to Kristeva, the sign which emerged in the Late 
Middle Ages retained the fundamental characteristic of the symbol, the 
315"Du symbole au signe," p. 27. 
316"From Symbol to Sign," p. 65. 
317"Du symbole au signe," p. 28. 
318"From Symbol to Sign," p. 66. 
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irreducibility of terms -- referent to signified, signified to signifier. She 
concludes that the time of the symbol was governed by a structure of 
transcendence which pervaded medieval literature, resulting in a literature 
which was tied firmly to the idea of a transcendental signified. 
Eco locates a shift in medieval mentality around the thought of 
Thomas Aquinas. After Aquinas, the medieval universe moved from 
mystical to scientific: things now had a concrete significance, not merely a 
symbolic one. Eco extends this change in world view to include a change in 
the perception of allegory, which he credits to Aquinas. According to Eco, 
Aquinas affirms the theory of allegory as consisting of four levels or types of 
meaning: the historical or literal, the allegorical, the moral, and the 
anagogical. Aquinas argued, however, that natural objects in themselves did 
not possess an allegorical meaning, but that such meaning was derived only 
in the context of Scripture. Eco calls this view "the end of cosmic allegory. "319 
There indeed seems to have been a shift in awareness in the High Middle 
Ages, in which concrete things developed an importance in their own right. 
Perhaps this led to a more harmonious attitude towards sensible objects, 
rather than a constant demand for the unworldly. 
The previous chapters were concerned with works from the Patristic 
and early medieval period and the High Middle Ages, before the occurrence 
of this shift in thought identified by Eco and Kristeva. In the last two chapters 
I will move to a discussion of several of Dante's works, which are late 
319 Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, trans. Hugh Bredin, (New Haven: Yale 
U. Press, 1986), p. 63. 
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medieval texts. The shift in notions of allegory noted by Eco will be 
immediately apparent in Dante's discussion of allegory in the Convivio, in 
which he emphasises the crucial role of the literal sense. Perhaps Eco's 
suggestion that the concrete objects in late medieval allegory were important 
in their own right loses its significance in light of Dante's Commedia, in 
which the concrete is itself a participant in the imagination. 
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Chapter Five 
"I am prostituting my most sacred memories into the commonest possible words 
and sentences." 
-- Alisdair Gray, Lanark 
Writing at the Origin: Deconstruction and Dante 
My intention throughout this thesis has been to demonstrate the 
complexity which lies behind medieval texts, and to show that any attempt at 
a "straightforward" deconstructive reading is problematic. In the previous 
chapters I have investigated the philosophical complexity inherent in 
medieval theological treatises. We have seen in the preceding chapters how 
medieval theological treatises crossed the boundary between philosophy and 
literature. I will now consider how Dante crosses this same boundary from 
the other direction. As with Derrida, Dante's works are too numerous and 
varied to be addressed in a single chapter. Instead of doing a close reading of a 
single text, however, I have referred to several of them to achieve a broader 
perspective on the issues involved. In this chapter and the next, I ask 
whether there might be hidden in Dante's texts the possibility of a new 
formulation of logocentrism, for a worldview which defies nearly every 
stereotype assigned to it by the postmodern age but which nevertheless 
remains theocentric. In a logocentric world in which form mirrors essence 
and the outer reflects the inner, the poetic form is chosen for its capacity to 
convey the inner sense of the poetry. Is allegory always, already, from its 
origins until the present, a genre which is mystified by a transcendence 
wanting both to reveal and to hide itself? In the following section, I will 
examine the form used by Dante in his epic work, the Commedia. 
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Through layers of text: The allegorical journey 
Dante's entry into the sixth circle of hell is marked by the hesitation of 
his guide. Virgil begins to speak in broken phrases, which he quickly covers 
up with more coherent sentences. His lapse does not go unnoticed by Dante, 
however, who describes the scene in the following lines: "I'vidi ben si com'ei 
ricoperse/ lo cominciar con l'altro the poi venne/ the fur parole a le prime 
diverse;/ ma nondimen paura it suo dir dienne,/ perch'io traeva la parola 
tronca/ forse a peggior sentenzia the non tenne. "320 [ "I saw plainly, as soon 
as he covered up his beginning with the words that followed, that they were 
different from the first; but none the less what he said made me afraid, for I 
drew out his broken phrases to a worse meaning than perhaps he meant. "]321 
It is in this circle of hell that Dante encounters the Furies, who call on the 
Gorgon to Dante Dante from furies and 
covers his face, protecting his uninitiated eyes from the vision which would 
destroy him. Virgil acts in the manner of Gregory the Great, who figuratively 
covered the faces of his sheep by employing allegory in his teachings. 
In this scene, Dante includes himself among his readers as those who 
cannot tolerate a direct vision of what is absolute (whether it be good or evil). 
Although the poet, the creator, the scribe, and the visionary, Dante admits 
that he too is seeing through a veil, creating without fully knowing or seeing. 
320lnferno, a cura di Umberto Bosco e Giovanni Reggio (Florence: Le 
Monnier, 1988) IX. 10 -14. p. 134. All further references to the Ialian text of L a 
Divina Commedia will be taken from this edition unless otherwise noted. 
Sinclair's version is a bilingual edition: the Italian text is quoted from this 
same edition. 
321 Inferno, trans. John D. Sinclair, (London: John Lane, 1939), IX. 10 -14. p. 
121. All references to the English translation of La Divina Commedia will be 
taken from this edition. 
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And although he participates in a forward journey towards heaven, he is 
turned around, looking backwards at the only reality he understands. It is at 
this moment that Dante writes the warning which will serve as the 
foundation of his allegory: "O voi ch'avete li' ntelletti sani, mirate la dottrina 
the s'asconde/ sotto'1 velame de li versi strani. "322 [ "Ye that are of good 
understanding, note the teaching that is hidden under the veil of the strange 
lines. ' }323 
A deconstructive reading of Dante's text would be based on knowing 
the author's intention, and demonstrating how the text undermines his 
intention. However, Dante's allegorical structure poses certain problems 
which make knowing his intention a complex matter. His allegory is like the 
symbols of Pseudo -Dionysius in that it serves to hide the author's true 
intention beneath layers of possible meaning. Since we know that the 
purpose of medieval symbols and allegory is to conceal as well as to reveal, in 
our search for the intentio auctoris we are encouraged to question at each 
point whether we have discovered it or the layer which hides it. The 
determination of allegorical meaning should not be a simple, straightforward 
process. If one desires to search for a transcendental signified or an absolute 
meaning in Dante's work, one should expect to encounter a web of meanings 
which have only the semblance of being transcendental or absolute. 
In the appendix to his Dante Studies I: Commedia, Charles Singleton 
explains the issue which will be central to this chapter, that of the two 





and the allegory of the theologians, has to do with the interpretation of the 
literal meaning. In the allegory of the poets, the literal sense is read as fictive, 
and the allegorical meaning is regarded as the true sense. In the allegory of 
the theologians, the literal sense can be interpreted as true in its own right. It 
is, as Singleton calls it, an allegory of "this and that," meaning that both the 
literal sense and the allegorical sense have meaning in their own right.324 
Singleton argues that the difference is not merely academic when considered 
in relation to the Commedia. On the contrary, he writes, "Indeed, it happens 
to matter very much, because with this poem it is not a question of one 
meaning but of two meanings, and the nature of the first meaning will 
necessarily determine the nature of the second -- will say how we shall look 
for the second. "325 And the conclusions, or shall we say consequences, of this 
argument are merely hinted at in his transposition of a quote from 
Benvenuto's Comenturn: 
Let it not seem improper to you, reader, that this journey of a 
living man into the world beyond is presented to you in its first 
sense as literally and historically true. And if you say: "I do not 
believe that Dante ever went to the other world," then I say that 
with those who deny what a poem asks be granted, there is no 
further disputing.326 
Rather than reiterate Singleton's argument, in the next section I will move to 
a discussion of the significance of the literal sense in Dante's texts. 
324Singleton, Dante Studies I: Commedia, (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1954), p. 89. 
3251bid, p. 89. 
326Ibid, p. 94. 
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Upon this rock: The literal sense in Dante's allegory 
In the Convivio, Dante outlines the four senses of the allegorical 
tradition. The first sense is identified as the literal sense or the "plain" sense, 
which does not go beyond the word of the poet. This first mode involves 
depicting reality faithfully, in a way which conveys meaning in a 
straightforward manner. In the other modes, representation must involve a 
degree of difference. The second mode is the allegorical sense, which he 
defines as truth hidden under a beautiful falsehood ["una veritade ascosa 
sotto bella menzogna "]327. In this case the terms "beautiful" and "falsehood" 
complement rather than contradict each other. The third sense is the moral. 
To define this sense Dante gives the example of the transfiguration in which 
Christ brought only three apostles with him.328 Dante reads this as an 
instruction that we should have only a few companions in activities in which 
discretion is necessary. The fourth sense, the anagogical, refers to a 
transcendental meaning which may exist in conjunction with the literal 
sense.329 
327 Convivio, Opere di Dante 1, eds. G. Busnelli e G. Vandelli, (Firenze: Felice le 
Monnier, 1934), II, I, 3. 
328 "Lo terzo senso si chiama morale, e questo è quello che li lettori deono 
intentamente andare appostando per le scritture, ad utilitade di loro e di loro 
discenti: sì come appostare si può ne lo Evangelio, quando Cristo salio lo monte 
per transfigurarsi, che de li dodici Apostoli menò seco li tre; in che 
moralmente si può intendere che a le secretissime cose noi dovemo avere poca 
compagnia." Convivio II, I, 5. 
329 "Lo quarto senso si chiama anagogico, cioè sovrasenso; e questo è quando 
spiritualmente si spone una scrittura, la quale ancora [sia vera] eziandio nel 
senso litterale, per le cose significate significa de le superne cose de l'etternal 
gloria, sì come vedere si può in quello canto del Profeta che dice che, ne 
l'uscita del popolo d'Israel d'Egitto, Giudea è fatta santa e libera. Chè avvegna 
essere vero secondo la lettera sia manifesto, non meno è vero quello che 
spiritualmente s'intende, cioè che ne l'uscita de l'anima dal peccato, essa sia 
fatta santa e libera in sua potestate." Convivio II, I, 6 -8. 
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Dante identifies the literal sense as the external meaning. It is essential 
in that one cannot arrive at the other meanings without first reaching the 
literal. Following his identification of the four senses, Dante states clearly 
that the literal meaning is simultaneously exterior and essential: 
sempre lo litterale dee andare innanzi, sì come quello ne la cui 
sentenza li altri sono inchiusi, e sanza lo quale sarebbe impossibile 
ed irrazionale intendere a li altri, e massimamente a lo allegorico. 
E impossibile, però che in ciascuna cosa che ha dentro e di fuori, è 
impossibile venire al dentro se prima non si viene al di fuori: 
onde, con ciò sia cosa che ne le scritture [la litterale sentenza] sia 
sempre lo di fuori, impossibile è venire a l'altre, massimamente a 
l'allegorica, sanza prima venire a la litterale. Ancora, è 
impossibile però che in ciascuna cosa, naturale ed artificiale, è 
impossibile procedere a la forma, sanza prima essere disposto lo 
subietto sopra che la forma dee stare ... Onde con ciò sia cosa che 
la litterale sentenza sempre sia subietto e materia de l'altre, 
massimamente de l'allegorica, impossibile è prima venire a la 
conoscenza de l'altre che a la sua.330 
the literal sense must always come first as that which contains in 
its meaning (sentenza) all other meanings; and without this literal 
sense it would be impossible and irrational to attend to the others, 
especially the allegorical. Impossible, because for each thing that 
has an inside and an outside it is impossible to come to the others, 
especially to the allegorical, without first coming to the literal. 
Hence, since in writings [the literal meaning] is always the outside 
meaning, it is impossible to come to the others, especially to the 
allegorical, without first coming to the literal. Furthermore: it is 
impossible because in each thing, natural and artificial, it is not 
possible to come to the form without having first prepared the 
matter on which the form must be imposed ... Hence, since the 
literal meaning is always the substance and material of the others, 
especially of the allegorical, it is impossible to come to the 
knowledge of the others without knowing the literal first.331 
Dante proceeds to draw an analogy between the literal sense and the 
foundation of a house, which is the most essential component: "Ancora, è 
330Convivio, II, 9 -12. 
331Convivio (excerpt), Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism c. 1100 -1375, ed. 
AJ Minnis and AB Scott, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 397. 
170 
impossibile però the in ciascuna cosa, naturale ed artificiale, è impossibile 
procedere, se prima non è fatto lo fondamento, sì come ne la casa e sì come ne 
lo studiare ... "332 [ "Further, it is impossible because in every natural or 
artificial thing it is impossible to proceed unless the foundation be first made; 
as in a house, and as in study. "]333 Dante declares that even if it were possible 
to reach the other levels of meaning without first arriving at the literal, it 
would be, in his own words, "irrazionale, cioè fuori d'ordine . . "334 
[ "irrational, that is to say out of order ... "]335 Thus, although the literal 
meaning is the external one, Dante takes great care to emphasise its essential 
role in allegory. While one assumes that Dante would privilege the 
allegorical meaning above the literal, his remarks in the preceding passage are 
an indication that our assumptions are wrong. As a poet, Dante is as much 
concerned with the external aspects of his art as he is with the interior 
meaning. 
The "Epistle to Can Grande della Scala," contains a discussion of the 
allegorical method used by Dante in the Commedia. The author commences 
this work with a word on the importance of relations between things. He 
makes a distinction between things which have absolute being in themselves 
and things which are dependent upon other things: "Eorum vero que sunt, 
quedam sic sunt ut habeant esse absolutum in se; quedam sunt ita ut habeant 
esse dependens ab alio per relationem quandam, ut eodem tempore esse et ad 
332Convivio II, I, 12. 
333Convivio, Second Treatise, trans. Philip H. Wicksteed, (London: JM Dent, 
1924), p. 65. 
334Convivio II, I, 13. 
335trans. Wicksteed, p. 65. 
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aliud se habere ut relative ... "336 [ "Now of things which exist some so exist 
as to have absolute being in themselves; others so exist as to have a being 
dependent on something else, by some kind of relation, for example 'being at 
the same time' or 'being related to something else' ... "]337 He describes the 
Commedia as a thing in which the parts are dependent on each other to form 
a whole. In like manner, the interpretation of the Commedia depends not on 
one meaning, but on several meanings occurring simultaneously. In the 
following passage he explicates the nature of his allegorical method: 
Ad evidentiam itaque dicendorum sciendum est quod istius 
operis non est simplex sensus, dici potest polisemos, hoc est 
plurium sensuum; nam primus sensus est qui habetur per 
litteram, alius est qui habetur per significata per litteram. Et 
primus dicitur litteralis, secundus vero allegoricus sive moralis 
sive anagogicus. Qui modus tractandi, ut melius pateat, potest 
considerare in hiis versibus: "In exitu Israel de Egipto, domus Iacob 
de populo barbaro, facta est Iudea sanctificatio eius, Israel potestas 
eius ". Nam is ad litteram solam inspiciamus, significatur nobis 
exitus filiorum Israel de Egipto, tempore Moysis; si ad allegoriam, 
nobis significatur nostra redemptio facta per Christum; si ad 
moralem sensum, significatur nobis conversio anime de luctu et 
miseria peccati ad statum gratie; si ad anagogicum, significatur 
exitus anime sancte ab huius corruptionis servitute ad eterne 
glorie libertatem. Et quanquam isti sensus mistici varies 
appellentur nominibus, generaliter omnes dici possunt allegorici, 
cum sint a litterali sive historiali diversi. Nam allegoria dicitur ab 
'alleon' grece quod in latinum dicitur 'alienum', sive 
'diversum'.338 
To elucidate, then, what we have to say, be it known that the sense 
of this work is not simple, but on the contrary it may be called 
polysemous, that is to say, 'of more senses than one'; for it is one 
sense which we get through the letter, and another which we get 
through the thing the letter signifies; and the first is called literal, 
but the second allegorical or mystic. And this mode of treatment, 
336Epistole XIII, ed. Ermenegildo Pistelli, Opere di Dante, (Firenze: R. Bemporad 
& Figlio, 1921), 6.15. 
337Epistolae X, A Translation of the Latin Works of Dante Alighieri, (London: 




for its better manifestation, may be considered in this verse: 
'When Israel came out of Egypt, and the house of Jacob from a 
people of strange speech, Judea became his sanctification, Israel his 
power.' For if we inspect the letter alone the departure of the 
children of Israel from Egypt in the time of Moses is presented to 
us; if the allegory, our redemption wrought by Christ; if the moral 
sense, the conversion of the soul from the grief and misery of sin 
to the state of grace is presented to us; if the anagogical, the 
departure of the holy soul from the slavery of this corruption to 
the liberty of eternal glory is presented to us. And although these 
mystic senses have each their special denominations, they may all 
in general be called allegorical, since they differ from the literal 
and historical; for allegory is derived from alleon, in Greek, which 
means the same as the Latin alienum or diversum.339 
What Dante demonstrates in this passage is a structure allowing for different 
interpretations of meaning to exist together in harmony. No one 
interpretation can be singled out as transcendent or uniquely true. The literal 
meaning is both lesser and greater than the allegorical -- lesser in that it is 
only a vessel which carries a perhaps more significant meaning, but greater in 
that it is the meaning which allows for the possibility of an allegorical 
meaning. It is the meaning without which allegory cannot be. 
Dante did not merely use the literal meaning as a structurally necessary 
foundation for the allegorical senses. He viewed it as the poetic level on 
which he could create his most beautiful poetry. These two functions of the 
literal sense were not in Dante's mind, conflicting, but reflected a greater 
harmony in which the beauty and attraction of the sensible led the mind to 
an understanding of the intelligible. The aesthetic importance of the literal 
sense was expressed by Dante in the following ode: 
339pp 347 -8. 
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Canzone, io credo che saranno radi 
color che tua ragione intendan bene, 
tanto la parli faticosa e forte. 
Onde, se per ventura elli vadi 
che tu dinanzi da persone vadi 
che non ti paian d'essa bene accorte, 
allor ti priego che ti riconforte, 
dicendo lor, diletta mia novella: 
"Ponete mente almen com'io son bella! "340 
Ode! I believe that they shall be but rare who shall rightly understand thy 
meaning, so intricate and knotty is thy utterance of it: 
Wherefore if perchance it come about that thou take thy way into the 
presence of folk, who seem not rightly to perceive it; 
Then I pray thee to take heart again, 
And say to them, O my beloved lastling: 'Give heed at least how beautiful I 
am.'341 
In its dual function as an object of beauty and the veil of inner meaning, the 
literal sense was the foundation of Dante's mystical poetry. Knowing that the 
full complexity of his poetic lines was perhaps too much for some of his 
readers, Dante considered the literal sense as what was most human and in 
some ways most important, and thus the most worthy of his attention and 
ours. To consider the abstract quality of Dante's work as an indication that he 
ignored the importance of its sensible qualities is clearly to miss what Dante 
loved most about his work, its aesthetic quality. 
Dante's ability to balance and combine two seemingly opposite concepts 
is a fundamental characteristic of his poetry. In the Con vivio as well as in 
the "Epistle to Can Grande," we find evidence in Dante's allegory of a binary 
opposition without hierarchy.342 Although the opposition literal/ allegorical 
340Convivio, Canzone prima, ed. Busnelli e Vandelli, p. 95. 
341Convivio, Ode I, Second treatise, trans. Philip H. Wicksteed, p. 62. 
342Also, if one compares Dante's remarks on Italian and Latin in the D e 
Vulgaris Eloquentia and the Convivio, one can locate another instance in 
which Dante conceives of an opposition without hierarchy. In these two 
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mirrors the logocentric oppositions (outer/ inner, carnal/ spiritual, plain/ 
hidden), in this case Dante makes what Derrida identifies as the lesser term 
the first term, the foundation on which the second term depends. Although 
Culler and other deconstructionists might attribute this conclusion to the 
process of deconstruction, one can see from the text that Dante did not intend 
to structure his allegory around a simple logocentric opposition. Thus the 
Commedia should not be read as a text which can be readily deconstructed. 
Dante's love of allegory, and his choice of it as the genre for his greatest 
work, led to its development as an art form. Aesthetic pleasure did not stop 
at the literal level. To truly appreciate the work, the reader must involve 
herself in the text, so that the allegorical meaning can be, not revealed to a 
passive reader, but seized or discovered by the active reader. The complexity 
of allegory as a genre lies in the possibilites it opens for interpretation and 
equally for misinterpretation. Through the fourfold nature of allegorical 
interpretation, Dante Being -- indeed 
act of description itself -- leads not to one signified but to a host of possible 
signifieds. Yet the description of Being through allegory is contradictory. 
Dante wants to describe a supposedly stable entity using a formula in which 
meaning can shift from one level of interpretation to another. 
works, Dante argues that although Italian and Latin are fundamentally 
different, both possess qualities of beauty and nobility which make the 
identification of one language as inherently superior impossible. Warman 
Welliver argues this point in his commentary on the De Vulgaria Eloquentia 
which is found in Dante in Hell: The De Vulgari Eloquentia, (Ravenna: Longo 
Editore, 1981). See also Roger Dragonetti's discussion in "Le langage poetique 
dans le 'De Vulgari Eloquentia"', Romanica Gandensia IX: Aux frontières du 
langage poétique (Etudes sur Dante, Mallarmé, Valèry), (Gent, 1961). 
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The problems in interpreting the Commedia stem from the difficulties 
inherent in the allegorical method. Deborah Jones, in "The Paradox of the 
Transcendental Trope: Intertextuality or the Allegory of Giles Goat -Boy," 
pictures the final cantos of the Paradiso as a paradigmatic allegorical text, in 
which Dante is always prevented from achieving the transcendental. It is 
infinitely deferred as representation fails to bring about any kind of real 
presence. According to Jones, allegorical representation does not end in 
paradox; the transcendental signified shares the same intertextual space as the 
narrative. She argues, "Allegory takes as its subject those differential 
categories of meaning, the structures of 'difference,' or systems of 
signification which admit this failure to 'picture' or make present the 
logos. '"343 According to this perspective, the failure of representation is built 
into allegory itself. Jones very likely meant that the failure of representation 
occurs on the anagogical level, which is the furthest displaced from the literal 
level. One might argue that the literal level of allegory is actually the most 
logocentric in that it strives to represent reality truthfully, to make meaning 
as direct and as present as possible. In contrast, the distance of the anagogical 
level from the referent concedes that the sheer difference makes true 
representation impossible. Thus allegory can be viewed as a genre of 
logocentric inversion in which the literal level invites the possibility of 
logocentric representation while the anagogical level denies it. 
A comparison can be drawn to Barthes' distinction between denotation 
and connotation in S /Z. Barthes calls attention to the position held by some 
(hypothetically the philologists) in which the denotative meaning is 
privileged as the canonical meaning. On the other side of the argument, 
343"The Paradox of the Transcendental Trope: Intertextuality or the Allegory 
of Giles Goat -Boy," Southern Review 20 (1987), p. 241. 
176 
there are those who maintain (hypothetically the semiologists) that the 
privileging of denotative meaning stems from the reduction in the field of 
linguistics of language to an analysis of sentence structure. Barthes argues 
that the aim of this denotative/ connotative hierarchy "est retourner à la 
fermeture du discours occidental (scientifique, critique ou philosophique), à 
son organisation centrée, que de disposer tous les sens d'un texte en cercle 
autour du foyer de la dénotation (le foyer: centre, gardien, refuge, lumière de 
la vérité). "344 [ "is to return to the closure of Western discourse (scientific, 
critical, or philosophical), to its centralized organization, to arrange all the 
meanings of a text in a circle around the hearth of denotation (the hearth: 
center, guardian, refuge, light of truth.) "]345 
The threat of the surrender of a text to logocentrism is present then, 
not only in Dantean allegory but in any text in which meaning can be 
privileged. In S /Z, Barthes identifies the denotative meaning as the one 
which can be privileged or made canonical. Denotative meaning would 
appear to correspond to the Dantean literal meaning, which is also 
straightforward and can exist in a one -to -one relationship between signifier 
and signified. However, in Dantean allegory, the "connotative" meaning is 
theological, and thus more likely to be regarded as the transcendental portion 
of the hierarchy. Thus Dantean allegory presents a problem for logocentrics 
and deconstructionists alike in the very (it would seem) simple and 
straightforward step of determining which term in a hierarchy is the 
privileged one. 
344S/Z, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970), pp. 13 -4. 
345S/Z, trans. Richard Miller, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 7. 
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The Commedia is an unusual allegory as well as an unusual narrative 
in that it takes place both within and without space and time. It is both fully 
exterior in reaching to the ends of the cosmos and fully interior in taking 
place within the human mind. Dante's signifiers are non -temporal, non - 
spatial, and non -material, yet must serve the same purpose as concrete 
signifiers which indicate abstractions. In this sense, there both is and is not an 
intertextual difference between the signifiers and the transcendental signified. 
Typical of medieval literature in general, allegorical representation both does 
and does not end in paradox. In describing the medieval situation, the 
language I must use is itself inadequate for this task, and results in a paradox 
in which everything must be described as both the thing and its opposite, as 
both is and is not. The problem of the limitations of language which plagued 
medieval poets and philosophers continues to infect our discourse today. 
Allegory is itself dependent on difference, on an intertextual space 
between the postulated transcendental signified and the signifiers. John 
Freccero writes, "The experience of the pilgrim, like the experience of pure 
whiteness or, for that matter, the experience of divine light, remains out of 
reach to mortal minds, which can proceed to unity only analogically. It is in 
difference that meaning is born, as when two phonetic sounds, unintelligible 
in themselves, constitute meaning when linked together. "346 This difference 
is the beginning of art, of language, of human communication, and of 
expressions of the divine. It is a fact for both deconstructionists and medieval 
Christian poets. 
346Dante: The Poetics of Conversion, ed. Rachel Jacoff, (Cambridge, MA and 
London: Harvard UP, 1986), p. 213. 
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Freccero associates logocentrism with the metaphor of the Word, 
reality as God's book, a universe in which allegory forms the syntax. He 
interprets the art of allegory in terms of a master code which must be read and 
deciphered with a hermeneutic eye, in which all objects may point beyond 
themselves. He defines logocentrism as a "way of reading concrete events as 
though they were written down in a book, in which the ending casts light on 
what went before. "347 An interesting concept he mentions is "logology, "348 
the notion of God as "a reflection of the idea of a book as it might be imagined 
without the mediation of time and space. "349 Freccero describes medieval 
literature as a continual glossing on a text which is missing, on an absent text. 
Dante's poetic tradition can be described as a glossing of the Book of 
Memory. But for Dante, the Book of Memory is the original text which is 
always somewhat out of reach, and somewhat untranslatable. The text we 
receive is only a glimpse of the ideal book, delivered to us through the poet as 
vessel, and the gloss which seeks to clarify but cannot force us to comprehend. 
And that is precisely the message as well as the challenge of the Commedia. 
This essential difference between what can be glossed from the Book of 
Memory, given the limitations of memory itself, and what was actually 
experienced (and inscribed in the Book) is continually present in the act of 
glossing. Dante reminds us of this difference in the "Letter to Can Grande" 
when he recalls the experiences of prophets and visionaries (and also of 
347"Dante's Medusa: Allegory and Autobiography," By Things Seen, p. 33. 
348The term was coined by Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies 
in Logology, (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1970). 
349Freccero, Dante: The Poetics of Conversion, p. 34. 
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sinners) who have gone before him. Describing the experience of 
Nebuchadnezzar, Dante writes: 
Vidit ergo, ut dicit, aliqua 'que referre nescit et nequit rediens'. 
Diligenter quippe notandum est quod dicit 'nescit et nequit': nescit 
quia oblitus, nequit quia, si recordatur et contentum tenet, sermo 
tarnen deficit. Multa namque per intellectum videmus quibus 
signa vocalia desunt: quod satis Plato insinuat in suis libris per 
assumptionem metaphorismorum; multa enim per lumen 
intellectuale vidit que sermone proprio nequivit exprimere.350 
He saw, then, as he says, certain things 'which he who returns has 
not knowledge, nor power to relate'; and it must be noted 
carefully that he says, has 'not knowledge, nor power.' He has not 
knowledge, because he has forgotten; and he has not power, 
because if he remembered and retained the matter, nevertheless 
language fails; for we see many things by the intellect for which 
there are no vocal signs, of which Plato gives sufficient hint in his 
books by having recourse to metaphors; for he saw many things by 
intellectual light which he could not express in direct speech.351 
A further clarification is offered by Dante: "Ad que intelligenda sciendum est 
quod intellectus humanus in hac vita, propter connaturalitatem et 
affinitatem quam habet ad substantiam intellectualem separatam, quando 
elevatur, in tantum elevatur, ut memoria post reditum deficiat propter 
transcendisse humanum modum. "352 [ "To understand which things be it 
known that the human intellect, when it is exalted in this life, because of its 
being co- natural and having affinity with a sejunct intellectual substance, it is 
so far exalted that after its return memory fails it, because it has transcended 
the measure of humanity. "]353 Perhaps this inability to record in the memory 
what has been experienced by the senses is so aptly described by Dante because 
he too has participated in this failure. 
350XIIII, 29, 83 -4. 
351p 360. 
352XIII, 28, 78. 
353p. 359. 
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The aim of deconstructionists is to demonstrate how deconstruction 
has revolutionised reading and introduced radical concepts unique to the 
postmodern age. Laurie Finke, in "Truth's Treasure: Allegory and Meaning 
in Piers Plowman," has attempted to demonstrate how the postmodern 
interpretation of allegory is radical and different from the medieval 
logocentric one. She argues that medieval allegory 
presupposes a stable relationship between words and things and 
assumes that signs reflect unproblematically what they signify. It 
does so by hierarchically ordering significance and meaning, by 
promising that allegories will yield up stable meanings if the 
initiated reader applies the proper "code" to translate the message. 
Taken a step further, this definition suggests that allegorical texts 
produce stable meanings and mirror unequivocal truths.354 
Unfortunately, her characterisation of medieval allegory shows less insight 
into medieval allegory itself than into the deconstructionist model of what a 
logocentric vision of allegory should be. 
In contrast to the idealised and outdated concept of allegory which she 
associates with the Middle Ages, she cites the work of Paul de Man and J. 
Hillis Miller as bringing new insight to the study of allegory. According to 
Finke, de Man and Miller have discovered that the language of allegory "is 
never simple, never simply the transparent means of revealing an 
unequivocal truth that, almost by definition, it pretends to be. "355 But how 
different is this new postmodern realisation of allegory from the logocentric 
354 "Truth's Treasure: Allegory and Meaning in Piers Plowman," Medieval 
Texts and Contemporary Readers, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987), p. 52 
355Ibid, pp. 52 -3. 
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one of the Middle Ages, which appears to have been formed and idealised by 
the postmodernists themselves? Finke continues to list the conclusions she 
makes based on the work of Miller and de Man, for instance that allegory 
"demonstrates language's inability to guarantee the signified, to wed once and 
for all word and thing. "356 Yet this revolutionary postmodern discovery, that 
allegory does not end in a present truth but in an absence caused by difference, 
is only revolutionary if one adopts a simplistic interpretation of medieval 
allegory. Finke appears to be locked into a frame of thinking in which 
"postmodern" is associated with new, radical, and insightful and "medieval" 
is associated with old, idealistic, and barren. 
The analyses of Paul de Man and J. Hillis Miller are, nevertheless, 
insightful, but only to the degree that they do not act as parasites which feed 
off an imaginary host. The assumptions which Finke and other 
deconstructionists make regarding medieval allegory are entirely missing 
from de Man's brilliant discussion of allegory in "Pascal's Allegory of 
Persuasion ". According to de Man, allegory as an art form is problematic and 
ambiguous because it tries to represent something which cannot be 
represented. Because language is inadequate, because signification is unstable 
and incomplete, because there will always be gaps between meaning and 
language, allegory becomes a problematic mode of transmission. De Man 
reaches to the heart of the issue when he asks, "Why is it that the furthest 
reaching truths about ourselves and the world have to be stated in such a 
lopsided, referentially indirect mode? "357 Certainly no one has understood 
the implications of de Man's insights better than Dante. De Man's work on 
allegory aims to uncover the basic condition of humanity, the limits of 
356Ibid, p. 56. 
357"Pascal's Allegory of Persuasion," in Allegory and Representation, ed. 
Stephen J. Greenblatt, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1981), p. 2. 
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language, the necessary workings of representation. His goal is the greater 
comprehension of the limits of humanity, rather than the construction of 
postmodern limits around medieval ways of thinking. The question posed by 
de Man could very well have been asked by Dante himself, as he undertook 
the task of expressing the furthest reaching truths of his age. 
The conclusions drawn by some recent critics regarding medieval 
allegory are based on a misperception of the Middle Ages as holding a 
theo(logo)centric world view which is capable of producing only simplistic 
expressions of art which are necessarily opposed to the radical products of the 
postmodern world. Postmodern thought seems to be able to define itself only 
through the process of differentiating itself from its own history. The 
postmodern reader attempting to engage the medieval past can be compared 
to the visionary described by Dante in the "Letter to Can Grande," the one 
who tries without success to recover the lost vision: "He has not knowledge, 
because he has forgotten; and he has not power, because if he remembered 
and retained the matter, nevertheless language fails." 
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In the absence of the author 
At the end of the previous chapter, I referred to Aquinas' notion of 
allegory as an indication of a shift in world view at the end of the High 
Middle Ages. Aquinas held that only sacred history (i.e. Scriptural history) 
should be interpreted according to the fourfold allegorical method (the 
allegory of the theologians), and that poetry should be read according to the 
literal sense only.358 Earlier in this chapter, I referred to Singleton's 
argument that the Commedia is actually an allegory of the theologians. Eco 
ventures one step further in Limits of Interpretation in stating expressly that 
Dante invites the reader to read his poems as if they were sacred texts -- that 
is, according to the fourfold allegorical method. And even though Dante 
makes a distinction between the allegory of poets and the allegory of 
theologians, he nevertheless applies the allegory of the theologians to his 
own poetic texts. Eco argues: 
in the Comedy Statius says of Virgil that he was to him "as the 
one who proceeds in the night and bears a light, not for himself 
but for those who follow him" (Purgatory XXII. 67 -9). This 
means that -- according to Dante -- Virgil was a seer: his poetry, 
and pagan poetry in general, conveyed spiritual senses of which 
the authors were not aware. Thus for Dante poets are continuing 
the work of the Holy Scriptures, and his poem is a new instance of 
prophetic writing. His poem is endowed with spiritual senses in 
the same way as Scriptures were, and the poet is divinely inspired. 
If the poet is the one that writes what love inspires in him, his text 
can be submitted to the same allegorical reading as the Holy 
358However, Eco stipulates that Aquinas' definition of the literal sense is based 
not on our opposition of literal and figurative but on the intention of the 
author. He writes, "Tommaso non parla di senso letterale come di senso 
dell'enunciato (ciò che denotativemente l'enunciato dice secondo il codice 
linguistico a cui fa riferimento), bensi come del senso che viene attribuito 
nell'atto dell'enunciazione." 1 limiti dell'interpretazione, (Milano: Bompiani, 
1990), p. 95. 
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Scriptures, and the poet is right in inviting his reader to guess 
what is hidden "sotto il velame delli versi strani" (under the veil 
of the strange verses).359 
There are several possible conclusions if Eco is correct: 1) that Dante believed 
that inspiration was an ongoing process, not temporally limited nor 
contained, and that ordinary humans could take their inspiration from the 
divine; 2) that the human author could indeed share in the process of 
authorship with God; 3) that the Scriptures were not a truly transcendent text, 
fundamentally different from all other texts. 
Giuliana Carugati connects Singleton's position on the allegory of the 
theologians to an argument concerning the relation of the poet to the text: 
A grandissime linee, si possono distinguere due posizioni critiche: 
quella di chi, facendo leva sui testi speculativi di Dante stesso, 
invoca l "'allegoria dei teologi" come centrale, senza accorgersi di 
ridurla a poco più di uno stratagemma tecnico, e quella di chi fa di 
Dante un profeta, uno "scriba" o un mistico infuocato, senza 
soffermarsi abbastanza sullo spessore propriamente scritturario 
dell'opera di Dante.360 
The latter position, rejected by Singleton, would view Dante as a passive 
author, or, as Carugati puts it, "uno strumento nelle mani del Dio, un 
profeta- vate -mistico ".361 Carugati has called attention to another dichotomy 
existing within Dante criticism. What is the role of Dante as author -- is he a 
a brilliant technician or an inspired prophet? 
This issue relates to one which emerges often in discussions of 
deconstruction and logocentrism, the death of the author. Derrida links the 
359Limits of Interpretation, p. 17. 
360Dalla menzogna al silenzio: La scrittura mistica della "Commedia" di Dante, 
(Bologna: Mulino, 1991), p. 34. 
3611bid, p. 36. 
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human tendency to search for the intention of the author (intentio auctoris) 
when reading a text to the longing of humankind for a transcendental 
presence, a divine Author who writes his will into the created universe. 
According to deconstructive critics, the author's intention should not serve as 
the central force or criteria in the determination of meaning. The mildest 
interpretation of the shocking announcement of the death of the author is 
that a criticism which was centred around the author has been replaced by a 
criticism which de- emphasises the role of the author in favour of the reader 
and the text. Taken a step further, the removal of the author as the centre of 
interpretation (and the deliberate refusal to designate another centre) makes 
room for a void in interpretive structure which allows for a more liberal 
process of interpretation. Linking this concept to questions of theology, the 
death of the author leads to the death of the Author, to the end of the notion 
of God as the centralising or organising force. 
The postmodern notion of the death of the author arises from a 
modern concept of the author as the authority of his or her own work. The 
medieval author, however, unlike the modern author, does not assert the 
same control over his or her text. Rather, the medieval author's attitude is 
something more like surrender, though not in any specifically theological 
sense. In vision literature, for example, the author surrenders his or her 
private experience by turning it into text, by making it public. The private 
vision is transformed into an event in which everyone can participate. We 
have seen evidence of such a sharing of the poet's experience in the 
Commedia, in which Dante's journey through the cosmos represents a 
journey which each individual reader must take. Perhaps in searching for a 
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compromise to the debate over which type of allegory Dante adopted in the 
Commedia, we can also determine a medieval response to the question of the 
death of the author. 
So much depends on the role of the author in the Commedia. Dante 
serves both as a poetic guide and as a representative everyman. He must 
attempt to transcribe the totality of his experience while being, like everyman, 
limited in his vision in the face of what is ineffable. Medieval texts are often 
based on the principle that language is an inadequate but necessary substitute 
for ineffability. Language is perceived as a complement to ineffability rather 
than an end in itself. It is the ultimate challenge for a poet to describe what is 
considered to be ineffable. In this next section, I shall discuss the self -image of 
the poet who makes such an attempt. Dante's map of the universe charts not 
only the limits of the cosmos but of the poet as author and creator. 
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The death of the author 
Much of Dante's identity as a writer is connected with two figures: 
Beatrice and God. This discussion of Dante's role as the author shall begin 
with the Vita Nuova, in which Dante traces the source of his writing to his 
love for Beatrice, which is, like heaven, a subject which cannot be easily 
articulated. The Vita Nuova is not an autobiography, and Dante does not 
make himself the object of his own discourse. Nevertheless, in the manner 
of Augustine, he relies on the Book of Memory as the source of his 
inspiration. The Vita Nuova is both an account of his love for Beatrice and a 
treatise on the art of poetry. It begins with Dante as a scribe who reads and 
recopies his book of memory. The image we get is of Dante involving 
himself in the process of reading a book which is already written. 
The setting behind the Vita Nuova is Dante's pursuit of Beatrice. 
Apparently, it is not only Dante who desires that his love should be fulfilled, 
but God. His first recollection of writing comes following a dream vision, and 
the first sonnet he composes is a transcription of his dream. Dante's visions 
constantly interweave with his narrative. In this way, Dante lends a certain 
inspiration to his own work. Due to the interruptions of the visions, a 
constant narrative stream with Dante's voice as the definite authorial voice is 
impossible. Rather, Dante's authorial voice weakens as the vision narrative 
begins. 
In his vision, he is instructed by God, "Queste parole fa the siano quasi 
un mezzo, si the to non parli a lei immediatamente, the non è degno; "362 
362 Vita Nuova, ed. Michele Barbi, Opere di Dante 1, (Firenze: Bemporad & Figlio, 
1921), XII, 8. 
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[ "Make, as it were, a mediator of these words, so that thou speak not to her 
directly, for this is not befitting. "]363 In human relations, writing as the 
intermediary is privileged when direct communication is impossible or 
undesirable. Although supposing some distance from his beloved, writing is 
the preferred mode, in human affairs as well as divine. In Dante's courting of 
Beatrice as well as in his ascent to the Paradiso, direct speech is impossible. 
The presence of what he tries to attain is too strong and an intermediary 
becomes necessary. In Book XVIII of the Vita Nuova, a lady remarks, "A the 
fine ami to questa tua donna, poi the to non puoi sostenere la sua 
presenza? "364 [ "To what end lovest thou this thy lady, since thou canst not 
sustain her presence? "]365 The presence of Beatrice is beyond Dante's capacity. 
Like the metaphor of the cloth in the temple, writing is not an 
obstruction but an intermediary which is made necessary by the force of his 
experience. In their discussion, the woman asks him where his joy resides, 
and his reply is that it resides in the words he has written which express his 
love for Beatrice. The lady then accuses him, "Se to ne dicessi vero, quelle 
parole the to n'hai dette in notificando la tua condizione, avrestù operate con 
altro intendimento. "366 [ "If thou hast told us the truth, those words which 
thou hast said to her, setting forth thine own condition, must have been 
composed with other intent. "]367 It is from that moment that Dante resolves 
to write of his love for Beatrice. 
The subject of Dante's work is equally about his love for Beatrice and 
about the process of writing. He is utterly self- conscious of this process, 







always probing for the origin of his writing. Did he secretly believe his words 
to originate from God, as his use of the vision seems to indicate? Or did he 
find within himself the source of his poetry? The Paradiso and the Vita 
Nuova consist not only of a search for the origin of truth but for the origin of 
the poet's own writing. Speech, in contrast to writing, holds no mystery. It 
begins and ends at almost the same moment. It begins and ends in time. Yet 
Dante's choice of the allegorical method which Aquinas reserved for sacred 
texts suggests that he suspected that his writing was more than mundane, 
more than merely human. 
Why does Dante write, and why does he make writing the object of so 
much speculation? Dante's interrogation of the origin of his writing leads 
him to a commentary on love as the motivator and on supernatural vision as 
the catalyst. It is writing rather than speech which is traced back to the divine. 
The history of logocentrism could in fact be rewritten as a history of writing. 
Speech is not considered as a worthy subject for the Vita Nuova, and it is the 
poet who is given an elevated position. The dream vision connects the poet 
to the Logos, and the Vita Nuova charts the commencement of the 
logocentrising of writing. Dante attributes to writing the logocentric 
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characteristics which deconstructionists generally assign to speech. 
In the Vita Nuova, the author is a scribe not only of the dream vision 
but of the Book of Memory itself. However, the author cannot be the origin 
of his own writing, and Dante's portrayal of the author as merely a scribe 
implies that the true origin exists elsewhere. In "nO nOt nO," Mark Taylor 
characterises the role of the translator as passive nearly to the point of non- 
existence: "the translator is one who transmits a message he has received 
from an other he might or might not know to others he can never know. 
The translator, in other words, does not exist in and for himself but is always 
for an other ... Never speaking in his own voice, the translator echoes the 
discourse of an other. "368 
John Freccero cites autobiography, which in the Christian context is 
"the application of God's syntax, allegory, to one's own life "369 as the 
tradition which connects Augustine's Confessions with the Vita Nuova and 
the Commedia, reaching as far as Sartre. Dante draws an analogy between 
this image of the scribe who translates the Book of Memory into words and 
the Bible as a translation of God's Book. There are two notions implicit in the 
image of Dante (and Augustine) as a scribe. First, Dante is a scribe and not the 
true author. In his search for the origin of his writing, he does not locate that 
origin within himself. The implication is, of course, that God is the divine 
author of his text. Second, for the medieval reader, the words of Dante the 
scribe are infused with the shadow of the divine. He is the mouth of the 
divine, the vessel through whom God can speak and write. 
368Mark Taylor, "nO nOt nO," in Deconstruction and Negative Theology, p. 170. 
369"Dante's Medusa: Allegory and Autobiography," By Things Seen, pp. 34 -5. 
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David Jeffrey cites as a characteristic of the Vita Nuova the idea of 
creation as a process, always moving. According to Jeffrey, creation leads to 
disintegration and to re- creation. This pattern applies not only to the creative 
power of the individual author, but to the universal Author. He argues, 
"When the structure of personal experience is made conformable to the 
design of the Author of history, then Love's new creation may bear fruit in a 
personal re- creation, here also the re- creation of Dante's poems. "370 
Although creation and life are trapped in time, writing, with its semblance of 
the divine, holds the power to surpass temporality. 
In Chapter One, I discussed Mark Taylor's argument in Erring that the 
desire of authors has been to speak rather than to write, in an effort to invoke 
the presence of the Logos. If his argument is correct, what, then, would be 
the purpose of literature? What motivates authors, particularly logocentric 
authors, to write in the first place? Why does one write, if the act of writing 
violates our deepest logocentric instincts, and why does the medieval 
Christian write, if writing is the act of distancing oneself from the logos? 
Taylor writes, "The death of the author creates the time -space of the reader .. . 
The tissue of texts not only shows that writing is reading; it also displays 
reading as writing. Instead of a finished product of a single author, the text is 
the social activity of countless coproducers. Productive readers infinitely 
expand and extend the text. "371 
The position of the medieval text is perhaps somewhat ironic. 
Although composed by writers locked into the temporal sphere, it is the only 
370lntroduction, By Things Seen, p. 12. 
371Erring, p. 182. 
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remnant of language to be preserved for us, the only to cross the temporal gap 
of five or more centuries. The written text is our only access to the medieval 
mind, the only means which may allow us to be present to them, and so its 
status as a remnant gives it an essentiality, and makes it fundamental. What 
brought Dante in the first place, to translate his abstract vision into words, to 
concretise it, to make it human? There is no indication that he felt that by 
writing, by translating divine writing into human writing, he would bring 
about the tainting of his vision. As the poet, it was not his purpose to bring 
about the fall of language, to make it dirty and corporal. Rather, writing is the 
medium that carried the trace of the divine to human beings. 
The question arises whether medieval writers in general felt that 
writing was a process which resulted in a tainting of the divine word. Such a 
view would make they themselves the instigators of sin. But the poet or 
philosopher was not the serpent which brought about the Fall, and writing 
was not the assertion of a hierarchy between divine/ human writing. 
What is the place of the medieval poet, such as Dante, who exists 
between heaven and earth, whose writing is half -divine, not relegated to 
artifice and certainly not to the exteriority of the body. So much of medieval 
writing is at once human and artificial, yet interior and non -corporeal. In the 
Divine Comedy, Dante shifts attention away from himself as the author; he 
relinquishes authority as the creator of the text. His mind is not the originary 
point but rather a receptor of the vision. He transmits the text into writing; 
writing that can be read. The text was written before him, even before Virgil, 
by a scribe who carried his messages from heaven. Dante concedes that his 
text is really God's text; the originary point is unplaceable because it is not 
temporal. Instead of illuminating the source of the text, he points beyond 
himself to his guides, who in turn refer to other beings. 
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Dante is different from other poets precisely in his attitude towards 
authorship. While other poets possess their poems, he writes with the 
assumption that he has not written the Comedy; he has transcribed it. He is, 
however, a participant in the act of creation. He is a partner in authorship, a 
partaker in a shared process which will bring glory not only upon himself. 
Dante would be the first to admit the distance between the author and his 
text. For Dante the text was written before he even took up his pen. It was 
written in a dream, and the writing down was like the lingering memory, the 
trace, of an experience realised not only in a single moment but which would 
carry through the ages. With the text already written, already completed 
before the physical act of writing, Dante acted first as a reader, reading not the 
signs but the meaning of his dream -text. He finds himself in something of a 
"double bind," in that, before the moment of his writing he has already read 
the text. 
Dante's texts resemble those of Joyce or Faulkner in that one 
encounters not one transcendent authorial voice but a polyphony of voices. 
In the case of the Commedia there is Dante the author, Dante the reader, 
whose task lies in interpreting his dream, Virgil and Beatrice and Bernard, 
the voices of the spirits, coming together as in a polyphonic chorus. There 
remains with us the sense that what Dante the writer has presented to us is 
not the original text. It is not the originary text which Dante imagined in a 
dream, which as a reader he attempted to transcribe. It is the remnant, for 
Dante as well as for us, of a text which in its original form has been lost 
forever. What has already taken place is a transcription or a translation across 
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texts. The original is the logocentric ideal text, which is to say a dream, that 
existed only in Dante's mind, forbidden because it is completely inaccessible. 
As the authorial voice dies, the voices of Virgil and of the various 
characters strengthen, as does the voice of the text. In the end, one is left only 
with the voice of God which does not speak. Dante, like the reader, must rely 
on Virgil as the interpreter. When the voice of Virgil fails he finds himself 
without guidance. Would he perhaps like to diminish his own voice, to 
transfer the poetic source away from himself? Upon first recognising Virgil, 
he tells his guide, "'O de li altri poeti onore e lume,/ vagliami' 1 lungo studio 
e '1 grande amore/ the m'ha fatto cercar lo tuo volume./ Tu se' lo mio 
maestro e '1 mio autore; to se' solo colui da cu' io tolsi/ lo bello stilo the m'ha 
fatto onore. "372 [ "O glory and light of other poets, let the long study and the 
great love that has made me search thy volume avail me. Thou art my 
master and my author. Thou art he from whom alone I took the style whose 
beauty has brought me honor. "]373 In this statement Dante acknowledges the 
debt which he owes to his guide, but at the same time displays his own 
mastery of the poetic form. He is both the guided and the guide. Having been 
taught by a great master, he has become a more able poet. And having been 
guided through hell and through heaven and witnessed firsthand the truths 
of the cosmos, he can more humbly and more ably serve as our guide 
through the journey of life. 
Knowing the great importance of what he must tell, and knowing well 
the difficulty of his task, he never leaves the reader to conduct the journey 
alone, just as he himself is never left alone. Throughout the Commedia, 
Dante calls attention to the presence of the veil, not permitting the reader to 
3721nf, I. I. 82 -7. 
3731nferno, trans. Sinclair,p. 27 
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forget that she must try to see the meaning beyond the literal sense. By acting 
as the active author, Dante permits us to be active readers, not interpreting for 
us but continuously teaching us to interpret so that we can read wisely. At the 
end of the Purgatorio, Dante beholds the pageant of divine revelation. 
Matelda asks him, "'Perchè pur ardi sì ne l'affetto de le vive luci, e ciò the 
vien di retro a for non guardi? "374 [ "'Why art thou so eager only on the 
sight of the living lights and givest no heed to that which comes behind 
them. "1375 Matelda's advice to Dante serves doubly as Dante's advice to the 
reader to read carefully and actively. At another moment in the Purgatorio, 
Dante alerts his readers: "Aguzza qui, lettor, ben li occhi al vero,/ ché '1 velo è 
ora ben tanto sottile,/ certo the '1 trapassar dentro è leggero. "376 [ "Here, 
reader, sharpen well thine eyes to the truth, for now, surely, the veil is so fine 
that to pass within is easy. "]377 These are the words not of a transcendent 
author but of an active author who expects his text to be read by active 
readers. But as an active author he is concerned that his readers will not 
ignore the trace that he has left behind. 
At the beginning of his second treatise of the Convivio, he writes: 
Poiché proemialmente ragionando, me ministro, è lo mio pane ne 
lo precedente trattato con sofficienza preparato, lo tempo chiama e 
domanda la mia nave uscir di porto, per che: dirizzato l'artimone 
de la ragione a l'ora del mio desiderio, entro in pelago con 
isperanza di dolce cammino e di salutevole porto e laudabile ne la 
fine de la mia cena. Ma però che più profittabile sia questo mio 
cibo, prima che vegna la prima vivanda voglio mostrare come 
mangiare si dee.378 
374Purg, XXIX, 1. 61 -3. 
375Purgatorio, trans. Sinclair, p. 379 
376VIII, 
1. 19 -21. 
377Purgatorio, trans. Sinclair,p. 107 
3781I, 1, 1. 
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Now that, by way of introductory discourse, my bread has been 
sufficiently prepared by my ministration in the preceding treatise, 
time calls and requires that my ship would issue from the port. 
Wherefore adjusting the sail of reason to the breeze of my longing 
I enter upon the open sea, with the hope of a fair journey and of a 
wholesome port and praiseworthy, at the close of this my feast. 
But that this my food be the more profitable, ere the first viands 
are served I would show how it must be eaten.379 
Dante is much more than the logocentric author who places a transcendent 
meaning before the eyes of a passive reader. Instead he has created a flexible 
narrative structure built on several layers of meaning and inserted himself as 
a character who can guide the active reader towards a fuller understanding of 
a complex text. 
The notion of the death of the author demonstrates that there are 
clearly other forces at work in a text besides the author, and other possible 
centres around which a text can be read and organised. Dante allows these 
other forces to interact within his text. In the Commedia the author and the 
Author do not refer to each other. The death of one does not end in the death 
of the other. By questioning his own role as the author, Dante contributes to 
the development of the role of the reader. But unlike in the case of the death 
of the author where the author is de- centred by the forces of the reader and 
the text, it is Dante himself who invites the reader to be an active participant 
in the text. Significantly, he is not the sole figure of the Commedia but one 
among many who is led by a successive procession of guides. In this case the 
human author removes himself as the centre, giving way to the Christian 
notion that there can be only one true Author. 
379Second treatise, chap. 1. 
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In this chapter I have attempted to reverse the postmodern model of 
allegory by demonstrating that Dante's allegory does not depend on a 
logocentric hierarchisation of the literal and the figurative, "hidden" 
meaning, and to formulate a Dantean response to the question of the death of 
the author. In Dante's texts, we find a situation in which the postmodern 
death of the author is prefigured yet limited in its consequences. Dante's 
invitation to the reader to become a creative participant in his work is an act 
of faith, faith in the ability of the reader to read well. The act of participation 
extends to each reader who must at some point make the journey to Paradiso. 
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Chapter Six 
"I don't suppose anybody ever deliberately listens to a watch or a clock. You don't 
have to. You can be oblivious to the sound for a long while, then in a second of 
ticking it can create in the mind unbroken the long diminishing parade of time 
you didn't hear. Like Father said down the long and lonely light -rays you might 
see Jesus walking, like. And the good Saint Francis said that Little Sister Death, 
that never had a sister." 
-- William Faulkner, 
The Sound and the Fury 
Journey to the End of Time and the Line: The Progression to Paradiso 
In the Paradiso, Dante attempts what may be called the most 
challenging poetic task of his time, to represent heaven in words. As he 
journeys towards paradise, he retains mastery over his language, using it not 
only to represent his image of heaven but to convey a sense of ineffability. At 
the very beginning of Canto I, he announces: 
La gloria di colui che tutto move 
per l'universo penetra e risplende 
in una parte più e meno altrove. 
Nel ciel che più de la sua luce prende 
fu' io, e vidi cose che ridire 
né sa né può chi di là sù discende; 
perchè appressando sé al suo disire, 
nostro intelletto si profonda tanto, 
che dietro la memoria non può ire. 
Veramente quant' io del regno santo 
ne la mia mente potei far tesoro, 
sarà ora materia del mio canto.380 
The glory of Him who moves all things penetrates the universe and shines in 
one part more and in another less. I was in the heaven that most receives His 
light and I saw things which he that descends from it has not the knowledge 
or the power to tell again; for our intellect, drawing near to its desire, sinks so 
deep that memory cannot follow it. Nevertheless, so much of the holy 
kingdom as I was able to treasure in my mind shall now be matter of my 
song.381 
This passage contains Dante's explanation of why ineffability will always 
remain a problem and a factor in any theological discussion. As we will see, 
the movement through the Paradiso is a progression through the levels of 
ineffability. This final journey is an exploration and a definition of that space 
which lies between language and experience. Dante writes inside that space 
380Paradiso (Bosco -Reggio edition) I, 1. 1 -13. 
381 paradiso 
, trans. Sinclair, I, 1, 1 -13, p. 19. 
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where language and experience cannot meet. The Commedia moves from 
the ineffability of the Inferno to the ineffability of the Paradiso. In this 
progression from one failure of language to the other, what changes take 
place in Dante's language? In this next section I will examine what happens 
to Dante's language as he moves towards the final cantos of the Paradiso. 
Dante's journey towards the limits of ineffable experience begins not in 
harmony but in chaos. In hell, language breaks down and is replaced by 
incomprehensible groans and wails. In Canto III of the Inferno, Dante finds 
himself confronted by a cacophony of vocal signs -- wails, unknown 
languages, expressions of pain and anger. Those who utter these noises are, as 
Virgil describes them, "c'hanno perduto it ben de l'intelletto. "382 [ "those who 
have lost the good of the intellect. "]383 Only the poets and Dante's chosen are 
capable of discourse, of producing noises which produce meaning. Each 
tortured soul uses discourse both as a confession and as an autobiography. In 
the timeless region of the Inferno, each soul invokes temporal history and 
restructures it through his narrative, making it coherent to the living soul, 
Dante. On the edge of the fourth circle, the inhabitants of a marsh must 
gurgle a hymn, since they cannot enunciate the words clearly. For these 
souls, language fails not only in communication but in worship. While 
language must serve as the primary means of communication between the 
spirits and Dante, it is also a barrier to understanding. The immediacy of 
speech negates itself in this region beyond time, but does not lead to a fulfilled 
382lnferno, 
(Bosco- Reggio) III, 1. 18. 
383lnferno, trans. John Sinclair, (London: John Lane, 1939), III, 1. 18. p. 47. 
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presence. In this inferno, presence is eternally deferred, and signs infinitely 
signify emptiness. 
In contrast to this scene from the Inferno, the Paradiso charts a 
breakdown of language of a completely different nature, in which ineffability 
is a sign of superessence rather than a tortured inability to express. In Canto I, 
Dante describes his poetry as merely a shadow of heaven. He attributes the 
ineffability of heaven to the presence of a light whose brightness reaches 
throughout the universe. Poetry is the shadow, and the absence of light 
opens the way for the presence of language. The shadow of heaven is the 
space in which Dante's memory exists. The Book of Memory abides not in 
pure light but in its shadow, and the shadow becomes the text of the Book of 
Memory. In his prayer, he writes, "O divina virtù, se mi ti presti / tanto the 
l'ombra del beato regno/ segnata nel mio capo io manifesti ... "384 r0 power 
divine, if thou grant me so much of thyself that I may show forth the shadow 
of the blessed kingdom imprinted in my brain ... "]385 
In these opening cantos, the image of the stamp refers to the memory 
of heaven impressed on Dante's mind, as well as to the stamp which the 
mind of God places on heaven. As he describes in Canto II, "e '1 ciel cui tanti 
lumi fanno bello, / de la mente profonda the lui volve / prende l'image e 
fassene suggello."386 [ "the heaven that so many lights make fair takes its 
stamp from the profound mind that turns it, and of that stamp becomes itself 
the seal. "]387 In this canto, he adopts Pseudo -Dionysius' notion of a central 
384Par, I, 1. 22 -4. 
385 paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 19 
386par, II, 1. 130 -2. 
387Paradiso, (trans. Sinclair)p. 39 
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intelligence diversified through matter. This diffusion of intelligence into 
matter is symbolised by the moon, in which dark spots mix with brightness. 
In the following lines, he describes this mixture of dark and bright as pleasing 
and delightful: "'Per la natura lieta onde deriva / la virtù mista per lo corpo 
luce / come letizia per pupilla viva. / Da essa vien ciò the da luce a luce / par 
differente, non da denso e raro: / essa è formal principio the produce, / 
conforme a sua bontà, lo turbo e 'l chiaro. "'388 [ "by the joyous nature whence 
it springs the mingled virtue shines through the body as joy through the 
living pupil. From this comes that difference which appears between light 
and light, not from density and rarity; this is the formative principle which 
produces, according to its excellence, the dark and bright." ]389 
Clearly, Dante does not regard the presence of dark shadows as a cause 
for despair, but instead accepts darkness as a necessary complement to light 
and as a necessary condition for the possibility of writing. This mixing of 
darkness and light represents Dante's technique of bringing opposites 
together to produce harmony, balancing ineffability with a controlled poetic 
verse, and combining in his own character a diminishing authorial voice 
with a strong sense of guidance. It further represents the blending of the 
sensible and the intelligible, the abstract and the concrete in the realm of the 
Commedia. Dante's visions contain the most abstract intelligible forms 
combined with sensibles made tangible through poetic description, presented 
in a form which refuses to force them into binary opposites but allows them 
to co- exist. What is missing in this passage is a sense of transcendence and 
condemnation. Light does not transcend and condemn the darkness, as we 
would expect in a traditionally logocentric structure. Dante imagines a 
388Par, II, 1. 142 -8. 
389Paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) pp. 39 -41. 
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universe in which the focal point lies not on one end of a hierarchy but is in 
all places, consuming all things. 
Canto III describes Dante's first conversation with the souls of the 
Paradiso. Here Dante encounters those shades who broke their vows. Theirs 
is a sin of empty signifiers and missing signifieds. Dante asks the first shade, 
whom he recognises as Piccarda Donati, if she wills to be in a higher place. 
She replies that to do so would be discordant with the will of God: 
Frate, la nostra volontà quieta 
virtù di carità, che fa volerne 
sol quel ch'avemo, e d'altro non ci asseta. 
Se disïassimo esser più superne, 
foran discordi li nostri disiri 
dal voler di colui che qui ne cerne; 
che vedrai non capere in questi giri, 
s'essere in carità è qui necesse, 
e se la sua natura ben rimiri.390 
Brother, the power of charity quiets our will and makes us will only what we 
have and thirst for nothing else. Did we desire to be more exalted, our desire 
would be in discord with His will who appoints us here, which thou wilt see 
cannot hold in these circles if to be in charity is here necesse and if thou 
consider well its nature. 
Clearly she has accepted her place in the hierarchy. Her response is a 
reflection of the divine order which binds the universe together. It is the 
same order which Dante describes in Canto I: 
Ne l'ordine ch'io dico sono accline 
tutte nature, per diverse sorti, 
più al principio loro e men vicine; 
onde si muovono a diversi porti 
per lo gran mar de l'essere, e ciascuna 
390par, III, 1. 70 -8. 
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con istinto a lei dato che la porti. 
Questi ne porta il foco inver la luna; 
questi ne' cor mortali è permotore; 
questi la terra in sé stringe e aduna; 
ne pur le creature che son fore 
d'intelligenza quest'arco saetta, 
ma quelle c'hanno intelletto e amore.391 
In the order I speak of all natures have their bent according to their different 
lots, nearer to their source and farther from it; they move, therefore, to 
different ports over the great sea of being, each with an instinct given it to 
bear it on: this bears fire up towards the moon, -- this is the motive force in 
mortal creatures, -- this binds the earth together and makes it one. And not 
only the creatures that are without intelligence does this bow shoot, but those 
also that have intellect and love.392 
As Dante tells us, not all creatures have the same capability to comprehend, 
yet all creatures have their place in God's universe. The harmony of all 
things depends ironically on a certain degree of confusion, on the presence of 
unknowingness. But as in the image of the moon in which darkness 
complements light, the unknowingness of created forms leads not to chaos 
but to an order which encompasses all things. 
Dante, too, finds himself limited as he approaches the higher levels of 
the Paradiso. In Canto III, he sees the shades as through smooth or 
transparent glass or limpid or still water. The actual beings are not visible, 
only their vague shapes. This blurring of figures, explains Beatrice in the 
following canto, is a sign of Dante's progression from the lower spheres to the 
higher. This progression is marked by a limiting of Dante's senses, beginning 
with his sight. As I argued in the previous chapter, this portrayal of Dante as 
391 par, I, 1. 109 -20. 
392Paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 25 
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an ordinary human being subject to all human weaknesses lends authority to 
his character, for he is able to serve as everyman, to make this journey not as 
an individual but for humanity. In the following canto, Beatrice explains to 
Dante that she introduces the various saints by sphere, according to their 
degree of blessedness, so that he can distinguish their ordering in heaven: 
Così parlar conviensi al vostro ingengo, 
però che solo da sensato apprende 
ciò che fa poscia d'intelletto degno. 
Per questo la Scrittura condescende 
a vostra facultate, e piedi e mano 
attribuisce a Dio e altro intende; 
e Santa Chiesa con aspetto umano 
Gabrïel e Michel vi rappresenta, 
e l'altro che Tobia rifece sano.393 
It is necessary to speak thus to your faculty, since only from sense perception 
does it grasp that which it then makes fit for the intellect. For this reason 
Scripture condescends to your capacity and attributes hands and feet to God, 
having another meaning, and Holy Church represents to you with human 
aspect Gabriel and Michael and the other who made Tobit whole again.394 
She continues with a significant reference to Plato's Timaeus: 
Quel che Timeo de l'anime argomenta 
non è simile a ciò che qui si vede, 
però che, come dice, par che senta. 
Dice che l'alma a la sua stella riede, 
credendo quella quindi esser decisa 
quando natura per forma la diede; 
e forse sua sentenza è d'altra guisa 
che la voce non suona, ed esser puote 
con intenzion da non esser derisa. 
S'elli intende tornare a queste ruote 
l'onor della influenza e '1 biasmo, forse 
in alcun vero suo arco percuote. 
Questo principio, male inteso, torse 
già tutto il mondo quasi, sì che Giove, 
393Par. I 1. 40 -8. 
394paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 63. 
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Mercurio e Marte a nominar trascorse.395 
What Timaeus argues about the souls is not like that which we see here; for 
what he says he seems to hold for truth. He says the soul returns to its own 
star, from which he believes it to have been separated when nature gave it for 
a form; but perhaps his view is other than his words express and may have a 
meaning not to be despised. If he means the return to these wheels of the 
honour and the blame of their influence, his bow perhaps strikes on a certain 
truth. This principle, ill- understood, once misled almost the whole world, so 
that it went astray, naming them Jupiter and Mercury and Mars.396 
Beatrice does not condemn Plato's theory as false, but rather identifies it as an 
approximation of the truth limited once again by language. It is a reversal of 
the idea of a transcendent Christian truth revealed at a single moment in 
time, diametrically opposed to other expressions of truth. Dante's conception 
of truth reflects his image of the universe: truth, like light, is distributed 
throughout the universe, albeit unevenly. Furthermore, truth depends as 
much upon the interpreting skills of the listener as on the words of the 
speaker. Here again is the image of a theocentric universe where all things 
fit, where Plato, and even Derrida, have their place. The theories of these 
philosophers are only false to the degree that their language is not an ideal 
language; it can only approximate the truth. 
As Dante moves toward the middle spheres, he reaches a level of heaven 
in which divine justice can be comprehended without a veil. This divine 
justice is symbolised in the image of the eagle. In Canto XIX, Dante notes that 
he is enabled to describe the indescribable: the eagle speaks with one voice 
composed of a plurality of voices. The ineffability of what he now faces 
395Par. IV, 1. 49 -63. 
396Paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 63. 
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is conveyed in the following lines: "E quel che mi convien ritrar testeso,/ non 
portò voce mai, né scrisse incostro, / né fu per fantasia già mai compreso; "397 
[ "And that of which I have now to tell never tongue conveyed, nor ink write, 
nor ever was conceived by fancy. "]398 The eagle reveals to Dante the 
limitations of humanity in comprehending divine mysteries, and the reason 
that we will always appeal to transcendence: 
Poi cominciò: «Colui che volse il sesto 
a lo stremo del mondo, e dentro ad esso 
distinte tanto occulto e manifesto, 
non poté suo valor si fare impresso 
in tutto l'universo, che'l suo verbo 
non rimanesse in infinito eccesso. 
E ciò fa certo che '1 primo superbo, 
che fu la somma d'ogni creatura, 
per non aspettar lume, cadde acerbo; 
e quinci appar ch'ogne minor natura 
è corto recettacolo a quel bene 
che non ha fine e sé con sé misura. 
Dunque vostra veduta, che convene 
essere alcun de' raggi de la mente 
di che tutte le cose son ripiene, 
non pò da sua natura esser possente 
tanto, che suo principio non discerna 
molto di là da quel che l'è parvente.399 
Then it began: 'He that turned His compass about the bounds of the world 
and within it devised so variously things hidden and manifest, could not 
make His Power to be so impressed on the whole universe that His Word 
should not remain in infinite excess; and, in proof of this, the first proud 
spirit, who was the highest of all creatures, fell unripe through not waiting 
for light, from which it is plain that every lesser nature is too scant a vessel 
for that good which has no limit and measures itself by itself. Thus our 
vision, which must needs be one of the rays of the Mind of which all things 
are full, cannot by its nature be of such power that it should not perceive its 
origin to be far beyond all that appears to it.'4o0 
397Par, XIX, 1. 7 -9. 
398 paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 271. 
399 par, XIX, 1. 40 -67. 
400Paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 273. 
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Although Dante's sight has become clearer, he is no closer to seeing the limit, 
for the clearer his sight becomes the more he realises that the limit is still far 
beyond him. He describes this situation using an analogy in which the eye, 
looking from the shore, sees the ocean's bottom; in the open sea the bottom is 
concealed by the sheer depth of the ocean. And this, as Dante tells us so 
clearly, is a problem for all humanity. It is the reason that we will never grasp 
Truth. And the sin of the devil, the first proud spirit, was not merely one of 
pride but of not waiting for light. 
In Canto XXI, Dante enters the seventh heaven. Immediately he is 
confronted by the sheer power of this new level. Beatrice warns him that 
should she smile, her beauty would completely overwhelm him. She tells 
him: 
S'io ridessi' 
mi cominciò, 'tu ti faresti quale 
fu Semelè quando di cener fessi: 
ché la bellezza mia, che per le scale 
de l'etterno palazzo più s'accende, 
com' hai veduto, quanto più si sale, 
se non temperasse, tanto splende, 
che '1 tuo mortal podere, al suo fulgore, 
sarebbe fronda che trono scoscende.401 
'Were I to smile' she began to me 'thou wouldst become like Semele 
when she was turned to ashes; for my beauty, which thou hast seen 
kindle more the higher we climb by the stairs of the eternal palace, is so 
shining that if it were not tempered thy mortal powers in its blaze would 
be as a branch split by a thunderbolt.'402 
401 par, XXI, I. 4 -12. 
402paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 303 
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Beatrice's beauty functions like language in the upper heavens in that it 
serves as an indicator of Dante's movement towards the summit. 
He then sees a ladder so tall that he cannot follow it to its end, a throng 
of lights descending from it. He allows the reader to feel his uncertainty 
about whether he should speak. After receiving encouragement from 
Beatrice, he asks why this realm is silent. The light replies that Dante is 
limited in his hearing as well as in his vision. For the same reason that 
Beatrice cannot smile in his presence, Heaven remains silent. In the speaking 
light the limits of humanity are negated. They become meaningless in an 
atemporal realm. The light tells Dante, "Luce divina sopra me s'appunta, / 
penetrando per questa in ch'io m'inventro, / la cui virtù, col mio veder 
congiunta, / mi leva sopra me tanto, ch'i'veggio / la somma essenza de la 
quale è munta. "403 [" 'A divine light is focused upon me, piercing through 
this in which I am embosomed, whose virtue, joined with my own vision, 
raises me so far above myself that I see the Supreme Essence from which it is 
drawn. 1404 In this canto, Dante's poetic message changes. His method is no 
longer to describe the elements of heaven, but to note what is absent. He has 
reached such a height that he is no longer striving. Rather he has become 
content with acknowledging the limits around himself. Just as Beatrice's 
smile would overpower him, the ladder placed before him reaches beyond his 
sight. It is not only his sight, however, but his hearing which is limited, as 
the speaking lamp informs him. This level of heaven is characterised by a 
silence not found in the other parts, where words hesitate to come forth. 
Dante himself writes that he feels reluctant to speak. The other is known to 
Dante only by its shadow, by the lamp which dims itself for him, by Beatrice 
403 par XXI, 1. 83 -7. 
404paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 307 
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who refuses to smile, by the chorus which does not sign, just as zero/ infinity 
is known only by a mark which represents what can only be imagined. 
The process of the journey towards heaven is actually a process of 
moving towards ineffability, represented in a language which must continue 
to remain expressive in the face of inexpressibility. It is in this act of writing 
where Dante shows his strength, because he has in a sense undertaken the 
impossible poetic task. The challenge of describing heaven is not that of 
describing heaven itself, but of describing the impossibility of describing. In 
the Third Treatise of the Convivio, Dante makes ineffability the subject of his 
discourse. Reflecting on his unspeakable love for Beatrice, he writes: 
Chè a me conviene lasciare per povertà d'intelletto molto di 
quello che è vero di lei, e che quasi ne la mia mente raggia, la 
quale come corpo diafano riceve quello, non terminando: e questo 
dico in quella seguente particula: E certo e' mi conven lasciare in 
pria. Poi quando dico: E di quel che s' intende, dico che non pur a 
quello che lo mio intelletto non sostiene, ma eziandio a quello che 
io intendo sufficiente [non sono], però che la lingua mia non è di 
tanta facundia che dire potesse ciò che nel pensiero mio se ne 
ragiona; per che è da vedere che, a rispetto de la veritade, poco fia 
quello che dirà.405 
For, through poverty of intellect, needs must I drop much of that 
which is true concerning her, because it comes in rays into my 
mind as if into a transparent body that receives but cannot arrest 
it. And this I say in this following clause: 
And verily it behooveth me first to drop. 
Then when I say: 
And of that which it understandeth, 
I assert that not only am I insufficient for that which my intellect 
cannot support, but even for that which I understand, because my 
tongue hath not such eloquence as to be able to utter the discourse 




in proportion to the truth, that which I shall say will be but 
little...406 
Although he writes in this instance of his love for Beatrice, his words would 
aptly describe the poetic dilemma of the Paradiso. Yet the significance of his 
handling of this dilemma cannot be understated. As postmodern readers, we 
will read the Paradiso not for the glimpse of heaven it offers us but for a 
glimpse of the poet's work. We will read wanting to see not the face of God at 
the end of the journey but the pointing of signifiers towards a meaning which 
is suspended in the face of this great ineffability. 
Dante handles this task by creating a boundary between the visible and 
the not visible (supravisible), the temporal and the not temporal (infinite), 
the speakable and the ineffable (infinitely describable). It is not the boundary 
or stroke which is crossed out, but a limit which, like the limit of calculus, 
points towards both zero and infinity. The chiasmus is not the crossing out 
that results from the hierarchisation of one opposition over another. Rather, 
the crossing out of the limit occurs when the zero and the infinity which 
Dante knows are beyond him are both separated from each other yet 
undivided. They are both expressed by representation alone, by Dante 
limiting himself, by confiding that the sight, hearing, and understanding of 
zero and infinity were not like his own. 
Approaching the thirtieth canto, Dante reaches a level of heaven in 
which the power of the vision clouds his own ability to see. He describes his 
state: "Non altrimenti il trïunfo che lude/ sempre dintorno al punto che mi 
vinse,/ parendo inchiuso da quel ch'elli 'nchiude/ a poco a poco al mio veder 
406trans. Philip H. Wicksteed, (London: JM Dent, 1924), chapter four. 
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si stinse;/ per the tornar con li occhi a Beatrice/ nulla vedere ed amor mi 
constrinse."407 [ "In like manner, the triumph that sports forever round the 
point which overcame me and which seems enclosed by that which it 
encloses was extinguished little by little from my sight, so that my seeing 
nothing and my love constrained me to return with my eyes to Beatrice. "]408 
Here Dante chooses to describe the divine in geometric terms, as a circle and a 
point. As he approaches the end of his journey, his images become abstract 
and paradoxical as earthly images fail to represent what Beatrice calls "ciel 
ch'è pura luce "409 [ "the heaven that is pure light "]410. His images of the 
divine are clearly not limited to three- dimensional space -time, but transcend 
reality to resolve paradox into truth. 
John Freccero, in "The Final Image: Par XXXIII, 144," describes God as 
"a circumference as well as a center. "411 God is also described as a 
circumference in Canto XIV: "Quell' uno e due e tre che sempre vive/ e regna 
sempre in tre e 'n due e 'n uno,/ non circunscritto, e tutto circunscrive,/ tre 
volte era cantato da ciascuno/ di quelli spiriti con tal melodia,/ ch'ad ogne 
merto saria giusto muno. "412 [ "That One and Two and Three who ever lives 
and ever reigns in Three and in Two and in One an uncircumscribed 
circumscribes all, was sung three times by every one of these spirits in such a 
407Par XXX, 1. 10 -15. 
408Paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 431. 
409par XXX, 1. 39 
410Paradiso, (trans. Sinclair)p. 433 
411Dante: The Poetics of Conversion, p. 256. 
412Par XIV, 1. 28 -33. 
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strain as would be fit reward for every merit.1413 Dante's description of God 
as both a circumference -- circumscribing and enclosing all -- and as a point, 
which is the centre of circumscription, is the paradox which underlies the 
universe of his poetic discourse. The point is both the origin and the 
terminus of itself, while the circumference has an infinity of origins and 
termini. Dante's paradox is something like that of Julian of Norwich's, who 
describes her divine vision thus: "And aftyr this I sawe god in a poynte, that 
es in myne vndyrstandynge, by whilke syght I sawe that he es in alle 
thynge. "414 The abstract point contains an infinite spectrum of possible lines 
running through it, and thus the figure which immediately originates and 
terminates itself can contain infinity within it. Origin and end are possible 
for Dante because his representations of them are impossible. His origin is 
not simply a tracing back of all things to the Primum Mobile. Rather, he 
demonstrates that the origin cannot be properly represented and is not 
arrived at through traces of history and the past, but rather is like the point to 
which nothing leads and to which all things lead, and the circumference, 
which contains an infinity of possible origins. 
The final canto signifies the end of Dante's journey. What does the 
reader expect in this canto? Are we led to believe that Dante will be 
confronted by a direct vision of God? Canto XXXIII opens with St. Bernard's 
supplication to allow Dante access to the highest vision. As Dante approaches 
the light, his vision increases in proportion to the greatness of the sight, yet 
he cannot describe what he witnesses: 
413paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 203 
414A Book of Showings, ed. Edmund Colledge and James Walsh, (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), Ch. viii, p. 226. 
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E io ch'al fine di tutt' i disii 
appropinquava, si corn' io dovea, 
l'ardor del desiderio in me finii. 
Bernardo m'accennava e sorridea 
perch'io guardassi suso; ma io era 
già per me stesso tal qual ei volea; 
ché la mia vista, venendo sincera, 
e più e più intrava per lo raggio 
de l'alta luce che da sé è vera. 
Da quinci innanzi il mio veder fu maggio 
che '1 parlar mostra, ch'a tal vista cede, 
e cede la memoria a tanto oltraggio. 
Qual è colui che sognando vede, 
che dopo '1 sogno la passione impressa 
rimane, e l'altro a la mente non riede, 
cotai son io, ché quasi tutta cessa 
mia visione, e ancor mi distilla 
nel core il dolce che nacque da essa. 
Così la neve al sol si disigilla; 
cosi al vento ne le foglie levi 
si perdea la sentenza di Sibilla.415 
And I, who was drawing near to the end of all desires, ended perforce the 
ardour of my craving. Bernard signed to me with a smile to look upward, but 
already of myself I was doing what he wished; for my sight, becoming pure, 
was entering more and more through the beam of the lofty light which in 
itself is true. 
From that moment my vision was greater than our speech, which fails at 
such a sight, and memory too fails at such excess. Like him that sees in a 
dream and after the dream the passion wrought by it remains and the rest 
returns not to his mind, such am I; for my vision almost wholly fades, and 
still there drops within my heart the sweetness that was born of it. Thus the 
snow loses its imprint in the sun; thus in the wind on the light leaves the 
Sibyl's oracle was lost. 
This beautiful passage contrasts the indescribable force of his vision with the 
strange mixture of emptiness and fullness which accompanies the vision's 
trace. Dante now writes, attempting to capture what has disappeared from his 
415Par XXXIII, 1. 46 -66. 
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sight in his text. He follows with a prayer that divine assistance will allow 
him to convey at least a glimpse of what he has seen: 
O somma luce che tanto ti levi 
da' concetti mortali, a la mia mente 
ripresta un poco di quel che parevi, 
e fa la lingua mia tanto possente, 
ch'una favilla sol de la tua gloria 
possa lasciare a la futura gente; 
ché, per tornare alquanto a mia memoria 
e per sonare un poco in questi versi, 
più si conceperà di tua vittoria.416 
O Light Supreme that art so far exalted above mortal conceiving, grant to my 
mind again a little of what thou appearedst and give my tongue such power 
that it may leave but a gleam of thy glory to the people yet to come; for by 
returning somewhat to my memory and by sounding a little in these lines the 
better conceived will be thy victory.417 
Dante's text, though it is but a trace of his full vision, can in turn serve in its 
written form as a trace for future readers. Dante intends his text to be used by 
others as a pathway to divine ascent. It is for this purpose that the Commedia 
must be written down. 
Gazing into divine light, Dante glimpses momentarily the structure of 
the universe: "Nel suo profondo vidi che s'interna,/ legato con amore in un 
volume,/ ciò che per l'universo si squaderna:/ sustanze e accidenti e for 
costume,/ quasi conflati insieme, per tal modo/ che ciò ch'i' dico è un 
semplice lume. "418 [ "In its depth I saw that it contained, bound by love in 
one volume, that which is scattered in leaves through the universe, 
substances and accidents and their relations as it were fused together in such a 
way that what I tell of is a simple light. "]419 We see in this metaphor of the 
416Par XXXIII, 1. 67 -75. 
417paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) pp. 482 -3. 
418 par XXXIII, 1. 85 -90. 
419paradiso, (trans. Sinclair)p. 483 
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divine Book that the metaphor itself is immaterial, for the bound Book is 
only the final, transcendent state of a reality which is presently, as Dante tells 
us, "scattered in leaves through the universe." 
We never encounter the voice of God in this work, only those of 
human intercessors. Dante no doubt realised that his poetic task was too great 
for the medium, language. He begins a task which he knows from the outset 
will not be fully realised. His attempts to describe his experience in this final 
canto are clouded by his admissions that his speech is limited, as is his ability 
to comprehend. Dante does not even attempt to describe God, save God's 
essence as light. His narrative of the events in the Paradiso is accomplished 
through analogy and metaphor. Even in heaven he finds only 
representations of divinity. But as in the case of Pseudo -Dionysius the failure 
to fully represent the divine is not a failure at all but the beginning of all 
expectation for the future. His subject in this final canto is not God but the 
ending of his journey towards God and the new beginning that all such 
temporary endings will lead to. 
Stephen Botterill argues that the Divine Comedy denies the 
ineffability it asserts, and uses language to prove the failure of language.420 
Yet there is a certain aesthetic delight in the failure as well as in the attempt. 
The contradiction which is the most fundamental part of allegory is evident 
throughout Dante's Paradiso as he attempts to represent what refuses to be 
represented. The Paradiso wants to escape from time and place, yet the 
motion, the progression of the persona, keeps him and us in a kind of prison 
420'""Quae non licet homini loqui': The Ineffability of Mystical Experience in 
Paradiso I and the Epistle to Can Grande." The Modern Language Review 8 3 
(1988), pp. 336 -7. 
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so that escape and true representation are rendered impossible. The 
progression toward the Paradiso does not end in final presence. The very 
quality of progression, involving movement and time, is itself an indication 
that eternity is out of reach. It is only at the moment when time stops forever 
that the Paradiso can arrive at its true terminus. 
In the Paradiso, Dante maps his vision of a theo(logo)centric universe. 
It is a universe in which all things fit, where the testimony of each life forms 
a part of a book whose completeness is dependent on each participant. The 
Paradiso, I believe, is Dante's response to deconstruction -- a universe in 
which Derrida, it seems, would, like the author of the Timaeus, have an 
important place, speaking in the shadow but speaking equally in the light. 
In the next section, I will discuss the image of the circle which 
dominated Dante's final vision, which he describes in the following lines: 
"Ne la profonda e chiara sussistenza/ de l'alto lume parvermi tre giri/ di tre 
colori e d'una contenenza;/ e l'un da l'altro come iri da iri/ parea reflesso, e '1 
terzo parea foco/ che quinci e quindi igualmente si spiri. "421 [ "In the 
profound and clear ground of the lofty light appeared to me three circles of 
three colours and of the same extent, and the one seemed reflected by the 
other as rainbow by rainbow, and the third seemed fire breathed forth equally 
from the one and the other. "]422 However, this divine image becomes the 
very symbol of the ineffability which absolutely refuses to be expressed, 
whether in speech or in writing: 
421 par XXXIII, 1. 115 -20. 
422Paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 485 
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Quella circulazion che sì concetta 
pareva in te come lume reflesso, 
da li occhi miei alquanto circunspetta, 
dentro da sé, del suo colore stesso, 
mi parve pinta de la nostra effige: 
per che '1 mio viso in lei tutto era messo. 
Qual è '1 geometra che tutto s'affige 
per misurar lo cerchio, e non ritrova, 
pensando, quel principio ond' elli indige, 
tal era io a quella vista nova: 
veder volea come si convenne 
l'imago al cerchio e come vi s'indova; 
ma non eran da ciò le proprie penne: 
se non che la mia mente fu percossa 
da un fulgore in che sua voglia venne. 
A l'alta fantasia qui mancò possa; 
ma già volgeva il mio disio e'l velle, 
si come rota ch'igualmente è mossa, 
l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle.423 
That circling which, thus begotten, appeared in Thee as reflected light, when 
my eyes dwelt on it for a time, seemed to me, within it and in its own colour, 
painted with our likeness, for which my sight was wholly given to it. Like 
the geometer his mind all his 
thinking does not discover the principle he needs, such was I at that strange 
sight. I wished to see how the image was fitted to the circle and how it has its 
place there; but my own wings were not sufficient for that, had not my mind 
been smitten by a flash wherein came its wish. Here power failed the high 
phantasy; but now my desire and will, like a wheel that spins with even 
motion, were revolved by the Love that moves the sun and the other 
stars.424 
423 par XXXIII, 1. 127 -45. 
424Paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 485. 
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The time of the circle: a circumventing of linear time 
In a passage from the Periphyseon, Eriugena describes God as being 
outside of time and place: 
Omne enim quod in mundo est moueri tempore loco diffiniri 
necesse est, et locus ipse diffinitur et tempus mouetur; deus autem 
nec mouetur nec diffinitur. [Nam locus quo diffiniuntur omnia 
loca locus locorum est et, quia ille a nullo locatur sed omnia intra 
se collocat, non locus sed plus quam locus est. A nullo enim 
diffinitur sed omnia diffinit: causa igitur est omnium. Eodem 
modo causa temporum tempora mouet, ipsa uero a nullo in nullo 
tempore mouetur. Est enim plus quam tempus et plus quam 
motus.] Non est locus igitur neque tempus.425 
For everything that is in the world must move in time and be 
defined in place; even place itself is defined and time itself moves. 
But God neither moves nor is defined. [For (He is) the Place of 
places by which all places are defined, and, since He is not fixed in 
place by anything but gives place to all things within Him, He is 
not place but More -than -place. For He is defined by nothing, but 
defines all things. In the same way, the Cause of times moves the 
times, but itself is not moved by any time in any time: for it is 
More -than -motion.] Therefore He is neither place nor time.426 
In this discussion, space and time will come together, for as Eriugena tells us, 
"Non enim possibile est locum subtracto tempore intelligi, sicut neque 
tempus sine loci cointelligentia diffiniri potest. "427 [ "it is impossible to 
conceive place if time is withdrawn, as it is impossible for time to be defined 
without understanding it in connexion with place. "]428 
What are the words constantly being used by contemporary thinkers to 
describe the Middle Ages? Postmodern terms originate from a postmodern 
mindset and are in this sense culture -specific. By using these words, what do 





we transform the Middle Ages into, and how do we transform ourselves? 
How can we cross the boundary between space and time? Perhaps the answer 
lies in the concepts of space and time, in our shared interest in exploring the 
theoretical limits of time and space. We are no longer fascinated with the 
details of landscape, as in the era of Realism,429 but are drawn to images and 
boundaries which are manipulated in the mind. Like medieval thinkers, we 
are more interested in what lies below the surface. "Realism" is not 
applicable in an allegory which takes place outside of time and space, unless 
"reality" itself could be deconstructed. Such an attempt would lead to 
madness. 
As compared to later movements in art and literature, the Middle Ages 
was marked by a notable disinterest in representations of the physical world. 
Dante described in magnificent detail an abstract landscape, a landscape which 
existed in his mind and which consisted of geometrical figures -- circles, etc. 
In the Middle Ages, it is the point, the line, the circle, which become objects of 
importance. Geometrical figures were used as figures of representation to 
express abstract ideas which were difficult to represent properly. For 
Augustine, the circle was a model of psychological reality. Describing the 
philosophy of Augustine, Jeffrey writes, "[According to Augustine] We think, 
exist, feel and will in a circle, and without the possibility of reference to 
something beyond itself our thinking wants to take this circle for the infinite 
and original reality and thus hopelessly entangles itself. "430 In this model, 
the psychology is a potential prison. The limitations of the human mind may 
lead us to believe that what we conceive of as infinity actually is; however, 
what is taking place is an infinite regress. Each referral, each portion of 
429I refer to the preference in the 19th century to depict things as they 
actually were. 
430David L. Jeffrey, Introduction, By Things Seen, p. 4. 
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regress, leads only to a "fake" origin, which refers to another "fake" origin, 
entangling us in a temporally infinite but spatially entrapping circle. Our 
only solution, according to Augustine, is really through a form of 
transcendence. Only through escaping everything we think, are, feel, and 
will, and by referring to something unknown beyond the circle, can we escape 
infinite regress and stumble upon a true original reality. 
In the Periphyseon, Eriugena uses geometrical figures to represent the 
limits of human knowledge.431 He argues that limits belong to the 
intelligible (as opposed to the sensible), just as the limits of geometrical 
figures are incorporeal. He begins with the example of the geometrical point, 
which is not part of the line, but its limit. In contrast, the sensible point 
forms part of a line, but does not limit it. The geometrical line is also 
incorporeal and limits the surface. The surface, similarly, is incorporeal and 
limits the solid. The solid is incorporeal and completes the perfection of the 
whole. The limits of things are perceived and determined by the intellect. 
As I mentioned in Chapter Four, Bonaventure also depended on 
geometrical figures to represent his abstract ideas. In the Hexameron, 
Bonaventure discusses the nature of the point: "Si enim unitas posset 
cognoscere totum posse suum, videret et cognosceret omnes numeros; et si 
punctus cognosceret totum posse suum, cognosceret omnes lineas in 
centro; "432 [ "if oneness were able to know the sum total of its potencies, it 
would see and know all the numbers, and if the mathematical point were 
able to know the sum total of its potencies, it would know the all the lines 
431Periphyseon 484C. 
432co11. III, 5. 
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passing through the center. "]433 For Bonaventure, the point is associated 
with infinity. Like the circumference of the circle it holds infinite 
possibilities. It is not only the point, but the mystical number one which 
represents infinity. He asserts that God is one, but the more a thing is one, 
the more it is infinite.434 Similarly, the image of the Eagle in Canto XIX of 
the Paradiso is a representation of profound plurality in one. 
Bonaventure applies his theory on the infinity of the point and of 
oneness to literary (ie Scriptural) interpretation, arguing that numerous 
interpretations of Scripture can co -exist harmoniously. He applies his vision 
of the world as numbered elements containing infinite qualities to scriptural 
interpretation. He compares scriptural interpretation to intelligences and 
figures which exist in determinable numbers, but to which infinite theories 
can be applied. He draws a further analogy between scriptural interpretation 
and a single mirror which infinitely reflects images and light -rays, and to a 
right and obtuse angle, within which an infinite number of intermediate 
angles are contained.435 Bonaventure's model of reading serves well to 
endorse Dante's chosen poetic method, in that it encourages the textual 
interplay of numerous senses and interpretations.436 Umberto Eco aptly 
describes the art of interpretation in the Middle Ages as a search for a 
meaning which was "infinite in terms of time but nevertheless limited in its 
433pp. 43 -4. 
434co11. 3, 4. 
435In coll. 15, 10, he states, "Intelligentiae enim principales et figurae in 
quodam numero certo sunt, sed theoriae quasi infinitae: quia, sicut refulsio 
radii et imaginis a speculo fit modis quasi infinitis, sic a speculo Scripturae. 
Quis potest scire, quot sunt media inter angulum rectum et obtusum, inter 
angulum obtusum et acutum? Sicut enim in seminibus est multiplicatio in 
infinitum, sic multiplicantur theoriae. Unde in Daniele: Pertransibunt 
plurimi, et multiplex erit scientia, quia varie inspicit hic et ille in speculo." 
436In coli 13, 10 -1, Bonaventure discusses the fourfold method of scriptural 
interpretation. 
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options. "437 It is as such paradoxical in seeking to violate the temporality of 
texts, in demanding a discourse which is limited to be delimited in terms of 
time. Nevertheless, medieval readers assumed that texts had boundaries, 
even if those boundaries encompassed infinity. 
He further argues, "Haec autem est Scriptura, ubi non unum, sed 
multa inveniuntur . . . Philosophus dicit, quod magna delectatio est scire, 
quod diameter est asymeter costae ... "438 ['But such a thing is Scripture, 
wherein not one thing but many things are found ...The Philosopher says it 
is a pleasure to know that the diameter is assymmetrical to the 
circumference. "]439 Thus the entire world that can be sought through 
knowledge -- mathematics, literary theory -- was according to Bonaventure 
established on the principle that infinity cannot be properly represented by 
finite signs which, while perhaps infinitely referring to other signs, do not 
invoke infinity at any given moment (indeed, according to Bonaventure, 
infinity is not actually invoked). Nevertheless, the diameter (finitude) is the 
temporal line which joins one point on the infinite circumference to another. 
While it represents finitude, it also represents the possibility of an infinity 
number of diameters. And as Bonaventure remarks, it is only through these 
lines that we can find the centre. 
Bonaventure also makes the paradoxical assertion that infinity is 
contained in the one. I argue that implied in the representation of God as 
point (and circumference) is a certain way of looking at spatio -temporal 
437lnterpretation and Overinterpretation, ed. Stefan Collini, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1992), p. 53. 
438co11. 17, 7. 
439p 255 
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reality. Space and time are by no means linear, regressing linearly to an 
origin. The Primum Mobile is the centre through which passes an infinity of 
signs, of essences, all of which refer to each other and to themselves and to 
their likenesses infinitely, but which nevertheless pass through the centre. 
Bonaventure's speculations on the point as containing an infinity of lines 
passing through it, an infinity of diameters, may serve as his cosmic model, 
and Dante's as well. 
In the Paradiso, abstract forms become realities. Yet reality is a word 
which implies a certain limitation, and in the case of both Dante and 
Bonaventure this limitation manifests itself in the admission that ideality is 
unattainable. As with Augustine, and other medieval thinkers, Dante 
maintains an awareness of his limitations, and this awareness always 
pervades, in fact becomes the object of, his own discourse. Dante is the 
limiter who draws limits about himself. He moves simultaneously towards 
infinity and nothingess but never reaches either. For Dante, poetic language 
is both the only representation of God and the unrepresentable qualities 
which God embodies and paradoxically the division from the eternal. 
Language never reaches what it attempts to represent. The ineffability which 
is written into Dante's poetics is not a characteristic of logocentrism but of 
medieval ontology. 
In Canto XXIX of the Paradiso, Beatrice gives a brief description of 
eternity as "la 've s'appunta ogne ubi e ogni quando. "440 [ "there where every 
ubi and every quando is centred. "]441 In eternity, beyond time, Dante's 
440Par. XXIX, 1. 12 
441 paradiso, (trans. Sinclair) p. 417. 
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conception is of a space -time with an infinite number of centres. Thus there 
can be no one central point of space or time. In this model of space -time, one 
centre is continually replacing another. Another possibility is that infinite 
centres are simultaneously centred, implying infinite circles. In contrast, 
Derrida uses the circle as a metaphor for a logocentric view in which the 
centre is a fixed locus, a determinable point which is privileged above other 
points. Derrida supplies some alternative names for centre: eidos, arché, 
ousia, God, man. He attributes this privileging of the centre to a longing for 
presence. Yet the continual renaming of the centre implies that presence has 
not been properly known, understood, or identified. Nor is the position of 
the locus properly fixed. This circular model of deconstruction involves 
picturing the centre as a fixed locus in which signs are infinitely substituted in 
an endless act of play. Derrida locates the weakness of a fixed -centre model in 
his hypothesis that the centre must be repeated, that is, substituted in a 
process of renaming that continues from the eidos to God and back to the self. 
Similarly, in reading allegory, there is no central point which organises 
and structures the process of reading, and no terminus at which the process of 
reading and interpretation ends. There is, however, a structure which guides 
the reader. Dante, as the first pilgrim, leaves his footprints so that further 
readers can follow his traces to the hidden meaning within the text. 
Deconstructive critics attempt to locate a centre within a narrative text as 
evidence of a transcendent organising point. Yet the centre of Dante's 
allegory is not fixed but changes as the circumscriptive narrative is reread and 
the narrative line is redrawn by each individual reader, who locates the 
centre sometimes in the literal sense, sometimes in the allegorical, but always 
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in herself. Thus the point at which interpretation begins and ends is located 
in each individual reader, so that there are an unlimited number of possible 
origins and journeys within a text. Perhaps allegorical structure can best be 
described as a circular structure in which the circles are continuously redrawn 
by each successive reader. 
The circle can serve as a representation of Dante's narrative time. 
While we may imagine the progression towards the Paradiso as a linear one, 
it is in fact better represented as a circle. Singleton views Dante's 
representation of God in the Vita Nuova as the centre of a circle, able to see 
all points, past, present, and future, on the line which serves as a map of time. 
He bases his conclusions on the phrase "I am as the center of a circle to which 
all points of the circumference are equidistant; you are not so." Singleton 
observes that these words are spoken to inform Dante that God, as the centre 
which sees all things, sees also what must inevitably come to pass, the death 
of Beatrice. Yet, as Singleton points out later, Dante as the poet who already 
knows the result of his narrative also sits at the centre of his narrative circle: 
With the death of Beatrice, a circle is closed. We know again what 
we began by knowing. And we stand at a point where we can see 
that the movement along the line of this action is not movement 
in a single direction. The current is alternating, which is 
something one had already seen in the figure of a poet -protagonist 
become two persons according to a situation in time: the one being 
he who, though ignorant of the end, moves always toward the 
end; and the other he who, knowing the end, is constantly 
retracing the whole line of events with the new awareness and 
transcendent understanding which such superior knowledge can 
give.442 
Singleton, in fact, interprets the whole of the Vita Nuova as a series of circles 
in which beginning and end meet. This structure implies that harmony and 
442Charles Singleton, An Essay on the Vita Nuova, (Baltimore and London: 
Johns Hopkins, 1949), p. 25. 
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order can exist in a non -linear framework. To deconstruct Dante would be to 
read according to the model of an open circle which never closes, which is 
never complete, infinitely lacking a narrative centre from which we can re- 
read with "transcendent understanding" and "new awareness." 
This consideration of Dante's works as based on a structure governed 
by circular time is a violation of what Derrida declares to be at the essence of 
logocentrism, linear time. In Of Grammatology, Derrida ties phonetic 
writing, which is a linear system of writing in which one word follows the 
next, to the linearisation of time: "Ce concept linéariste du temps est donc 
l'une des plus profondes adhèrences du concept moderne de signe à son 
histoire. Car à la limite, c'est bien le concept de signe lui -même qui reste 
engagé dans l'histoire de l'ontologie classique, et la distinction, si ténue soit - 
elle, entre la face signifiante et la face signifiée. "443 [ "This linearist concept of 
time is therefore one of the deepest adherences of the modern concept of the 
sign to its own history. For at the limit, it is indeed the concept of the sign 
itself, and the distinction, however tenuous, between the signifying and 
signified faces, that remain committed to the history of classical 
ontology. 1 444 
443De la grammatologie, p. 106. 
444 p f Grammatology, p. 72. 
227 
Of origins and the time of the line 
While experiencing his final vision in Canto XXXIII, Dante comments, 
"Un punto solo m'è maggior letargo / the venticinque secoli a la'mpresa, / 
the fé Nettuno ammirar l'ombra d'Argo. "445 [ "A single moment makes for 
me deeper oblivion than five and twenty centuries upon the enterprise that 
made Neptune wonder at the shadow of the Argo. "]446 Here time, the 
governing force, is regarded as subjective and personal. Paradoxically, time is 
both uncontrollable in its regularity yet subject to individual experience. In 
this section, time will be treated as one of the central issues lying buried 
beneath the surface issues which cloud discussions of deconstruction and 
logocentrism. 
The issue of time is central in this discussion because the cultural gap 
dividing medieval literature and postmodernism is chronological rather than 
geographical. It has another significance beyond this. Our perception of time 
is either the basis of the foundation of logocentrism or the constant flux on 
which deconstruction temporally and temporarily rests. Just as the 
consideration of space leads to a demarcating of the sensible from the 
intelligible, so a similar contemplation of the workings of time leads us to 
grasp for the infinite and to postulate an area of containment which we 
designate finite. It is here, in this continuous conflict between Being and 
Becoming, where lies the heart of the matter. 
445Par. XXXIII, 1. 94 -6. 
446paradiso, (trans. Sinclair)p. 483. 
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What can be gained by escaping time? What knowledge can be seized 
by decentring the now, the present, and substituting it with another time, an 
unprivileged moment in which what is is only a myth. What can medieval 
texts teach us about other moments in time (or out of time)? For Dante, self - 
realisation cannot come about in time. We must first renounce time, evade 
the present, as Dante does, evading not only our present but his as well. In 
order to evade the present we must identify with another time, since we 
cannot like Dante imagine ourselves beyond time, for as postmoderns we are 
always in time, even though time may appear to us warped or disturbed. 
Theory leads to the question: where is the origin of logocentrism? Is it 
possible to locate? Do we find it in the New Criticism, in older methods of 
critical theory, or in the Romantic era, with the idealisation of the Author as 
the vehicle of inspiration? Or do we find it in Platonic thought or in the 
Christian Logos? These are all very different manifestations of logocentrism; 
so different, in fact, that we should hesitate to bind them all together. 
Nevertheless, Derrida has made an attempt to place temporal boundaries 
around logocentrism, giving it a tentative origin in Plato and a tentative 
closure in Nietzsche or perhaps in himself. 
The Divine Comedy is an interrogation of the Other. It dares to turn its 
gaze away from itself, Dante away from himself, and to turn the Other into a 
subject, the subject of his examination. Dante makes the Other a discourse, 
much like Beatrice, and much like himself. It is the ultimate act of praise and 
of sacrilege. Once the Other is transformed into a readable text, it loses some 
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of its profound strangeness. It can be read; it can possibly be understood. For 
Dante, there is no permanent separation at the beginning of time which a 
poet cannot dare to breach. There is only the question of how the separation 
can be overcome. 
Dante's ascent to the Paradiso is a violation of time. In this literary 
imagination, movement through space is possible outside of time. Yet 
moving outside of time, there is neither end, nor origin, nor centre. One is 
left with the impression that the Paradiso has no beginning. From the 
moment it begins, it anticipates a terminus which never really comes to be. 
While Dante certainly understood the human desire for an origin and a 
terminus, the Paradiso eclipses the origin and the terminus in favour of the 
middle. The emphasis of the Paradiso is on the progression towards the end. 
While the concepts of origin and terminus are static, the process is always in 
flux, and one can see that movement in Dante's poetics. 
The Paradiso ends not with a transcendental terminus but with a 
pause which suggests the moment before eternity. The reader expects that the 
Paradiso will end with a full vision of God, and yet it ends only with a feeling 
that presence is momentarily deferred. The terminus is missing. However, 
the absence of a terminus does not bring about the downfall of the Paradiso. 
Presence is deferred within the time -space of a narrative which will be reread 
throughout the ages by each new seeker. The terminus of the Paradiso is 
perhaps, like so much in the Commedia, not a fit subject for words. While 
the terminus is indefinite, the origin is also obscure. Dante's narrative is not 
chronological but spatial. As the entire narrative takes place outside of what 
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we have come to understand as "real" time, his beginning lacks a temporal 
origin. 
Dante's poetic narrative gives the semblance of escape from space and 
time. Escape is never possible with speech, however, as the continuous 
appearance and disappearance of phonetic sounds constantly reminds both 
listener and speaker of the prison of temporality. Furthermore, the presence 
of the human speaker implies the absence of the transcendental signified, 
which, unlike the human speaker, transcends space. Thus the logocentric 
aspects of speech are also the very characteristics which render it non - 
logocentric. 
In literature, space and time can be easily and artifically manipulated. 
In the Commedia, time and space are reinterpreted. Taylor, in 
Deconstruction and Context, describes literary space -time as "a space without 
presence and a time without the present. This ungraspable space and 
incomprehensible time are the space and time of the other. In this other 
space and time, space is timed and time spaced. "447 Movement through space 
in the Commedia is spirallic rather than linear. In the absence of a temporal 
marking of time, this movement as time becomes time itself. 
The problem of time is intimately concerned with both medieval sign 
theory and deconstruction. Some of the concerns shared by the two 
philosophies, such as the debate over an originary Logos, language and the 
cosmos as a system of relations, and the potential of structure existing in the 
447pp 29 -30. 
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universe, depend on the problem of time. Terms such as "temporality," 
"transcendence," and "infinity," are now often found in the works of literary 
critics though their meanings may not be explained, and thus I have found it 
necessary to determine a working definition of infinity (and thus of 
temporality or finitude) in order to deal properly with the subject at hand. I 
argue that the human mind associates infinity with an absence of motion. 
Thus I shall define infinity as a moment in which there is no action, in which 
the Verb, any verb, does not move, a moment in which there is absolutely no 
Becoming. Temporality, then, can be defined as all that is theoretically 
comprehensible, all that exists in time and space. In A Brief History of Time: 
From the Big Bang to Black Holes, Stephen Hawking defines three arrows of 
time: the thermodynamic, which is based on increasing entropy, the 
psychological, which deals with the way we perceive time, and the 
cosmological, which follows the expansion or contraction of the universe. 
Hawking demonstrates in his three -arrow model that there is a difference 
between time as it is perceived in the individual mind and time which 
depends on a universal structure. According to the model, there is the 
possibility of a transcendent time running absolutely independent of human 
consciousness. This potential for transcendence is useful not only in 
discussing theories of time, but of language and ontology as well. Beneath 
this potential for transcendence, beneath the word Transcendent, we store all 
that we do not have access to, be it an explosion of things or nothing. 
Medieval thinkers were determined to cross the boundary which could not be 
crossed. Unlike us, they had given the Transcendent a proper name -- God, 
Logos, the Word -- and although the Transcendent's name did indeed bear 
some relation to the names given to words, speech, and signs, nevertheless 
the relation failed to mystify language. The areas of discourse and 
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transcendence were separate: the Transcendental Signified remained 
unchanging, the foundation of medieval Christian belief, but untouched by 
the instability of the signifier. 
Signs were given the role of hovering near the boundary of space -time 
without crossing it. Trapped in space -time, they changed as did the structure 
that surrounded them. And even as they pointed towards infinity, they failed 
to signify properly. Because language dominates our perception of reality, 
whatever lies beyond space -time remains unsignifiable. There is no illusion 
for medieval thinkers that the transcendental signified was present to the 
signifier. What Augustine expressed in De Trinitate was a wish, an 
expectation of something that would happen in the future. The boundary 
between space -time and beyond, the contradiction between infinity and 
finitude, can only be mediated by signs, where each part of the sign exists on 
different sides of the boundary. 
The boundary could not be mediated except through the Incarnation of 
the Word, which effectively merged the two realms. It was the perfect 
solution to an otherwise irresolvable, irredeemable paradox -- though most of 
us today cannot accept a deus ex machina. And so what remains for us is that 
signs and time cannot be separated. Kristeva writes, "There is no time 
without speech. Therefore, there is no time without the father. That, 
incidentally, is what the Father is: sign and time. "448 The "cure" for 
logocentrism would be to regard the world as a system of Saussurean 
differences, in which signifiers point to other signifiers in a process of 
unlimited semiosis. Thus, the signified is infinitely displaced, and there is no 
terminus which we can call the Father. There is no illusion of presence -- 
448"Chinese Women," in The Kristeva Reader, ed. Toril Moi, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), p. 153. 
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neither a beginning and nor an end, but infinity discoursing with arbitrary 
(and finite) signs. We speak of infinite regress and discourse as the new 
privileged One who escapes time. Discourse escapes that by which we name 
things beginning and end (that is, itself) and becomes the beginning and end 
of all things. But how well does infinity fit into finitude? Terms like infinite 
regress, endless play are contradictory -- on the one hand action and 
movement, on the other hand the absence of time. The transcendental 
(un)signified is so dangerous because it escapes both sign and time. But 
discourse, being both sign and time, can never escape itself. 
I will apply the conclusions I have arrived at in the discussion of time 
to the ontological question. Umberto Eco in La struttura assente argues that 
structure is psychological rather than ontological. I see in this assertion 
something of an empathy with the medieval standpoint. If we adopt the 
viewpoint that all attempts to describe the ontological will in fact result only 
in semiotic descriptions we are both empathising with medieval philosophy 
and deconstructing ontology. There is little doubt that deconstruction and 
ontotheology arrive at different conclusions, the latter ultimately asserting 
the existence of Being, God, essence, truth, etc. and the other declining to 
assert. Nevertheless, many of their conclusions about language and reality 
are similar. The similarites in the two philosophies are indications of the 
potential of an ontological signified. Returning briefly to the three -arrow 
model of time, each person's time -consciousness is independent from 
another's yet dependent to some degree on cosmological time, thus resulting 
in a sameness and difference in psychological time. According to Eco's 
model, the differences between the ontotheological structure and the 
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deconstructive non -structure do not affect the potential for ontology. But 
according to the medieval model, conventional structure and non -structures 
are dependent on Being for their existence or non -existence, and their 
differences are merely a product of semiotic necessity. 
Both ontotheology and deconstruction are concerned with a central 
paradox -- the impossibility of signifying what we most desire to signify. The 
difference is that for Derrida, silence is not the unspeakable word but the 
possibility of silence pure and simple, utter non -Being. Nevertheless, I 
propose a new integration founded on this principle: that, despite its claims of 
revolutionary power, deconstruction is not a radical revolution against the 
ontological theory of signs, but closer to what one may describe as a 
"respeaking." By creating a new vocabulary, Derrida respeaks and renames 
the structure in which Western metaphysics has existed. But instead of 
creating a new order which defies order, he has cast a shadow on the previous 
structure, a shadow which is dependent first and foremost upon the self, the 
essence, the body that was there before. One can also consider that perhaps he 
has spoken for the first time the self of which logology was merely a shadow. 
Either way, deconstruction depends on ontotheology for its being, for its non- 
being, for all things in between. Derrida has given the philosophy of the 
Word a partner to dance with. We might even conclude that there has never 
been the possibility of a "right turn." 
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Chapter Seven 
"When your words came, I ate them ..." 
-- Jeremiah 15:16 
The End of the Time of the Line: The Confessions of St. Jacques 
One will notice first of all that this chapter is out of place, or should I 
say instead, out of time. Despite the immediacy with which the reader will 
stumble upon this truth, he or she will see that this chapter which is 
figuratively out of place and literally out of time (that is to say, not fitting into 
the time of the line), actually belongs here. The subject of this chronologically 
violating chapter (this chapter which commits a chronological violation) is 
Derrida himself, who stands out as a disruption of this thesis' gradual 
chronological progression through the Middle Ages from Augustine to 
Dante. However, it will soon be clear that the time has come to speak about 
Derrida himself. I say "speak" and not "write" because this distinction which 
in some cases has become the critical point in the history of logocentrism will 
now be decentred. I say "the time has come" because this phrase finds itself 
out of place in a thesis which must be characterised by its scholarly language. 
This phrase toys not only with the seriousness of my language or my serious 
attempt at language but with time itself, by putting time into an empirically 
impossible situation. As we have seen many times in the work of Derrida, 
however, the occasional descent into non -scholarly, non -philosophical 
language does not imply that one has lost control of one's language. This 
descent into the Other of language can be compared to a temporary (but non- 
temporal) descent into hell which is merely the precursor to paradise. This 
out -of -time chapter will contain a reading of a book which begins with the 
words "Avec Le Temps" [ "With Time "]. Since this particular book is the 
biography/ autobiography of Derrida, this chapter will turn Derrida into a 
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subject both with time and out of it. So this chapter begins by committing a 
number of violations, which may be atoned for in due time. 
Jacques Derrida is the title of a book which brings together two works: 
Derridabase, a comprehensive attempt to summarise Derrida's philosophical 
project by Geoffrey Bennington, an Englishman who composed the original 
work in French, and Circonfession, Derrida's autobiography. Inscribed like a 
medieval gloss in the margins of Derridabase, Circonfession is deliberately 
and quite literally marginalised. This autobiography takes the form of fifty - 
nine episodes or extracts from the narrative of his life, "écrites dans une sorte 
de marge intérieure," as it is described on the title page. These rather 
fragmented episodes act as snapshots from Derrida's life, complements to 
Bennington's presentation of his thought. 
In this juxtaposition of texts, Derrida becomes a participant in his own 
rewriting, his own objectification. In reading Bennington's text, he is a co- 
author of his own biography. By marginalising himself he questions and 
decentres his own authorship: he is not the first creator, the first to construct 
Jacques Derrida. The act of confessing is for Derrida the turning of oneself 
into a sign, both spoken and written. However, by making himself a sign 
without an intention, without a will, by killing himself, he is immortalised 
in the text. He is the author but not the final reader. Like Augustine before 
him, he has turned himself into an object which can be judged, and which 
cannot object to our judgement. 
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In this final chapter, the object text, Jacques Derrida, and one of my 
"originary" texts (a text which marks the origin of this enterprise), the 
Confessions, will come under scrutiny together, as Derrida willed it, a 
connection written into the pages of the Circonfession. It is an act which 
joins beginning and end, performed in obedience to a circular time which 
cannot move forward without looking backward. The potential for a 
harmonious organisation of this final chapter is deterred first of all by the 
nature of Jacques Derrida itself, in which the marginalised text always 
interrupts and threatens the position of the primary text. Throughout our 
reading of the primary text, we are diverted by the voice of the primary 
author whose originary voice we have already come to know and to 
recognise, and perhaps even to desire, so that while concentrating on 
Bennington's text we are constantly aware of that absence, the absence of the 
speaking subject. 
The second intrusion comes from with the text of the Circumfession: It 
is the confessing voice of Augustine, in this case adamantly secondary, 
invited into, even forced, but nonetheless intruding and invading Derrida's 
not -so- private, not -so- secret confessions. Thus any reading of Jacques Derrida 
is constantly (in the manner of a constant, non -variable) disturbed (as when 
the constant does not prove harmonious to the equation) in its quest for 
order, in its location of a beginning and (I might suspect) an ending, and in its 
identification of a subject and an object text (not one but three). In fact, the 
very essence of this thesis itself, its language, is traumatised by these voices 
which try to dislodge any notion of a transcendent scholarly discourse. Thus 
my double aim, to write about this text and to write using a transcendent 
discourse which has already been not only desecrated but also forbidden by 
the object text itself (not three but one), is more appropriately called my 
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double bind. My goal of reading this usurping discourse and writing in the 
most transcendent discourse is itself transcendent, which is to say, a goal and 
perhaps a possibility. 
239 
Derridabase 
In Derridabase, Bennington retraces and reexplicates the many issues 
addressed throughout Derrida's career, beginning at or near the beginning 
with Derrida's early work on the Saussurean concept of the sign and on the 
opposition between speech and writing. Bennington's task is a difficult one: 
to give a general account of a work which cannot be overgeneralised and to 
rewrite and rephrase without recreating -- that is, to preserve the essential 
meaning of Derrida's texts. In this section, I will discuss briefly just a few of 
the issues raised by Bennington. 
In the first section, "Avec Temps" [ "With Time "], Bennington 
describes his goal of showing how Derrida is a "contemporary," of placing 
him in a tradition both among his contemporaries and among philosophers 
from the past. This placement implies something of a linear progression in 
which Derrida takes his place at the end of the line. Such is implied by 
Bennington's phrasing of the question, "en quoi Derrida depasse -t -il Hegel, 
Heidegger, Husserl, Freud, Marx, Nietzsche? "449 Yet if this, the positioning 
of Derrida as the present linear terminus of a line of distingushed 
philosophers, is to be the aim of a book about Derrida in which he himself 
acts as the marginalised and the one who marginalises, then we suspect from 
the beginning that Bennington's goal is problematic. And Derrida, who is so 
often marginalised in a system which has refused to place him where he 
clearly belongs (in this place where Bennington has assigned him), finds 
himself once again trapped between margins, between positions and places. 
449Derridabase, 
in Jacques Derrida, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1991), p. 8. 
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In what sense does Derrida belong where Bennington has placed him, 
either among his contemporaries (Lyotard, Foucault, etc.) or at the end of the 
line, after Nietzsche? In what sense does he not belong where I have placed 
him, right after Dante in a tradition beginning with Augustine, a placement 
which defies a coherent linear order or perhaps any order. Yet by including a 
chapter on Derrida as an object text which can be read and studied, I 
deprivilege Derrida and deconstruction as a transcendent (or pseudo - 
transcendent) force which dismantles the logocentric tradition. By placing 
Derrida's autobiography at the end of a line of object texts, I de- 
transcendentalise deconstruction, or rule out the possibility of the 
transcendence of deconstruction. Derrida's corpus has become one text 
among many. 
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The sign itself 
In the section "Le signe" ["The Sign "], Bennington considers Derrida's 
comments on the Saussurean sign, which is founded on a distinction (and 
also a hierarchy) between the signifier and the signified, and furthermore 
between the sensible and the intelligible. The signifier and the sensible realm 
to which it is attached is reduced, made secondary. According to Bennington, 
an attempt to overthrow this formula by reducing in the other direction is 
prevented by a structure which he terms "contrebande transcendantale "450 
[ "transcendental contraband "].451 Deconstruction aims to reverse the 
hierarchy by maintaining the priority of the signifier over the signified. 
What this implies, argues Bennington, is "l'originarité du secondaire "452 
[the originarity of the secondary] ".453 He describes the implication of this 
turn of phrase: "il est évident que cette formulation est un contresens en ce 
sens très simple qu'elle va contre le sens même du sens. Une origine 
secondaire ne peut plus être ni originaire ni secondaire, et il n'y a donc pas 
d'origine. Comme nous l'avons annoncé plus haut, il se trouve donc qu'il 
n'y a ni chose, ni signe, ni commencement. "454 [ "it is obvious that this 
formulation is a non -sense in the very simple sense of going against the very 
sense of sense. A secondary origin can be neither originary nor secondary, 
and there is therefore no origin. As we announced above, we find that there 
450p. 41 






is no thing, no sign, and no beginning.4551 Bennington's solution to the 
paradox which emerges from this turn of phrase is to displace and then to 
dismiss the origin. For Bennington there is no possibility of the resolution of 
paradox. 
According to Bennington the origin is that which escapes the text,456 
but differance is also escaping between the text, between lines, between signs, 
intertextual, in its existence, as Bennington describes it, as a relation. 
Bennington differs the origin by emphasising its foundational quality, its 
ability to ground the text. Differance, on the other hand, implies a structure 
composed only of traces which do not provide stability and cannot serve as 
origins. But here Bennington argues, "Mais dire que rien ne précède la trace 
est une proposition apparemment impossible: elle fait de la trace une origine, 
alors que par définition la trace, étant toujours trace de trace, ne peut 
l'être. "457 [ "But saying that nothing precedes the trace is an apparently 
impossible proposition: it makes the trace into an origin, whereas by 
definition the trace, always being trace of the trace, cannot be one. "]458 
Bennington's differencing of the trace from the origin is rooted in his 
declaration that the trace is fundamentally different by definition, that is, 
because and only because this signifier "trace" means something, something 
which is itself. This self, this essence, this identity which grounds this 
particular signifier in its meaning, tying it to its definition, is the very thing 
which makes difference possible. 





Metaphor and differance 
Bennington introduces the section on metaphor with a statement 
which is compelling when considered in the context of medieval philosophy. 
He writes: 
Si l'écriture de Derrida est difficile à insérer dans le genre 
«philosophique », c'est qu'il semble jouer la métaphore contre le 
concept. Non que la métaphore soit non philosophique en soi, mais 
que le concept de «métaphore» déployé par la philosophie (car 
«métaphore» est le nom d'un concept philosophique) s'exerce à 
lui donner une place, secondaire encore, qu'elle n'a pas, de toute 
évidence, dans le texte derridien.459 
If Derrida's writing is difficult to insert into the genre of philosophy, 
this is because he appears to play metaphor against concept. Not that 
metaphor is unphilosophical in itself but the concept of metaphor 
deployed by philosophy (for "metaphor" is the name of a 
philosophical concept) is concerned to give it a secondary place which 
it obviously does not have in Derrida's writing.460 
Medieval philosophy presents a more extreme example in that it is often 
dependent on the construction of metaphors to convey meaning, as we have 
seen in the thought of Bonaventure. The absence or the oppression of 
metaphor would lead in the case of medieval philosophy to the absence or 
oppression of philosophy itself. Bennington compares the opposition of 
metaphor and (philosophical) concept to an opposition between seriousness 
and truth and, in his words, "le jeu séducteur et donc irresponsable ".461 






opposition, as has been done so many times before, to an oppostion between 
philosophy (truth) and literature (fiction). 
Bennington's attempts to define differance result in a description of 
what differance is not. It is not presence, not a new foundation, not a word or 
a concept. It is not the end of linear history. Bennington calls it 
"provisionally" a "force," but quickly corrects this suggestion upon 
remembering that force implies energeia, yet another possible manifestation 
of presence. He modifies his description and defines it as a relation between 
at least two forces. According to Bennington, differance is not a force, not 
anything which can be made to sound like presence, and certainly not 
presence itself, nor anything present. Instead he calls it not any thing, but a 
relation, a difference between things, a crucial difference which is presumably 
somehow unique among differences and relations. Like other differences and 
in the manner of transcendentals, differance is always eluding language and 
proceeding a step further to evade meaning as well. And because it is nothing 
outside of differences, Bennington argues, differance cannot be God. 
In my circular retracing of Bennington's roundabout description or 
circumscription of differance, we see that while we cannot call it a 
transcendental presence, it is like a transcendental presence in that it can only 
be described in terms of what it is not, so that like the transcendental 
signified, it must always evade language. However, deconstructionists would 
object to any insinuation that differance evades language because it rests 
above language. Perhaps we should say instead that it is under language, 
around language, outside language. "Il n'y a pas de hors -texte." 
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For Bennington as for me the beginning is a question. The beginning, 
his beginning, is always under questioning, beneath the question, yet also 
before the question. And this is a question which can only respond to itself, 
in this now, in this attempt to locate the origin, and the now has already 
passed itself. Thus, I aimed to begin this thesis not on an origin but on a 
question, and this section, which has already begun, begins with the regret 
that I should have begun with what was intentionally marginalised, that is, 
the autobiography of Jacques Derrida. 
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Reading the margins: Circumfession 
We assume that autobiography will speak about life, the life of an 
author. But in his autobiography, Derrida anticipates the conclusion of the 
death of the author -- certainly not his own death, but the possibility that the 
death of the author will catalyse the suicide of the author, or at the very least, 
the author speaking about his own death or about his own erasure. For 
Derrida, an incident of his own erasure results from Bennington, whose 
name he erases, all except for the first letter of "Geoff," this "G. ", as Derrida 
refers to him, writes a book on Derrida while refusing to quote from his 
corpus, refusing to bring Derrida's body of text whole into his own (text). 
Derrida accuses him of this injustice without any anger or emotion, for it 
appears that he has been emptied out: "or il n'a pas gardé un seul fragment 
intact de mon corpus et s'il en a sectionné ou prélevé quelques morceaux, 
c'est juste pour ne pas les garder, pour les laisser tomber comme des peaux 
inutiles à l'intelligence de mes textes, pour les effacer en somme . . . "463 
[ "well he has not retained intact a single fragment of my corpus and if he has 
cut or lifted out some pieces, it's just so as not to keep them, to let them drop 
like skins useless to the understanding of my texts, to erase them in 
short... "]464 
Derrida writes around Augustine's Confessions, describing the events 
of his own life in relation to the event of Augustine's autobiography. The 
463Section 5, p. 29. Further citations to Circumfession will appear in this 
format: 5: 29. 
4645: 27. 
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Circumfession alters the linear mode of time on which Augustine's 
narrative appears to be structured and replaces it with what perhaps may be 
described as a spirallic mode. Defying linear history, Derrida's confessions 
follow a pattern of signs which refer randomly to each other rather than 
follow an ordered chronological framework. The description of his mother's 
death leads to a meditation of his own circumcision, in an order which 
dismisses linear time. Circumfession makes every effort to defy linear time, 
notably in its title, and further in its ordering of events. The traditional 
autobiographical form which faithfully depicts events in a linear sequence is 
rejected and replaced by a form which is dictated by Derrida's will to 
circumvent or to overturn time. It seems that the pages of Derrida's book of 
memory are out of order, thrown together by an author who is consciously 
rebelling against the enforcement of time. 
Not only does the Circumfession disturb the Confessions' linear 
model of time, but it furthermore questions the authorial voice, mixing the 
voice of Derrida with that of Augustine, whose Confessions are excerpted 
throughout the work. We are always therefore invited to question the 
authority, indeed the identity of the author, in a work in which at least three 
authors appear to speak simultaneously. But to view Augustine's 
Confessions as the host on which Derrida feeds, whose text he eats, digests, 
and regurgitates, would be a mistake, for Derrida is consumed even as he 
consumes. Of this fact he himself seems acutely aware. In describing the act 
of feeding his ailing mother, he uses the phrases "eating the other" and 
"loving- eating- the -other," which can be read as "I love eating the other" or "I 
love the other even as I eat it" or "I love, I eat, I (or you) am /are the other." 
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Who or what is the other of whom and to whom Derrida speaks? At 
one point, Derrida inserts an address to the other, which he defines as a 
common noun, "god," a sign which does not designate an original or 
originary thing (God) but is only a sign which serves only to designate some 
generality which may lead to an absent thing (the possibility of 
disappointment, of not being heard). For Derrida, what's the use of speaking 
to half a sign, in which one has already concluded from the very beginning 
that the other half is absent. And is Derrida's address to the other a deliberate 
reference to his argument in "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials" that the 
address to the other is a characteristic of negative theology. Derrida speaks the 
following address to an unknown god: 
je te demande pardon de t'avouer, toi, toi qui représentes tout, en ce 
duel, toutes mes adresses, figure -toi, pardon de te confesser là où tu 
ne m'entends plus, là où tu ne t'es peut -être jamais entendue, ni en 
moi ni avec moi, ni même en toi, je me contente de tourner autour 
de toi dans ce silence où tu figures n'importe qui, mon dieu, je te 
demande pardon de ne pas m'adresser à toi, de m'adresser encore à 
toi pour te le dire même si tu ne m'entends pas, tu ne m'as jamais 
entendu, ni lu, ni peut -être vu... 465 
I ask your pardon for admitting to you, who represent everything, in 
this duel, all my addresses, would you believe it, pardon for 
confessing you where you hear me no longer, where you perhaps 
never heard yourself, neither in me nor with me, nor even in you, I 
am content to turn around you in this silence in which you stand in 
for anybody, my god, I ask your pardon for not addressing myself to 
you, for still addressing myself to you to tell you so even if you don't 
hear me, you never heard me, nor read me, nor perhaps saw 
me...466 
46532: 155 -6. 
46632: 165 -6. 
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Derrida empties his text even as he mystifies it, making it from the beginning 
an address and a prayer which is destined not to be heard. The question 
which Derrida asks when he speaks about negative theology is not "How to 
avoid speaking about something," but simply "How to avoid speaking ?" 
[ "Comment ne pas parler?"] Perhaps one can rephrase this as "How to speak 
in the darkness ?" or "How to speak in a way that no one will hear ?" 
Derrida turns his own corpus into text, that is, his own body is 
rewritten into text, and not only his own, but that of his mother. Derrida 
speaks about his body in a most corporal sense. He describes his blood, his 
sores, his illnesses -- the deficiencies which come together like a mutated 
genetic code which is painful to read. What we have left at the end is not 
Jacques Derrida nor the Augustine whom he appears throughout the work to 
be in the process of becoming but a collection of fragments which cannot be 
taken apart because they lay in pieces from the beginning. Derrida invites us 
to read his autobiography in the same way he forces us to examine his body, 
as a corporal text which has never been whole. 
Derrida locates his own conversion in his body, in the facial paralysis 
which strikes him at the age of fifty -nine. This paralysis strikes at the very 
centre of his self. He is made to be no longer himself. He tells the reader: 
la défiguration te rappelle que tu n'habites pas son visage parce 
que tu as trop de lieux, vous avez lieu en plus de lieux qu'il ne 
faut, et la transgression même viole toujours un lieu, une ligne 
infranchissable, elle se saisit, punit, paralyse sur le coup. la 
topologie étant et n'étant plus ici une figure, et si c'est une 
défiguration, voilà le trope que je viens de prendre en sacrés, les 
lieux de culte, les lieux des morts, les lieux de la rhétorique, les 
lieux d'habitation, tout ce que je vénère, non pas l'événement 
imprévisible que j'aurais écrit, moi, nommément des phrases 
propres à fissurer le géologiciel, non, cela s'est passé hors l'écriture 
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que vous lisez, en mon corps si vous aimez mieux, cette 
conversion devait être la surprise d'un événement m'arrivant à 
«moi -même », qui ne le suis donc plus, depuis le bois dont je 
me chauffe, c'est la «conversion» que j'appelais de mes voeux 
ou aveux, ils furent entendez même si vous restez sourds ...467 
the disfiguration reminds you that you do not inhabit your face 
because you have too many places, you take place in more places 
than you should, and transgression itself always violates a place, 
an uncrossable line, it seizes itself, punishes, paralyzes 
immediately, topology here both being and not being a figure, and 
if it is a disfiguration, that's the trope I've just been hit right in the 
face with for having violated the places, all of them, the sacred 
places, the places of worship, the places of the dead, the places of 
rhetoric, the places of habitation, everything I venerate, not the 
unpredictable event I have supposedly written, myself, namely 
sentences fit to crack open the geologic program, no, that took 
place outside the writing that you're reading, in my body if you 
prefer, this conversion ought to be the surprise of an event 
happening to "myself," who am therefore no longer my self, from 
the wood I warm myself with, that's the "conversion" I was 
calling my wishes or avowals, they were heard even if you remain 
deaf ...468 
Derrida's conversion defies the division between mind and body. He plays 
with the idea of "conversion," a change which we assume to have taken place 
in the mind, but which Derrida locates in his body, or more specifically, in his 
face, the point of coincidence between his body and his mind. In this meeting 
of thought and matter, the word is made flesh. In contrast to the act of finding 
oneself implied in Augustine's conversion, Derrida loses himself in this, the 
supposedly central turning point of his life. 
Derrida's conversion cannot be called a focal point; on the contrary, his 
life turns on points which are decentred. If one conceives of narrative on a 
circular rather than on a linear model, Derrida's narrative can be represented 
by a series of circles which overlap but which have no centres. The centre is 
46724: 118 -9. 
46824: 123 -5. 
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continuously displaced, as the author intends it to be. As the author who 
imagines the centre of his narrative to be indeterminable, Derrida challenges 
the Augustinian notion of conversion as the centralising moment which 
structures the narrative of his life. But ironically, just as he creates a 
decentred but circular narrative, he comments: 
Inutile de tourner en rond, car tant que l'autre ne saura pas, et 
d'avance, tant qu'il n'aura pas regagné cette avance au moment du 
pardon, ce moment unique, le grand pardon qui n'est pas encore 
arrivé dans ma vie, je l'attends en effect comme l'unicité absolue, 
au fond le seul événement désormais, inutile de tourner en rond, 
tant que l'autre n'aura pas regagné cette avance, je ne pourrai rien 
avouer et si l'aveu ne peut consister à déclarer, à faire savoir, à 
informer, à dire vrai, ce qu'on peut toujours faire, en effet, sans 
rien avouer, sans faire la vérité ... et c'est pourquoi je m'adresse à 
Dieu, le seul que je prenne à temoin, sans savoir encore ce que 
veulent dire ces mots sublimes, et cette grammaire ...469 
No point going around in circles, for as long as the other does not 
know, and know in advance, as long as he will not have won back 
this advance at the moment of the pardon, that unique moment, 
the great pardon that has not yet happened in my life, indeed I am 
waiting for it as absolute unicity, basically the only even from now 
on, no point going around in circles, so long as the other has not 
won back that advance I shall not be able to avow anything and if 
avowal cannot consist in declaring, making known, informing, 
telling the truth, which one can always do, indeed, without 
confessing anything, without making truth ... and this is why I 
am addressing myself here to God, the only one I take as a witness, 
without yet knowing what these sublime words mean, and this 
grammar ...470 
46911: 56 -7. 
47011: 55 -6. 
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The suicide of the author 
It is fitting that Derrida's autobiography is, in a sense, about death, 
revolving around death, he whose philosophical writings have so much to 
do with flux, becoming, finity, absence, and death, death being the final 
question, not spoken about directly, but which Derrida seems always to be at 
once addressing and avoiding, speaking about but refusing to speak with. The 
act of speaking with death which we find in Dante's Commedia surfaces in a 
different manner in the Circumfession, in the form of Derrida's continual 
speaking about death in the presence of death even as he speaks about his life. 
"How to avoid speaking ?" as Derrida puts it. How to avoid speaking 
about death when death is always present in any discussion of the opposition 
of Being and Becoming, of origin and end, of presence and absence. Yet 
Derrida skirts around this present issue, avoiding the presence of this topic by 
circumfessing, going round as in a medieval dance of death, even while his 
mother's process of dying demands that its conclusion be a solemn funeral. 
Deconstruction is in a sense a method by which one avoids speaking by 
speaking about writing and speaks constantly about presence, mourning 
presence, perhaps hoping for the death of presence, while never speaking of 
or about or in the presence of death. Derrida, when asked to write about his 
life, chooses to write about a death which is not experienced directly but 
experienced through others, a death which is deferred for one moment longer 
while he breathes. But it is during the long, sad process of his mother's dying 
that Derrida finds that he has lost himself, at the moment when she can no 
longer speak and when she cannot speak his name. His identity dies at the 
death of his name. 
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How to avoid asking the final question? How to avoid the termination 
of speech, which signifies to the speaker that she is indeed present, not only to 
the listener but to the world? How to surrender oneself to a writing which 
endures the passage of time, turning into a corpus in the same moment that 
the author becomes a corpse, a writing which is never forced to end in the 
manner of temporal discourse through the asking of the final question. 
Derrida shows us how to speak constantly about death without 
speaking about the thing itself, by speaking in circles, by circumfessing and 
circumcising, cutting around the question, by speaking about circles, about 
absence, about traces, about differance, about mother. In Circumfession, 
mother and death meet, and we the readers, never having met his mother, 
can only know her in the context in which Derrida has placed her, shrouded 
in a vocabulary of illness. 
elle [la mère de Derrida] prononça clairement, au milieu de 
gémissements confus «J'ai envie de me tuer », et précisément ce 
que G., là- dessus, tout près trop tard, ne peut vous laisser entendre 
ni deviner, et que sans doute mes écrits peuvent manifester mais 
comme illisiblement, suivant telle règle de lecture à formuler, 
c'est que «j'ai envie de me tuer» est une phrase de moi seul, la 
mise en scène d'un suicide et la décision fictive mais combien 
motivée, convaincue, sérieuse, de mettre fin à mes jours ...471 
She [Derrida's mother] pronounced clearly, in the midst of 
confused groanings "I want to kill myself," and precisely what G. 
up there, very close or too late, cannot let you understand or 
guess, and that no doubt my writings can manifest but as though 
illegibly, following some rule of reading still to be formulated, is 
that "I want to kill myself" is a sentence of mine, me all over, but 
known to me alone, the mise en scene of a suicide and the fictive 
4717: 39. 
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but oh how motivated, convinced, serious decision to put an end 
to my days ... 472 
And here once more Derrida speaks around death, hinting of death and 
speaking of the author who not only expects death but welcomes it, the 
suicide of the author; and suicide, too, being just a metaphor for something 
else which we can only guess at, a desire held by Derrida but spoken through 
his mother, through the origin of his being. 
Can Derrida escape his own self -presence, for he too, is involved in the 
accident of hearing himself speak, his own speech and now his own writing 
constantly reminding him of himself. But he does not speak now of the 
death or of the suicide of the author as a kind of liberation. He continues: 
le retour incessant du «j'ai envie de me tuer» dit moins le desir de 
mettre fin à ma vie qu'une sorte de compulsion à doubler chaque 
seconde, comme une voiture l'autre, à la dédoubler plutôt en y 
surimprimant d'avance le négatif d'une photographie déjà prise avec 
un dispositif «retard », la mémoire de qui me survit pour assister à 
ma disparition, interprète ou se repasse le film, et déjà je les 
surprends à me voir couché sur le dos, au fond de ma terre, j'entends, 
ils comprennent tout, comme le géologiciel, sauf que j'ai vécu dans la 
prière, les larmes et l'imminence à chaque instant de leur survie, 
terminable survie depuis laquelle «je me vois vivre» traduit «je 
me vois mourir ». . .473 
the incessant return of the "I want to kill myself" speaks less the 
desire to put an end to my life than a sort of compulsion to overtake 
each second, like one car overtaking another, doubling it rather, 
overprinting it with the negative of a photograph already taken with 
a "delay" mechanism, the memory of what survived me to be present 
at my disappearance, interprets or runs the film again, and already I 
catch them out seeing me lying on my back, in the depth of my earth, 
4727: 37 -8. 
4737: 40 -1. 
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I mean, they understand everything, like the geologic program, except 
that I have lived in prayer, tears, and the imminence at every 
moment of their survival, terminable survival from which "I see 
myself live" translates "I see myself die ... "474 
Derrida's argument in Of Grammatology is dependent on the fundamental 
opposition between speech and writing, and on the association of writing 
with man, body, matter, artifice, finitude, and death, and death itself being 
only a metaphor. However, it is not writing but speech which mimics death, 
speech which terminates at the end of each moment and at the end of each 
breath, speech which cannot survive the death of the author. The question 
"How to avoid speaking" should more properly be asked "How to avoid 
speaking and dying ?" Derrida has stumbled on the question which cannot be 
answered in any of its modifications. It is the question which lies at the end 
of deconstruction. 
4747: 39 -40. 
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A (temporary) final gloss 
Derrida clearly wants to tempt us to read everything into his life, as the 
Arab Jew who describes his own circumcision, who meditates on the death of 
his mother, who reconstructs his life in the manner of Augustine's 
Confessions, which have rewritten his life just as he has rewritten 
Augustine's text. Yet by reading everything into him, we find that we have 
only succeeded in rewriting him in our own image. At this point we realise 
that we have not discovered Jacques Derrida at all. Neither have we 
discovered ourselves. Bennington writes on the final page of Derridabase: 
Nous avons, évidemment, manqué d'adresse. En essayant de 
répéter fidèlement l'essentiel de la pensée de Derrida, nous 
l'avons trahi. En disant que la déconstruction n'est autre, 
finalement, que la nécessité, et qu'elle est toujours déjà à l'oeuvre 
dans les textes les plus «métaphysiques », nous avons absorbé 
Derrida, sa singularité et sa signature, l'événement qu'on a 
tellement voulu dire, dans une textualité où il risque d'avoir tout 
simplement disparu.475 
We have, obviously enough, been clumsy. Trying to repeat 
faithfully the essential features of Derrida's thought, we have 
betrayed him. By saying that deconstruction is, finally, none other 
than necessity, and that it is always already at work in the most 
"metaphysical" texts, we have absorbed Derrida, his singularity 
and his signature, the event we were so keen to tell you about, 
into a textuality in which he may quite well have disappeared.476 
And this thesis too, having tried to pin down the essence of 
deconstruction, has not captured any of it, but has demonstrated that both 
deconstruction and medieval thought will resist the structures assigned to 




always be a missing element evading the text, evading structure, evading language itself. And 
Bennington, in attempting to capture every element in Derrida's thought without citing his 
text, concludes that he has not captured any of it. He phrases it aptly in this closing remark, 
both his and mine: 
Chaque texte de Derrida est un événement, disions -nous de facon thématique, en 
les manquant tous. Chacun de ces textes a une adresse ou des adresses qu'on a feint 
d'ignorer pour mieux pouvoir les digérer nous -même. Nous avons, dans le meilleur 
des cas, tout dit de la déconstruction sauf la remarque supplémentaire qui la 
nomme dans les textes signé Jacques Derrida. 
C'est ce qui nous a interdit de tenter une lecture "derridienne" de Derrida, seule 
façon de respecter cette pensée en le trahissant encore: nous avons dit les limites 
du commentaire et de l'interprétation en nous limitant au commentaire et un peu 
(très peu) d'interprétation. Double bind où notre fidélité absolue a été l'infidélité 
même. C'est pourquoi ce livre ne vous servira en rien, à vous autres, à vous l'autre, 
et n'aura été qu'un prétexte dérobé pour y inscrire ma propre signature derrière, 
dans son dos 477 
Every one of Derrida's texts is an event, we said thematically, missing them all. 
Each of these texts has an address or several addresses we have pretended to 
ignore the better to be able to digest them ourselves. In the best case, we have 
said everything about deconstruction except the supplementary remark whereby 
it is named in texts signed by Jacques Derrida. 
This is what forbade us from attempting a "Derridean" reading of Derrida, the 
only way of respecting this thought by betraying it again: we have said the 
limits of commentary and interpretation in limiting ourselves to commentary and 
a little (very little) interpretation. Double bind in which our absolute fidelity 
has been infidelity itself. This is why this book will be of no use to you others, or 
to you, other, and will have been only a hidden pretext for writing in my own 
signature behind his back 478 
We should once again confront the question: is it enough to overturn this one simple 
yet crucial hierarchy of speech and writing? Can we continue to centralise this opposition, in 
the light of Derrida's speaking and writing and praying and refusing to speak while trying to 
avoid the address to the other, while trying to avoid the Other, even as the other speaks to 
him and about him, and in the light of his never really avoiding, his failure to avoid 
through his address to the other spoken in someone's else's words, namely Augustine, who has 
already emptied himself through confession and left behind only his empty corpus and 
corpse. Derrida rewrites the Confessions not in his own words, for he borrows Augustine's, but 
displaces the meaning and provides his own. Derrida, whose confessions flow like water, 
unstoppable, unpunctuated, and unremorseful, has hidden beneath the simple hierarchy of 
speech and writing a foundation which will not be revealed no matter how long critics 





"The laws of Physics... express the reason or ratio in the movements of 
all the parts, in the sense that the law relates the movement of each part to the 
configuration of all the other parts. This law is deterministic in form, in that the 
only contingent features of a system are the initial positions and velocities of all 
its parts. It is also causal, in that any external disturbance can be treated as a cause, 
which produces a specifiable effect that can in principle be propagated to every 
part of the system. 
With the discovery of Brownian motion, one obtained phenomena that at 
first sight seemed to call the whole classical scheme of order and measure into 
question, for movements were discovered which were, what have been called 
here 'order of unlimited degree,' not determined by a few steps (e.g., initial 
positions and velocities). However, this was explained by supposing that 
whenever we have Brownian motion this is due to very complex impacts from 
smaller particles or from randomly fluctuationg fields ... In this way, classical 
notions of order and measure can be adapted, so as to accomodate Brownian 
motion, which would at least on the face of the matter seem to require 
description in terms of a very different order and measure. 
--David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order 
I 
This thesis began with the writer who in many ways laid the foundation for 
medieval thought by conceiving of a theory of signs which would be 
influential throughout the Middle Ages. Furthermore, as the father of the 
Western autobiography, Augustine redefined the role of the author as the 
subject of the text as well as its creator. Through the Confessions he explores 
the role of memory and time in self -knowledge, through the acts of writing 
and speaking about oneself. In the memory, past, present, and future meet in 
defiance of linear time. 
The medieval self- consciousness displayed by Augustine in the 
Confessions can be compared to the attitudes of medieval mystics. Mystic 
autobiography is not merely a temporal narrative of the events of one 
person's life, but a self- examination so intense that it loses all pretense of 
objectivity. It inevitably leads the modern reader to skepticism regarding the 
reliability of the authorial voice. In mystic narrative, the speaking subject 
detaches itself from empirical objectivity, indulging in its own rationality. 
While the postmodern age has to some degree rejected rationalism, the 
Middle Ages, temporally prior to the Age of "Enlightenment," operates 
according to a rationality all its own. 
The mystic voice can be regarded as an authorial voice freed from the 
prison of rationality. The extent of self- consciousness results in an eclipsing 
of the exterior. The reader is free to draw whatever conclusions she wishes, 
but the author remains untouched by the opinions of the outside world, 
which is shut out as the author imagines him or herself to be writing in a 
figurative (or literal) "inner room." The text which emerges from the 
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mentally constructed inner sanctuary can only be described rationally as 
madness. 
Augustine in many ways foresaw the concerns and doubts which 
might occur to later generations. Perhaps it is this concern for the future 
which led him to write the Confessions. He willingly unveils his inner 
thoughts in a medium which would remain static through the passage of 
time, which would not be subject to the fleeting temporality of speech. And 
yet, as Derrida himself points out, the act of the Confessions "is not reduced 
to informing, teaching, making known . . . Confession does not consist in 
making known -- and thereby it teaches that teaching as the transmission of 
positive knowledge is not essential. "479 Derrida interprets the Confessions 
as the post -scriptum, the written word occurring after the conversion and the 
already trace 
without which the confession would have no sense. Without sense and 
without being, the confession which is held secret and whispered directly into 
the ear of God evades language. The Confessions is the final remembrance 
or trace of a confession which has already passed away. In this sense, writing 
becomes the last and only possibility of preservation, the only means of 
address to the brethren alive in Augustine's present as well as in our own. 
479Derrida, "Postscriptum," Derrida and Negative Theology, p. 286. 
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II 
Writing is a kind of silence, but speech disrupts the silence which 
Pseudo -Dionysius desires. Speech is the noise which threatens to interrupt 
and destroy the total absence of signs in which Dionysian discourse is spoken 
or written. Speech is also the noise which reveals the inner secret to 
untrained ears. In this sense, speech is also the destroyer of the secret. It is 
direct communication which leaves the speaker open to interrogation, 
whereas the secrets hidden in the written word can remain hidden forever 
under the protection of an absent author. Speech enables and invites the 
interrogation of the speaker who wishes to remain silent, but who is 
compelled to speak, to disclose, to confess, to betray himself. 
In negative theology, the limitation of language results in a situation 
in which negation masks yet is indicative of its opposite, the suprapositive. 
In such a structure, a true opposite is impossible, because difference and 
likeness come together in what is merely the semblance of an opposition. 
Perhaps negative theology is not a theology at all, but language stretched to its 
furthest boundaries, a language so poetic, so dependent on the use of tropes, 
that meaning cannot possibly be grasped, distorted as it is beyond recognition. 
If one speaks or writes only in contradictions, meaning must be infinitely 
deferred because the contradiction will not resolve itself in favour of one 
meaning or the other. Yet contradictions could resolve themselves on that 
level of language beyond signs in which opposites cannot exist. For Pseudo - 
Dionysius, there is no subject worthy of this highest use of language except for 
God. 
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Deconstruction and negative theology have in common a falling back 
into the language of negativity and difference in their attempts to challenge 
the boundaries of language. They demonstrate that we cannot speak about 
infinity without also speaking of zero. Just as Derrida asserts that negative 
theology cannot be accused of being an atheism or a nihilism, so 
deconstruction cannot be suspected of being a negative theology or of being a 
theology or of being. Negative theology and deconstruction are 
fundamentally different except in their attempts to read, interpret, and 
decipher the infinity of signs. Working within the same system of signs (i.e. 
human language, specifically Western or phonetic language), together they 
must function according to the same entrapping structure. 
III 
The power which enables Bonaventure, as well as Augustine and 
Dante, to make present what has vanished into time is memory. For these 
three writers, memory is the tool which makes representation possible, which 
ignores differences between the three modes of time. However, 
Bonaventure's dependence on memory is itself a barrier to the fullness of 
presence. The representation of past events to the mind involves a 
continuous movement in which the psychological Now is completely 
subjective and the sense of the present is decentred. 
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Memory makes possible a relationship between modes of time, 
between the present moment which immediately becomes the past, and the 
past which is in the process of being assimilated into the present. The 
restructuration of reality in the memory involves not only assimilation but 
also rejection, the act of forgetting. It is this forgetting which leads to the 
absence of the self and the possibility that self -presence will remain an 
unattainable goal. 
IV 
Derrida's arguments on the Book of Nature are dependent on the 
construction of another opposition, that of human writing, which is sensible, 
finite, and artificial, and universal, natural writing, a non -temporal writing 
which must be represented through metaphor. This opposition could 
perhaps be reduced to an opposition between theological and non -theological 
writing. The necessity of constructing a new binary opposition within writing 
itself in order to validate the opposition of speech and writing opens up the 
possibility that we will enter into a vicious circle in which we are 
continuously forced to create new constructions in the process of 
deconstruction. What would be the purpose of a reconstruction, of a new 
obstruction, in the history of deconstruction. What will be the result of a 
deconstruction which is forced to reconstruct at the moment of 
deconstructing. Deconstruction will never see the moment of the closure of 
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its own history, because it must always reconstruct new oppositions from the 
rubble of metaphysics, and it will always be forced to deconstruct its own 
oppositions in a play which is no longer a game but a matrix which demands 
regeneration. In this temporality of constant becoming, Derrida's reversal can 
only result in yet another reversal. 
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V 
Augustine is the author for whom self- consciousness leads to a 
constant interrogation of the self. We might consider whether the possibility 
of his falling into a "logocentric" theology is checked by his incessant 
questioning in which each transcendent aspect of his thought (i.e. his self - 
identity) becomes in turn the subject of his next interrogation. Dante, on the 
other hand, evades logocentrism by deferring his own authorship. He 
himself negates the possibility of the author as the transcendental signified. 
Both Augustine and Dante resist the stereotypes which postmoderns have 
created for the logocentric author. Perhaps we should speak not of the death 
of the author but of the death of the logocentric author. As logocentric 
writers, Dante and Augustine can perhaps be accused of a glorification of the 
written word, as poets who turn the written word not into a medium for 
truth but for the interrogation of truth. 
The association of logocentrism with the debasement of writing leads 
to a series of questions: Why would a poet who craves presence select to 
express him or herself in a mode which can lead only to absence? Why does 
one write, if writing violates one's deepest logocentric instincts? If writing, 
and by this I mean human (artificial, technical) writing, is truly regarded by 
logocentric thinkers to be secondary, then medieval literature too finds itself a 
participant in a deliberate distacing or escaping from the logos. Is it only 
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through writing that we can know ourselves, and can become acutely 
conscious of our logocentric longings? 
On the surface, it would appear that medieval writing lends itself easily 
to deconstruction, so easily, in fact, as to make a deconstructive reading seem 
rather obvious. However, it is this seeming facility which leads to trouble, for 
the medieval text, like the medieval symbol, serves to conceal as well as to 
reveal. Any attempt at a deconstruction of medieval texts should commence 
with the awareness that there was for the medieval writer a skepticism of 
language in general, not that language was inherently false or deceptive, but 
with ineffability as the final goal language was both the barrier as well as the 
vehicle. The postmodern era determines the failure of language as a 
reflection of the failure of the transcendental signified to materialise. In other 
words, the emptiness of language is a reflection of an emptied presence. But 
in the Middle Ages, the failure of language was a necessary step towards the 
transcendental signified in a universal paradox which escaped the limitations 
of human signifiers. 
Some critics have accused deconstruction of threatening theology and 
traditional faiths, and those critics have in turn been criticised for their 
unwillingness to challenge old traditions. In the past, deconstruction has 
even been perceived (and used) as a means of attacking theology. However, 
as some deconstructionists have clarified, deconstruction does not (and 
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should not) concern itself with the existence or non -existence of God, a 
subject which seems to be beyond the scope of the discipline of literary 
criticism. When medieval texts are considered in a deconstructive 
perspective, we should not focus our attention on the various ways that 
Christian belief might have led medieval writers to a perpetual logocentrism. 
As I have hoped to demonstrate in this thesis, such a reading of medieval 
texts relies on a simplistic interpretation not only of medieval texts but of 
deconstruction as well. We should consider instead how an analysis of 
medieval theories of language and signification might lead to our greater 
understanding of their very foreign and often very profound ideas. 
The logocentric search for the origin has been transformed into a 
postmodern search for the origin of logocentrism. Where does logocentrism 
begin? At the moment when Plato postulates an ideal realm of intelligibles? 
Or at the moment when Heidegger begins an interrogation of Being? The 
critique of the search for the origin of truth leads inevitably to an 
interrogation of the critique itself. Deconstruction cannot be isolated from 
logocentrism; though seeming to be its opposite, it is an opposite which is 
only a parasite and cannot exist as a system of thought without the 
metaphysics it deconstructs. 
Logocentrism is not a movement which can be traced to a beginning. 
Nevertheless, critics search for it beneath every literary nook and cranny. In 
deconstruction's dissemination across the field of literary criticism, the search 
for logocentrism in literary texts has become the norm. Deconstruction has 
become an institutional model for reading literary texts, and 
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deconstructionists have outlined the process by which logocentrism can be 
identified and overturned. In its institutional form, deconstruction can no 
longer act as the parasite which devours its host. In this case, perhaps 
medieval literature can act as a stimulus for a second look at deconstruction. 
Christopher Norris writes, "Deconstruction is most importantly a 
textual activity that works to undermine the kinds of consoling self -image 
given back by a dominant cultural tradition. "480 But ironically, 
deconstruction is now part of the dominant cultural tradition; it holds power 
in the present. It seems that we cannot help but draw strength from being in 
the present, and privileging our own presence. It is a condition from which 
not even a rebellious postmodernism can escape. Perhaps by trying to 
understand a medieval perspective we can, by privileging the past, defuse the 
power of the present. Deconstruction must now work to undermine itself. 
Derrida did not intend deconstruction to be a method of reading 
medieval texts, but nevertheless it has become one. It can reshape and define 
history as it desires. It can construct logocentrism from the ashes of an often 
incomprehensible past, making the past comprehensible only through its 
relation to logocentrism. Postmodernism pretends to be the shadow of 
logocentrism, its inevitable conclusion. But postmodernism can be the 
shadow only if it is not the origin. In Derridabase, Bennington has argued 
that contradictions in the logic of constructs result in the negation of those 
constructs. Deconstruction demands the reversal of logocentric constructs, 
and presents as primary what is considered by metaphysics to be secondary. 
480What's Wrong With Postmodernism: Critical Theory and the Ends of 
Philosophy, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), p. 165. 
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But where does the valorising of the primary occur, in the past or in the 
present? Furthermore, how have our notions of what is primary and what 
secondary changed since the Middle Ages? I raise the question, to what 
degree have deconstructive critics constructed the Middle Ages? 
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A temporary terminus 
Is it possible to be truly free? Is it possible to be free of what may be 
termed as an abiding logocentrism? Also, is it possible to be truly different? 
Can deconstruction differ itself sufficiently from logocentrism to be the force 
which dismantles it? Perhaps the possibility of difference is limited by 
something inherent in language or in the world, something which cannot be 
evaded through deconstruction because deconstruction is itself forced to 
function within the limits of language. If we follow the doctrine of Pseudo - 
Dionysius, liberation is possible only through silence itself. 
Is it possible to speak of a future for deconstruction? If one considers a 
spirallic mode of time, the future will always contain echoes or traces of the 
past. Derrida wants above all to keep from falling back into logocentrism. 
However, in its scramble to differentiate itself from a past which it has 
constructed, deconstruction writes its own destiny, a destiny in which 
construction and differentiation cannot co- exist. In this sense, deconstruction 
will fall back into the past it has built, having destroyed any possibility for a 
better foundation in the future. 
Is it possible, furthermore, to speak of a future for deconstructive 
criticism? The danger in the field of literary criticism is that deconstructive 
readings will be based more and more on stagnant thinking, using 
deconstruction as an institutionalised model of reading. Literary criticism 
may become a prime example of deconstruction, as critics produce repetitions 
of signifiers which point endlessly to other critics' deconstructive readings. 
Deconstruction as an institutionalised model of reading is not an 
impossibility but should be a contradiction in terms. Perhaps it will become 
the worst form of logocentrism we have yet seen. 
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Derrida has deconstructed those who attempted to name or discuss the 
ineffable, but medieval thinkers already understood the folly that lay behind 
each attempt. Deconstruction is not so much determined to exorcise the 
structure as the mythos. There is a new mythos for every age. Today it is the 
philosopher, or the literary critic who tries to be one, who leads us from the 
illusion of the light. The poet is the potential saviour who creates discourse, 
but one who is ultimately doomed as he or she searches for answers to 
questions that have none: How can one speak Being? How can one 
transform essence into words? What must the poet do to reach beyond 
Becoming? Heidegger claimed to have found in Hölderlin the one poet in 
the history of the West who could do it. But did that poet transcend the 
limits of language, other than through metaphor, when metaphor is itself not 
transcendent? As Paul de Man writes in his critique of Heidegger on 
Hölderlin: 
Hölderlin states the presence of Being, his word is Being present, 
and he knows that this is the case; the metaphysicians, on the 
other hand, state their desire for the presence of Being, but, since it 
is Being's essence to reveal itself by hiding in that which it is not, 
they can never name it. They are the dupes of Being's subterfuge; 
they are naive even though they claim to be hyperconscious, for 
that which they name as the essential is nothing more than Being 
disguised, and that which they dismiss as the negation of the 
essential is, in fact, the authentic face of the very same Being.481 
De Man shows us what deconstruction also reveals, that Being can never be 
properly described. Even de Man resorts to paradox, and Derrida to metaphor. 
481pau1 de Man, Blindness & Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Criticism, 2nd ed., (London: Methuen, 1983), p. 250. 
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Discourse cannot capture a thing (res) which is not temporal, which contains 
no movement. And yet Derrida writes of infinite regress, the res which is 
eternally displaced. It is in fact through such terms that Being and Becoming 
merge, that infinity is captured in discourse, when the complete 
transcendental absence of movement becomes the descriptor for the verb 
itself. 
Derrida, like the medieval philosophers, embraced language to the 
highest degree (or the lowest), and Hölderlin (or was it actually Heidegger or 
de Man ?) came near to capturing Being into the Becoming of discourse, but 
both were confronted by the emptiness in language, the fullness in silence, 
the very pinnacle of Derrida's abyss or the Dionysian symbol. Poets will 
never be happy with the naming of Being. They can only find happiness in 
the attempt. If the centre can only be described in paradox or as a paradox, 
then the successful deconstructionist must reveal the silly truth -seeker who 
speaks plainly. The logocentric fallacy is not the attempt to locate an origin. 
But ignorance that any such attempt will end either in paradox or in silence 
will certainly lead to it. All such texts should deconstruct themselves, not 
because Derrida showed us the light but because we were never far from it. 
Medieval thinkers, like us, lived on the edge of the abyss and gazed into the 
void, there finding everything and nothing. 
This thesis has attempted a joining of the beginning and ending points 
of Western thought, although neither the Middle Ages nor deconstruction 
can aptly be located as the point of origin or of terminus. Perhaps 
deconstruction, by announcing the beginning of a new era free of 
273 
logocentrism, will set itself up as a new origin from which all new things 
begin. On the other hand, perhaps deconstruction will defy a linear 
conception of time and look backwards into its past. Deconstruction and 
medieval thought have in the past always been spoken of as hostile opposites, 
the one deconstructing the other, and the other rejecting or expelling the one. 
It would seem as if their only common ground is their mutual antagonism. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, there are many possible points of dialogue 
between these two modes of thought. Perhaps these points of meeting can 
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